<249>James Hay, Earl of Carlisle, has been chiefly known in modern times as a spendthrift and a lover of the pleasures of the table; yet he was May.Carlisle as a negotiator.in many respects well qualified to conduct the delicate negotiation with which he was entrusted. Compared with the courtly and volatile Kensington, with whom he was ordered to act, he may well rank as a statesman. His tried courtesy, and his special friendliness towards France, made him an acceptable person in the Court to which he was accredited, whilst he had a strong regard for his master’s dignity, and a sympathy for the Protestant feeling in England, which would prevent him from becoming, as his colleague had become, a mere echo of the sentiments to which it might please the Queen Mother and her ladies to give utterance. When he arrived he was received with open demonstrations of satisfaction from all, with happy glances from the bright eyes of the Princess, and with friendly words from the King.[412]
Herbert, however, who was still in Paris, doubted whether all this meant much. “They do not spare,” he wrote to James, “to profess openly that June.Herbert’s doubts.they have no disposition to come to a manifest rupture with Spain. Notwithstanding which, they have promised thus much already, that, in all that can be done by other means than coming to an entire breach they will not fail to give your Sacred Majesty contentment.”[413]
<250>The first difficulty of the negotiation, however, turned upon the marriage treaty. Both James and Charles had assured Parliament that The marriage treaty and the English Catholics.there would be no article in favour of the English Catholics, and for the present they both intended to keep the promise which they had given. “The constitution of our estate,” wrote James in the instructions which he gave to Carlisle, “cannot bear any general change or alteration in our ecclesiastical or temporal laws touching religion for so much as concerns our own subjects.” Even for the Catholics themselves it would be better that they should rely on his own clemency than on a treaty with any foreign power. “For when,” he added, “they shall have the reins loosed to them, they may, by abuse of favour and liberty, constrain us, contrary to our natural affections, to deal with them with more rigour than we are inclined to; so as we may not article for dispensation and liberty to our Roman Catholic subjects, but hold the reins of those laws in our own gracious hands. And you may assure that King and his ministers that, in contemplation of that marriage, we shall be the rather inclined to use our subjects Roman Catholics with all favour, so long as they shall behave themselves moderately; and, keeping their consciences to themselves, shall use their conversation without scandal.”[414]
The first meeting between the ambassadors and the commissioners named by Louis took place on May 31. As was often May 31.Refusal of the French to treat without mentioning the English Catholics.the case in those days the progress of business was stopped by a question of precedence. Richelieu was one of the commissioners, and claimed honours as a cardinal, which the representatives of Protestant England were unwilling to concede. At last the difficulty was got rid of by Richelieu’s taking to his bed under pretence of illness. He would thus cease to enter into competition with those who were seated in a sick man’s chamber.
The next dispute was more serious. The English ambassadors offered to take up the treaty which had been sketched <251>out in 1613, when a marriage had been contemplated between Charles and the Princess’s elder sister Christina, and in which there was no mention of toleration except for the bride and her household. The French commissioners at once refused to accept this proposal as sufficient. On their side they had drawn up articles framed upon the model of the Spanish treaty, one of which contained an express engagement on the part of the King of England that no Catholic in his dominions should be molested on account of his religion.
Further discussion did not tend to remove the difficulty. “No man,” said the ambassadors, “shall be persecuted for being a Catholic. But if he goes to mass he will be punished for disobeying the law.” After this it is not strange that an assurance that James would give a verbal promise of his intention to show favour to the Catholics made but little impression on Louis. Nothing less than a written engagement, he informed Carlisle, would be satisfactory. James might keep this engagement secret if he pleased; but it was indispensable that it should be in writing.[415]
Whatever might be the value of the French alliance, it ought to have been evident that it was not worth purchasing on these terms. June.Charles draws back.It was better to go to war without the help of France than to go to war without the help of the English Parliament. There could be no doubt that if the promises solemnly given by King and Prince were heedlessly flung aside, it would be hopeless to expect the support of the House of Commons. Not indeed, that, at first, it seemed likely that these promises would be broken. Tillières, as soon as he was apprised of the difficulties raised in Paris, reported that, though James’s scruples might perhaps be overcome, nothing was to be expected from Charles. The Prince was ‘very hard,’ having ‘little inclination to satisfy France in these essential points.’ He was surrounded by Puritans, and would soon be a Puritan himself.[416]
<252>If Louis’s demand had been pressed in the harsh terms in which it was originally couched, the negotiation would probably La Vieuville hints that the demand was only made to please the Pope.have been strangled at its commencement. La Vieuville, however, with wisdom beyond that of his master, was little solicitous for an engagement which it was as impolitic for Louis to exact as it would be for James to give, and he was very anxious to secure the practical co-operation of England in his resistance to Spain. La Vieuville’s wisdom unfortunately was for others rather than for himself, and in pursuance of his own objects he allowed himself to use words which Louis was certain to disavow as soon as they came to his ears. “Give us,” he said to the English ambassador, “some stuff with which we may satisfy the Pope, and we will throw ourselves heart and soul into your interests.” “They do here,” wrote Carlisle, “let fall unto us that June 14.though they are bound to make these high demands for their own honour, the satisfaction of those of the Catholic party, and particularly for the facilitating of the dispensation at Rome, yet it will be always in your Majesty’s power to put the same in execution according to your own pleasure; and they do also with strong protestations labour to persuade us that when the articles of marriage shall be signed, they will enter into treaty for the making of a strict conjunction with your Majesty for the redress of the general affairs of Christendom, and will declare themselves to espouse your Majesty’s interests, so as both the treaties shall be ratified together.”[417]
<253>To give weight to these words the French preparations for war were hurried on. Already on May 31 a treaty had been drawn up by which French preparations for war.France engaged to assist the Dutch with large sums of money, and immediately afterwards Venice and Savoy were asked to join in the support of Mansfeld. On June 19 three French armies were ordered to prepare themselves for active service. Two of these were posted respectively in Picardy and at Metz, whilst the third, being stationed on the frontier towards Franche Comté and Savoy, would be equally available for an attack upon the Palatinate or for an attack upon the Valtelline.[418]
As far as it is now possible to ascertain the truth, these measures made little impression on James. He ordered the judges to Dissatisfaction in England.see to the execution of the penal laws.[419] The French alliance suddenly ceased to form the staple of conversation at Court, and those who were behind the scenes began to make inquiries about the good looks of marriageable princesses in Germany.[420]
La Vieuville saw that something more must be done if the negotiation was to be saved. He begged Kensington to return to England La Vieuville’s middle course.to propound a middle course. If James objected to sign an engagement, he would perhaps not object to write a letter containing the promise required.
To give greater effect to this proposal, Tillières, who had never given more than a half-hearted support to the marriage, was recalled. Effiat sent as ambassador to England.His successor was the Marquis of Effiat, a man endowed with much of the tact and ability of Gondomar. He had not been in England many days before he found his way to the heart of James by eagerly <254>listening to his long stories about his triumphs in the hunting field; but he was too clear-sighted not to perceive that his chief effort must be made in another direction. Buckingham, now recovered from his illness, was again at Court, and whoever could gain the ear of Buckingham had gone far to secure the approbation of his master.
The French demands which had startled James and his son, had not startled Buckingham. To embark with all his heart upon July.Buckingham gained by Effiat.some darling scheme, and to treat all obstacles as not existing, was the course dictated to Buckingham by his sanguine and energetic nature. He was now bent on chastising Spain and reconquering the Palatinate. These objects he believed could only be attained with French aid; if so, we may imagine him arguing, the terms laid down by France must be complied with. When Europe was at his feet, who would think of reminding him of the Royal promise that those terms should not be granted? He assured Effiat that he would stake his personal reputation on the success of the marriage negotiations. He was ready to row in the same boat with him. If the marriage did not take place it would be his ruin.[421]
It was a momentous resolution — how momentous for himself and for England, Buckingham little knew. Before Effiat’s courteous flattery all difficulties faded away, and though the ambassador had not himself been entrusted with the secret of La Vieuville’s suggestion, his presence was none the less favourable to its reception. After all, it might be argued, to write a letter could hardly be a breach of the Royal promise. When Kensington returned to Paris he carried with him the news that James was ready to embody in a letter his already declared resolution to show favour to his Catholic subjects.
James had taken but a little step in advance; he doubtless intended that the letter Aug. 2.Disgrace of La Vieuville.should not contain any binding engagement, but he had left the firm ground on which he had hitherto stood, and if he once began to discuss with a foreign sovereign the administration of the <255>English law, it would be hard for him to know where to stop. Before long, he had to face the alternative of going farther or of drawing back altogether. When Kensington reached Paris he found that he had toiled in vain. La Vieuville’s proposal about the letter had been made without his master’s knowledge, in the belief that the thing when once done would be accepted with gratitude. As soon as the truth came to the ears of Louis, he dismissed his too independent minister and placed the direction of the government of France in the hands of Richelieu.
Whether Richelieu concurred in the stringent demands which he was now instructed to put forward, it is impossible to say. Richelieu’s policy only to be known by conjecture.In the memoirs which he left behind, it was his studied object to falsify history, in order to show that everything actually done proceeded from his own deliberate judgment. The real facts can often be shown, and still oftener suspected, to have been very different from the representation which he has given of them. Instead of being the author of all that was done in his name, he was in these early years of his ministry the servant of a jealous master, who was careless indeed of details, and ready to leave high authority in the hands of one capable of exercising it, but who took good care to exact submission to his general views. For the present Louis had made up his mind to demand from England, as the price of his sister’s hand, concessions to the English Catholics which could only result in making that alliance thoroughly unstable. This was the mistaken policy of which Richelieu, willingly or unwillingly, made himself the mouthpiece. It is possible that, unversed as he was in English Parliamentary politics, he may have believed that the relaxation of the penal laws would be more easily attainable than it really was. At all events he had hardly any choice. If he refused his concurrence in Aug. 4.Richelieu demands an article for the English Catholics.the designs of Louis he would fall as La Vieuville had fallen before him, especially as the clergy, backed by a powerful party at Court and in the country, would stand up as one man to advocate the resumption of the old friendly relations with Spain. Richelieu, therefore, if he was to hold his ground, must speak plainly to the English <256>ambassadors. He would preserve all forms of courtesy, but they must understand that the concession demanded was a serious matter.
Richelieu, in fact, was not likely to fall into La Vieuville’s mistake of fancying his power greater than it was. He understood that the need of satisfying the Pope might still be pleaded for the unwelcome requirements of Louis; but he would take care that the Pope should be really satisfied. The King assured the ambassadors with studied politeness that the word of his dear brother would content him as well as either article or oath, but it would not content the Pope. The ambassadors betook themselves to the Cardinal. Was this the reply, they asked, which they were to deliver to their master. “Assuredly,” answered Richelieu, “if the King said there must be an article, an article there must be.” “Is this then,” they asked again, “the answer we are to give?” “Yes,” he replied, “for you will find no other.” The next day he spoke with the same resolution. “On my salvation,” he said, “we must have either an article or a writing — baptize it by what name you will — signed and sworn to, so to oblige the good faith of your King.”
Carlisle and Kensington betook themselves to the Queen Mother. “We let her know,” to use the words of their own narrative, “the impossibility of it, both in regard of the engagement of his Majesty’s royal word to his Parliament to the contrary, and that upon the motion and prayer of the Prince his son; and of the necessity of keeping himself free in that point to entertain good intelligence betwixt him and his subjects for the better enabling him to the common good.” The ambassadors further reported that the Queen answered not a word, though she contrived, with all the grace of her southern breeding, to look as if she would gladly have satisfied them if she could.[422]
Both James and Charles, who were together at Rufford when the despatches announcing the new proposal reached them, agreed in rejecting the demand of an article. A letter, <257>they probably argued, would simply announce their intention of showing favour to the Catholics; an article constituted an obligation. Aug. 12.Refusal of James and his son to agree to the change.Conway was therefore directed to inform Effiat that if the arrangement made with La Vieuville was disavowed, the negotiation must be considered as broken off.[423] Charles was as decided as his father. “If,” he wrote to Carlisle, “you perceive they persist in this new way that they have begun, in making an article for our Roman Catholic subjects, Aug. 13.dally no more with them, but break off the treaty of marriage, keeping the friendship on as fair terms as you can. And, believe it, ye shall have as great honour with breaking upon these terms as with making the alliance. Yet use what industry you can to reduce them to reason, for I respect the person of the lady as being a worthy creature, fit to be my wife; but, as ye love me, put it to a quick issue one way or other.”[424]
Effiat felt that his diplomacy would be tested to the uttermost. His only hope lay in Buckingham, who was drinking the waters Effiat appeals to Buckingham.at Wellingborough, the curative properties of which had recently come into repute. Buckingham’s aid was easily obtained, and he offered at once to accompany the Frenchman to the Court, which had by this time removed to Derby. On their way they met a courier with despatches Aug. 14.for the ambassadors in France. At Effiat’s suggestion, Buckingham asked for the packet, broke the seal, and, having ascertained its contents, carried it back with him to James to demand its alteration. When he reached Derby, the whole Court was astir. The news that the marriage had been broken off was in every mouth.
All that evening Buckingham was closeted with the King and the Prince. What passed between them we have no means of knowing, but James gives way to some extent.the result was that Buckingham was able to show Effiat the despatch with about two-thirds marked for omission. Yet the Frenchman was far from having everything his own way. James still positively refused to concede the article which Richelieu demanded. He <258>told Effiat that, in the face of Parliament, he could never accept such an article, but he offered so to word the letter which he had promised to write as to guarantee the Catholics against persecution.[425]
Would a mere alteration in the wording of the proposed letter be sufficient to satisfy the French Government? Buckingham at least Aug. 16.Buckingham’s letter to Louis.hoped so, and wrote to Louis, assuring him that his master could yield no further, and adding that, in his poor opinion, more could not reasonably be asked of him.[426]
To fancy, however, that such a concession would content the French Government was to mistake the meaning of the late Richelieu not content.change of ministry. La Vieuville’s policy had been the policy of Protestant alliances in Germany, and he had fallen because neither the Queen Mother nor Louis himself was ready for so startling an innovation. Mary de Medicis, by favouring her daughter’s marriage with the Prince of Wales, aimed at the acquisition of influence which would ameliorate the lot of the English Catholics. Louis, on his part, aimed also at the creation of a diversion against Spain which would enable him to secure his own interests in the Valtelline. It was Richelieu’s business to carry both these wishes into effect.
As soon, therefore, as the conferences in Paris recommenced after La Vieuville’s fall, Richelieu proposed an engagement drawn up in Aug. 10.He draws up an article.the strongest possible terms. In the form which had been agreed upon with La Vieuville, James was to write to Louis that, in contemplation of the marriage, he would permit his Roman Catholic subjects ‘to enjoy all suitable favour, and would preserve them from all persecution, as long as they continue to live without scandal, and keep themselves within the limits of the obedience of good subjects; and he will also permit them to enjoy, in trust upon his word and promise, as much favour and liberty as they would have had in virtue of any articles granted to Spain.’ The <259>wording, as Richelieu proposed it, ran as follows:— “The King of Great Britain will give the King a private engagement signed by himself, by the Prince his son, and by a Secretary of State, by which he will declare that, in contemplation of his dearest son and of the Princess, the sister of the Most Christian King, he will promise to all his Roman Catholic subjects, on the faith and word of a king, and in virtue of his word and oath given on the holy Gospels, that they shall enjoy all the liberty and freedom which concerns the secret exercise of their religion which was granted by the treaty of marriage made with Spain, as he does not wish his Catholic subjects to be disquieted in their persons and goods on account of their secret profession of the Catholic religion, provided that they behave modestly, and render the obedience and fidelity which good and true subjects naturally owe to their king.”[427]
Carlisle, when this proposal was made, was in the highest degree indignant. Whether these words were placed in the actual contract or not, Aug. 14.Anger of Carlisle.there was no doubt, in Carlisle’s mind, that their acceptance would involve an infraction of the promise given to Parliament. He refused even to reply to the French commissioners, and recommended James, if the proposed engagement were shown him by Effiat, ‘to express some indignation, and not to yield a whit till he heard from’ his ambassadors again.[428]
Carlisle’s colleague was made of more yielding stuff. Dissatisfied with Carlisle’s attempt ‘to carry all with a high hand,’ and Aug. 18.Kensington gained by the French.careless of any considerations beyond the success of the marriage, Kensington entered into secret communications with Richelieu, and was able, before many days were over, to paint the condescension and affability of the Cardinal in the most glowing colours. Richelieu, in fact, was loud in his professions of friendship, and threw the blame of his strictness upon the necessity of satisfying the Pope. But, though he consented to some verbal alterations, he was firm on the main point. The engagement need not form part of the contract, but it must be a binding obligation. “The signing by <260>the Prince and Secretary,” wrote Kensington, “was next questioned, because that made it a public act, whereas before we were made believe that a private promise of his Majesty’s should serve the turn. It was answered that La Vieuville had therein transcended his commission, and that it was that brake his neck; that the treble signing was only to make it more specious, that they could not think the King my master would press to change it.”[429]
Having thus secured an advocate in one of the English ambassadors, Richelieu was all the Aug. 28.The French demands insisted on.more confident of gaining his point. When James’s draft and Buckingham’s letter arrived, they were both thrust aside as offering no basis of agreement.[430] Some further modifications were made in the wording of the French draft, but that was all.
To support the demands of Louis, the French Government made a great show of eagerness to give help to Mansfeld’s expedition. Aug. 29.Louis promises to support Mansfeld.The ambassadors were informed that the Count should be supported by France as long as he was supported by England. Nor is it altogether impossible that at this moment Louis may have been inclined to do something in this direction. Though the mere fact of his sending Marescot to treat with the Elector of Bavaria had given umbrage to Spain,[431] his plan of raising up a central party in Germany under French influence had broken down completely. Marescot, who had Marescot in Germany.spent the summer passing from one prince to another, had just come back to report the entire failure of his mission. Many of the princes had refused even to look at his credentials. The Elector of Saxony had treated him with the greatest rudeness, asking him ‘whether there were any such king as the King of France.’ The ambassador gravely replied, ‘that he could not be so ignorant as he pretended of a prince so great and powerful.’ “That is strange,” said John George, mockingly, “that there should be a great and mighty king in France, and <261>we for four years together never heard of him.” To Marescot’s rejoinder, that ‘this answer savoured too much of the Spanish faction,’ the Elector’s reply was prompt. “If I had been of the French,” he said, “I had likewise perished, as I have seen those other princes that depended upon that crown do before me.”[432]
Such scorn flung openly in the face of a French ambassador was likely to provoke Louis to more decided action, and the knowledge that September.The concessions to the Catholics discussed in England.this was the case may well have had weight with the English Government in their consideration of the amount of concession to be made on the subject of the English Catholics. When once James had agreed to put his promises upon paper at all, it was difficult for him to know where to stop. Each new alteration proposed seemed to involve but a little step of retreat from his original position, and it was not till the whole was yielded that the full extent of the ground lost could be measured. Yet on this occasion James was inclined to stand firm. Buckingham, however, Buckingham supports Effiat.threw himself at once upon the side of the French. To him, the immediate object at which he aimed, the success of the marriage and the acquisition of French aid in the war, was the one thing visible. He knew that his close alliance with Effiat was regarded with suspicion at Court. Pembroke and Hamilton had raised objections to his policy, and he had good reason to believe that, when Parliament met, their objections would be urged far more strongly, and that he would be openly reproached for abandoning the position which he had taken up about the Catholics.[433] He now comported himself more as an agent of France than as an English minister. With Effiat he held lengthy and secret consultations, The Prince gained over.placing without scruple in the Frenchman’s hands the despatches of Carlisle and Kensington, almost as soon as they were received. Soon he succeeded in gaining over the Prince, whose mind was always fertile in excuses for doing that which at the moment he wished to do.
<262>The old king was therefore isolated. For two whole days he resisted the united pleadings of his favourite and his son. On the third day Sept. 7.Decision of James.he gave way so far as to accept the formula offered by the French, though he saved his conscience by insisting that it should take the shape of a letter and not of an engagement, either in the contract or out of it.[434] “The business,” wrote Charles to Carlisle, forgetful of Sept. 9.Satisfaction of the Prince.his decision taken less than a month before, “is all brought to so good an issue that, if it is not spoiled at Rome, I hope that the treaties will be shortly brought to a happy conclusion, wherefore I pray you warn your Monsieur that the least stretching more breaks the string, and then Spain will laugh at both.”[435]
One formality remained to be observed. It was the custom in England, as Buckingham explained to Effiat, to submit treaties either The treaty submitted to the Council.to the Privy Council or to a select committee of its members. It was the more necessary to take this course now, as he had little doubt that in the approaching session of Parliament an attack would be made upon him for advising the King to stop the execution of the Recusancy laws. If the Privy Councillors could be made partakers in the offence, they would be unable to open their mouths against him[436] as members of either House.
What passed in the Council we do not know. A consultation, invited only after the King’s mind had been made up, can Offer of the English Government.scarcely have had any real value except for the purpose indicated by Buckingham. The resolution taken was conveyed to the ambassadors in Paris. “His Majesty,” wrote Conway to them, “cannot be won to any more in largeness of promise or any other form, it being apparent to all this kingdom what promise the Prince hath made and the King approved, not to enter into articles or conditions with any other Prince for the immunities of his subjects <263>Roman Catholics, that being indeed to part his sovereignty, and give a portion to another king.”[437] It was a poor shred of comfort for James to wrap himself in. A letter engaging that the English Catholics should have as much freedom in the secret exercise of their religion as they would have had by the treaty with Spain might not form part of the contract; but the difference was not great, excepting that a promise given in a letter might be broken with a little less reluctance than a promise given in a contract.
James began to act on the assumption that everything was settled. Kensington, whose Kensington created Earl of Holland.facile compliance with the French demands had endeared him more than ever to Buckingham, was raised to the Earldom of Holland in approbation of his conduct.
The Privy Council had consented, not merely to the form of the treaty, but also to that which was its necessary consequence, Suspension of the proceedings against the recusants.the suspension of the laws against the recusants.[438] The immediate result was most disastrous to a good understanding between the King and his people. Whether the promise given by James and his son about the Catholics had been broken or not, it was certain that the promise about summoning Parliament in the autumn could not be kept.[439] How would it be possible to face the Commons? When, indeed, the bride was once in England, it would be too late to remonstrate on the conditions on which she had come; but if Parliament met before the step had been irrevocably taken, who could answer for the consequences? The <264>Houses were therefore prorogued to February 26, on the transparent pretext that Oct. 1.Parliament prorogued.London had become too unhealthy to be a safe place of meeting. Care was taken to insert in the proclamation a statement that this course had been adopted in pursuance of the advice of the Council.[440]
The chances of winning over the hard heads of the House of Commons to an unpopular domestic policy with the aid of the charms of Buckingham’s war policy.the young Queen were not very great. Unless Buckingham could escape the consequences of his actions in a blaze of military glory, he was plainly doomed to be taunted with apostasy from the cause which he had voluntarily adopted. To some extent the news which reached him from the Continent sounded hopefully in his ears. The Kings of Sweden and Denmark were bidding against one another for English support, and the Duke of Savoy was eager to make use of the English navy for designs of his own against Genoa. It was true that Buckingham had no money with which to pay the fleets and armies which he was busily organising in his imagination. The supplies voted in the last session had been devoted to special objects, and he had just cut off for five months all possibility of obtaining more from a legitimate source. Financial considerations, however, seldom obtruded themselves on Buckingham. If the war were only once begun on at scale large enough to dazzle the world, he might safely, he fancied, throw himself upon the patriotism of the English nation.
Buckingham was embarking on a hazardous policy. Armies set on foot upon the chance of future supplies are apt to be less <265>dangerous to the enemy than to their own commanders. Yet what else was to be done? July.Refusal of the Council of War to supply Mansfeld.An attempt had been made in vain to divert some of the subsidy money to the support of Mansfeld. The Council of War had replied by asking whether the King would give them a written declaration that he needed the money ‘for one of those four ends mentioned in the statute.’ Weston, who had been sent to ask for the money, could not say that the King intended to give any such declaration, but he knew ‘that it was both his Majesty’s and the Prince’s pleasure’ that they should enable Mansfeld to pay his troops. He was told distinctly that without ‘some particular warrant in writing nothing could be done.’[441]
Even if Buckingham had been able to raise the money which he needed, it was unlikely that Mansfeld’s armament would gain for him Questions arising out of Mansfeld’s employment.the good-will of the House of Commons. If the force which it had been proposed to levy had been directed towards the Palatinate, such an employment would have been entirely outside the circle of ideas within which the Lower House had been moving, and Buckingham had already reason to question whether France was disposed to give even this amount of satisfaction to the wishes of the King of England. The League for the recovery of the Valtelline.A little later Louis’s intentions were made still clearer. On August 26 a league had been signed between France, Venice, and Savoy for the recovery of the Valtelline; and, in order to prevent the Spanish Government from bringing up fresh troops to resist the attack, it had been arranged that the Duke of Savoy, with the aid of a French force, should make an attack upon Genoa, and that Mansfeld should throw himself upon Alsace and the Austrian possessions in Swabia.[442]
Whilst James and Buckingham, therefore, were fondly hoping to make use of Richelieu Richelieu and Germany.for the reconquest of the Palatinate, Richelieu was planning how to make use of James and Buckingham for the reconquest of the Valtelline. The result of Marescot’s embassy to <266>Germany had been discouraging. Richelieu had consequently assured the Elector of Bavaria that he need have no fear of an attack from France for at least a year, and had instructed Effiat to lay before James a plan for the pacification of Germany which bore a very close resemblance to those unsatisfactory overtures which had been made by Francesco della Rota in the preceding winter.[443]
Richelieu was probably right in judging that this was as much as he could persuade his master to do for some time to come; perhaps also in judging that it would be unwise for France to embark in open war till it was clear that she could find allies who could be trusted; but when Buckingham passed his neck under the yoke of the imperious Cardinal, he had certainly expected more than this.
Towards the end of September Mansfeld was once more in England, pressing for men and money. He announced that September.Mansfeld again in England.his English troops, if he could persuade James to entrust him with any, would be allowed to land between Calais and Gravelines, close to the Flemish frontier,[444] and that Louis was ready to allow him to levy 13,000 men, and would, in conjunction with his allies, supply money for their pay.[445] Yet the French ministers, who had so pertinaciously demanded the strictest acknowledgment of the rights of the English Catholics, refused to bind themselves to any definite course in their military operations by a single line in writing. In the meanwhile, Louis wrote to Effiat informing him that what was given to Mansfeld was given ‘for the affairs of our league,’ that is to say, for the support of his operations in the Valtelline. If the men could also be useful to the King of England and his son-in-law, he should be glad. After the marriage had been agreed upon, he would be able to deliberate further.[446]
<267>Such was the position of affairs when the English Parliament was a second time prorogued. Buckingham, it would seem, had October.A written engagement demanded from France.sold his master’s honour for nought. To his thinking, indeed, the only course left to him was to push blindly on. If he had had his way, 20,000l. would have been placed at once in Mansfeld’s hands. The adventurer had an interview with James, who listened, well pleased, to his talk, and amused him by a recommendation to ask leave of the Infanta to pass through the Spanish Netherlands on his way to the Palatinate.[447] There was, however, still some prudence left in the English Court. The Council recommended a short delay till Louis had given a written promise to allow Mansfeld’s troops to enter France, and to permit their employment for the recovery of the Palatinate. In the meanwhile Mansfeld was to go to Holland, to muster some Germans who were to take part in the expedition.[448]
In a few days James learned that he had reckoned without the French in respect both of the marriage and of Mansfeld’s army. The French refuse to give one.Carlisle and Holland were plainly told that their master’s letter, even if countersigned by the Prince and a Secretary of State, would not suffice, and were informed at the same time that there could be no offensive league for the present. “To capitulate in writing,” said the French ministers, “would but cast rubs in the way of their dispensation, and make it altogether impossible; since it must needs highly offend the Pope to hear they should enter into an offensive league with heretics against Catholics, and was like so far to scandalize the Catholic princes of Germany, as this king should lose all credit with them, whom yet he hoped to win to their better party.” In vain the ambassadors remonstrated. Not a line in writing could be drawn from the French ministers. ‘They could not,’ they said, ‘condescend to anything in writing; but if the King’s faith and promise would serve the turn, that should be renewed to us here, and <268>to his Majesty likewise by their ambassador in England, in as full and ample manner as we could desire it.’ A long altercation followed, and the English ambassadors broke off the interview in high dudgeon, saying that ‘they knew not whether, when the King their master should hear of this their proceeding, he might not open his ear to new counsels, and embrace such offers as might come to him from other parts, and leave them perhaps to seek place for repentance when it would be too late.’[449]
In a private letter to the Prince, Carlisle expressed his opinion strongly. “It may therefore please your Highness,” he wrote, “to Aug. 13.Carlisle’s opinion.give your humble servant leave, out of his zeal and devotion to your Highness’ service, to represent unto your Highness that our endeavours here will be fruitless unless you speak unto the French ambassador in a higher strain, and that my Lord of Buckingham also hold the same language unto him. It is true that they do offer the King’s word for their assistance, and that their ambassador shall give his Majesty the like assurance; but what assurance can be given to the verbal promise of this people, who are so apt to retract or give new interpretations to their former words, … your Highness, out of your excellent wisdom, will easily discern.”[450]
With respect to the marriage treaty, so much had been yielded already that a point or two further hardly mattered much. The French plan supported by Buckingham.Buckingham had before him the vision of an angry Parliament, incensed with him, as he told Effiat, because he ‘had so far departed from the promises that had been made.’[451] Startling news, too, reached him from Spain. Inojosa, as might have been expected, had, after a mock investigation, been fully acquitted of the charge of conspiring against Buckingham; but the party <269>opposed to Olivares had sufficient weight in the Council to make one more effort to avoid a breach, and a resolution was taken to send Gondomar once more to England in Coloma’s room. The prospect of seeing the clever Spaniard again Gondomar to return to England.whispering his words of command in James’s ear was very terrible to Buckingham; and who could foresee the result if Gondomar should find new and unexpected allies in the House of Commons?
If it was to be a question whether the King should give way to Spain or to France, Charles was sure to place himself on Oct. 19.Charles supports Buckingham.Buckingham’s side, and he joined in urging his father to make the required concession. “Your despatch,” he wrote to Carlisle, “gave us enough ado to keep all things from an unrecoverable breach. For my father at first startled very much at it, and would scarce hear reason, which made us fear that his averseness was built upon some hope of good overtures from Gondomar, who, they say, is to be shortly here, though I believe it not; which made me deal plainly with the King, telling him I would never match with Spain, and so entreated him to find a fit match for me. Though he was a little angry at first, yet afterwards he allowed our opinions to be reason, which before he rejected.”[452]
It was like Charles to suppose that his father could not be really influenced by the motives he professed, and to fancy that it was impossible for anyone to differ from himself with any semblance of reason. Yet if the concession which he was now recommending had been laid before him six months before, he would doubtless have started back with amazement and horror. He had directly engaged that his marriage should bring ‘no advantage to the recusants.’[453] As for James, a loophole was still left to him. He had promised that ‘no such condition’ should be ‘foisted in upon any other treaty whatsoever.’[454] He was not asked to do precisely this. He was to keep his word in the letter, whilst breaking it in the spirit. The article, separate from the treaty, was to be called a private engagement. As, however, it was to be made as binding as possible by <270>his own and his son’s signature, attested by that of a Secretary of State, this was surely enough to startle James, without its being necessary to seek for an explanation of his reluctance to give his assent in some imaginary overtures from Gondomar.
To his own disgrace Charles had his way. James had not strength of mind enough to break up the alliance on which he had James gives way.counted for the restoration of the Palatinate. Orders were sent to the ambassadors to accept the French proposals. What was James to gain in return? The The French Government and Mansfeld.verbal promise of support to Mansfeld, which was all that Louis offered, was plainly not worth having. “We think it not fit,” wrote Carlisle and Holland, “to express by writing the sense we have of the proceedings of the French.”[455] Louis, in fact, had agreed to declare his intention of continuing his contribution to Mansfeld for six months, and of allowing the money to be used for the recovery of the Palatinate. If, however, ‘the affairs of the Palatinate were not settled within this time, His Majesty would continue, in every way which he might consider most fitting, to testify to his brother the King of Great Britain his desire that he might receive contentment in the matter of the Palatinate.’[456] Against this wording the ambassadors protested. Instead of declaring that he would aid ‘in every way which he might consider most fitting,’ Louis might at least say that he would aid in every way that was most fitting. They were told that this could not be. In that case, they replied, they would rather not listen at all to so illusory a promise. Acting, no doubt, in pursuance of orders from England, they said that they would be content with a simple promise to pay Mansfeld for six months. To this Louis cheerfully consented, and, in giving the promise, added a few words still vaguer than those to which objection had been taken. “As to the continuance of my assistance for the Palatinate,” he said, “let my good brother the King of Great Britain confide in my affection, which I will show by my deeds and acting rather than by my words and promises.”[457]
<271>On these terms the marriage treaty was signed by the ambassadors on November 10. Nov. 10.The marriage treaty signed.It needed only the ratification of the King of England and the grant of the Papal dispensation to be carried into effect.
What was now to be done for Mansfeld? Was he, without any real understanding with France, to be launched into the heart of Germany? Something to be done for Mansfeld.If a scheme so rash was to be persisted in, where was James to find the 20,000l. which he would be called upon to pay month by month. The Exchequer had not in it a farthing applicable to the purpose. The Council of War had shown by its former answer that its members did not believe that the subsidies were intended to be expended in such a way, and without an order from the Council of War the Parliamentary Treasurers could give nothing. But for the turn which the marriage arrangements had taken, Parliament would by this time have been in full session, able either to grant the sum required or to give the King plainly to understand that no further subsidies would be forthcoming for the purpose.
In default of Parliament, application was again made to the Council of War. Payments for such an expedition as Mansfeld’s Where was money to be found?were perhaps covered by the letter of the Subsidy Act, as being intended to assist ‘other his Majesty’s friends and allies,’ but they were certainly in contravention of its spirit. Besides, even if this had not been the case, there was no money really applicable to the purpose. It would tax all the powers of the Treasurers to meet the demands made upon them for the four points expressly named in the Act, and it was only by neglecting one or other of them that it would be possible to divert something for Mansfeld.
By what arguments the Council of War was swayed we do not know. But on October 4 a warrant, followed up by another on November 24, Nov. 24.Payments out of the subsidies.was issued by that body to empower the Treasurers to advance 15,000l. for the expenses of levying troops for Mansfeld, and 40,000l. to pay his men for two months.[458]
<272>On October 29 orders had been given to levy 12,000 Oct. 29.pressed men for this service.[459] On November 4 Nov. 4.Mansfeld in England.Mansfeld landed at Margate on his return from Holland. On the 7th he received a commission empowering him to take command of the troops. He was to use them for the recovery of the Palatinate, doing nothing against the King’s friends and allies, especially doing nothing ‘against the lands and dominions of which He is not to touch Spanish territory.the King of Spain, our very dear brother, and the Infanta, have a just and legitimate possession.’[460]
The troops, in short, were to be used for the purposes for which they were intended, and for nothing else. If a war with Spain must come, let it come after due deliberation, and not as the result of one of those raids which Mansfeld knew so well how to plan and to execute.
Assuredly reasons were not wanting to justify James in the policy of carrying the war into Germany rather than attacking Spain. Little prospect of success.On the other hand there is nothing to be said for the means which he adopted to secure his end. Mansfeld himself was a man upon whom no dependence could be placed. Even in the little Court which gathered round the exiles at the Hague, he was no longer regarded with favour. Camerarius, one of the ablest of Frederick’s counsellors, predicted that no good would come of his employment. “From this,” he wrote, “the restoration of the Palatinate is not to be expected. Indeed I see many other objections; and if Mansfeld has with him foreign soldiers, instead of an army for the most part composed of Germans, the whole Empire will be leagued against him. I fear, too, that Duke Christian may combine with him, and he is alike hateful to God and man. The time requires not such defenders.”
Broken and divided as Germany was, there was still some national feeling left. To fling a couple of adventurers with an army of foreigners into the heart of the country was not the <273>way to conciliate this feeling. As yet no arrangement had been come to with the German Princes. It was not upon any understanding with them that Mansfeld’s projects were based. Nor, even if the chances of an invasion of Germany had been greater than they were, was this invasion one which could be regarded hopefully. For, of the two Governments by which it was to be supported, one was anxious to employ the troops against Spain in Italy, whilst the other was anxious to employ them against the Emperor in Germany.
There were, in fact, two policies, each of which was not without its merits. A close alliance with France to attack Spain would probably not have been without its fruits in lightening the weight which pressed upon the German Protestants. On the other hand a close alliance with Sweden, Denmark, the Dutch Republic, and the Princes of North Germany would probably have been more directly effectual for the recovery of the Palatinate. In the first case, the co-operation of the Northern Protestants; in the second case, the co-operation of France, would have to be regarded as of secondary importance.
The course which was actually taken was the result of the several faults of James and Buckingham. It satisfied the King’s caution by the appearance of strength which he saw in an alliance reaching from Stockholm to Paris. It accorded with Buckingham’s impetuosity, that England should stand alone, and should prepare to throw her only army into the midst of Europe without any trustworthy or ascertained alliance on any side.
James’s notion that it was possible to treat the question of the Palatinate apart, without given offence to Spain, was one which could hardly bear the test of conversion into practical action.[461] He had thought to mingle in a strife in which the passions of men were deeply engaged, without taking account of anything but their reason, and he had fancied that he could <274>measure their reason by his own. He had expected his son-in-law to forget his injuries, and to consent to take his place again at Heidelberg as a peaceable subject of the Empire. He had expected the King of Spain, in spite of the deep distrust which he entertained of Frederick, to help him back into his old position. Frankenthal demanded from the Infanta.He now expected the Infanta Isabella to surrender Frankenthal to an English garrison according to the treaty made in the spring of the preceding year.[462] The Infanta replied that she was quite ready to give up the town to an English garrison if James would send one to the gates; but she declined to assure that garrison against the probable danger of an attack from the Imperialist forces in the neighbourhood. Clearly the Spaniards were not about to assist in the recovery of the Palatinate.
Would France be more likely to help than Spain had been? For a moment James and Buckingham were able to flatter themselves that France gives hopes of aid.it would be so. On November 18 it was known in London[463] that, when the marriage treaty was signed, Louis had promised with his own royal mouth that Mansfeld should have liberty to land at Boulogne or Calais; that the letters of exchange for the French share of the expenses had actually been seen by the ambassadors; and that Richelieu had assured Carlisle and Holland that ‘they had not so much linked together two persons as two crowns, and that the interest of the Palatinate was as dear to them as to the English.’[464]
At the news that the treaty had been signed the bells of the London churches rung out Nov. 21.Rejoicings in London.their merriest peals, and healths were drunk to the future Queen of England around bonfires in the streets.[465] Yet at the very time the French Court had already made up its mind to draw back from the engagement into which Louis had entered a few days before to allow Mansfeld to pass through France. The preparations for the attack upon the Valtelline were now complete; <275>and, though it could not be known in Paris that the French force which had Nov. 17.French view of Mansfeld’s expedition.started from Coire on November 15 would sweep all opposition before it, there could be no doubt that the result would be determined long before Spanish troops could reach the scene of action from Flanders. So far as the Valtelline was concerned, therefore, there was no further need of Mansfeld’s assistance.
What steps Louis and Richelieu intended to take with respect to Germany in the next summer’s campaign it is impossible to say. Most probably they did not know themselves. We may, however, be quite sure that they never seriously entertained the idea of allowing Mansfeld to pass through France to attack the Imperial garrisons in the Palatinate, whilst England remained at peace with Spain.
Louis was soon provided with an excuse for abandoning his engagements. The Spanish Government at this time combined a full appreciation of the benefits of peace with a firm determination not to make those concessions which would alone make peace possible. In the past winter and spring Philip and Olivares had been quite in earnest in desiring to make peace in Germany, upon terms which would have secured the triumph of their own religion; and a few months later they were equally in earnest in desiring to make a final peace with the revolted Netherlands, if only they could secure the opening of the Scheldt to the commerce of Antwerp, by which means, as the Infanta Isabella assured her nephew, the trade of Amsterdam would be entirely ruined. On July 3, The siege of Breda.the day after her letter was written, news arrived in Brussels that her overtures had been rejected at the Hague, and that the Dutch had entered into a league with France. Upon this Spinola, who had remained inactive since his failure at Bergen-op-Zoom in 1622, marched to lay siege to Breda.[466]
To the Prince of Orange, Breda was no common town. In it was the house in which his ancestors had dwelt whilst as yet the seventeen Provinces reposed peacefully under Spanish rule. <276>Its recovery from the enemy had been his own earliest military exploit. Upon the ramparts and sluices by which Breda was guarded, he had lavished all the resources of his own consummate skill as a military engineer. “Have you seen Breda?” he used to say to travellers who spoke boastfully of this or that fortress which they had visited. He now learned that, at a time when he was himself wasting away with enfeebled health and furced inaction, this town, so dear to him as a man and as a soldier, was in danger. The forces of the Republic were not sufficient to justify him in running the risk of an attempt to save it.
During his last visit to Holland, Mansfeld had suggested to Maurice that the English troops entrusted to himself might be employed in relieving Breda.[467] The French wish to employ Mansfeld at Breda.Louis, too, who was sending over his secretary Ville-aux-Clercs to receive James’s oath to the engagement he was to take about the Catholics, instructed him to argue that Mansfeld would be far better employed in succouring Breda than he would be in Alsace or Franche-Comté, especially as it would be impossible for him to march into the Palatinate in the winter.[468] In fact, if Mansfeld was not to be used at Breda, it was difficult to say how he could be used at all.[469] Even if the French had been more than half-hearted in the matter, it would have been premature to send him into Germany without any previous arrangement with the German princes. And why, the French ministers might well argue, should James object? Six thousand soldiers were already serving in his pay under Maurice against Spain, and why should not twelve thousand under Mansfeld do the same? It was perhaps hard to meet the logical difficulty; but Unwillingness of James.James drew a line between assisting the Dutch against Spain, and sending an independent force with the same object. He had fallen back upon the belief that he could escape a war with <277>Spain after all. The fleet, which in the beginning of the summer had been gathering in the Spanish harbours, had been called off across the Atlantic by the news that San Salvador, in Brazil, had been captured by a Dutch force, and there had, in consequence, been the less necessity for proceeding hastily with the equipment of the English navy. Lest Spain should take umbrage at what little had been done, James explained to the Infanta’s agent that the ships which he was preparing were intended to convoy the French Princess to England, and to make reprisals on the Dutch East India Company for the massacre of Amboyna. At the same time he repeated his assurance that Mansfeld should not attack Spanish territory.[470]
When Ville-aux-Clercs arrived, his first task was to obtain the ratification of the marriage treaty. The King was at Cambridge, suffering from a severe attack of the gout. His hands were so crippled that, like Henry VIII. in his old age, he had been Dec. 12.The marriage treaty ratified.obliged to make use of a stamp, from inability to sign his name. On December 12, however, though still suffering, he was sufficiently recovered to be able to join his son in ratifying the articles of marriage. Much to the discontent of the Privy Councillors, not one of the number, excepting Buckingham and Conway, were allowed to be present at the ceremony.
There remained the private engagement to be signed: “I the undersigned Charles, Prince of Wales,” so ran the words finally The private engagement.agreed upon, “after having seen the promise of the Most Serene King of Great Britain, my very honoured Lord and father, and in conformity with it, promise on the faith and word of a Prince, both for the present and the future, in everything that is and shall be in my power, that, in contemplation of the Most Serene Princess Madame Henrietta Maria, sister of the most Christian King of France, I will promise to all the Roman Catholic subjects of the Crown of Great Britain the utmost of liberty and franchise in everything <278>regarding their religion, which they would have had in virtue of any articles which were agreed upon by the treaty of marriage with Spain, not being willing that the aforesaid Roman Catholic subjects should be disquieted in their persons and goods for making profession of their aforesaid religion, and for living as Catholics, provided, however, that they use the permission modestly, and render the obedience which, as good and true subjects, they owe to their King. I also promise, through kindness to them, not to constrain them to any oath contrary to their religion, and I wish that my engagement, which I now sign, should be attested by a Secretary of State.”[471]
Then followed the signatures of Charles and Conway. It was not a transaction of which they had any reason to be proud. Charles’s probable motives.The edifice of toleration, founded upon a breach of one promise, might easily be overthrown by the breach of another. In truth, neither Charles nor Buckingham cared about toleration at all. What they wanted was to make the French marriage and the French alliance possible, and we may well believe that they swallowed the necessary conditions without inquiring too closely into their chance of being able to fulfil them. The explanation which Charles afterwards gave, that he had signed the engagement without intending to keep it, because he was aware that the King of France wished him to do so in order to deceive the Pope, finds no countenance from any source of information now open to us.
Whatever Charles’s motives may have been, the French ministers required him to act at once upon the engagement he had taken. Dec. 24.Suspension of the Recusancy Laws.On December 24 the Courts were forbidden to admit any further prosecution of the recusants under the penal laws.[472] On the 26th an order was issued to the Lord Keeper to set at liberty all Roman Catholics in prison for offences connected with their religion. At the same time the two Archbishops were directed to stop all proceedings against them in the Ecclesiastical Courts, and the Lord Treasurer was commanded to repay all fines which had <279>been levied from them since the last Trinity Term. For the future the fines, instead of passing into the Exchequer in the ordinary course, were to be paid over to two persons especially appointed for the purpose, who were to repay the money at once to those from whom they received it. In this way it would look as if the fines were still being paid, whilst nothing of the kind was really being done. Nor was this the only deception practised upon the nation. These special orders were only made known to those specially interested in them. Another order, directing the banishment of the priests then in prison — which, as there was now nothing to prevent their returning in security as soon as they had crossed the sea, can only have been intended to throw dust in the eyes of the world — was passed under the Great Seal, and enrolled on the Patent Rolls, to be seen by all who chose to examine those public documents.[473]
If Charles had not strengthened his position by the step which he had taken, Richelieu had still less cause to congratulate himself. Value of Richelieu’s success.He had indeed gained a great diplomatic success; but the very concession made to him was fraught with future evil to France as well as to England. Although both he and Louis had aimed at less than had been aimed at by Olivares and Philip; although France had been content with the protection of the English Roman Catholics, while Spain had aimed at the restoration of the Papal authority in England, even this interference with the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign was likely to produce an element of discord between the two nations which would more than counterbalance the family connection which was about to join the two kings. The marriage treaty was the first link in the chain of events which in two short years was to lead to war between France and England.
[412] Carlisle and Kensington to Conway, May 27, S. P. France.
[413] Herbert to the King, June 2, S. P. France.
[414] Instructions to Carlisle and Kensington, Harl. MSS. 1584, fol. 10.
[415] Ville-aux-Clercs to Tillières, June 1⁄11. Louis XIII. to Tillières, June 9⁄19, Harl. MSS. 4594, fol. 41, 64 b.
[416] Tillières to Ville-aux-Clercs, June 6⁄16, ibid. fol. 59.
[417] Carlisle to the King, June 14, S. P. France. The person from whom the idea about the Pope came is not mentioned in this letter. But in a later despatch (Carlisle and Holland to Conway, Oct. 9, S. P. France), the words given above are quoted as La Vieuville’s — “Donnez nous de faste pour contenter le Pape, et nous nous jetterons dans vos intérêts à corps perdus.” At a time when Charles had the greatest interest in showing that Louis or Richelieu had encouraged the idea that the engagement was only offered to satisfy the Pope, with the express understanding that it might be disregarded in England, no one ever ventured to state that they personally had done so. The charge was always made impersonally, and had its foundation, I believe, upon these overtures of La Vieuville. Richelieu, indeed, when pushed hard, may have said, that without the engagement the Pope would not consent, and may have made civil <253>speeches about his readiness to oblige the King of England if it were not for the Pope; or even said that the King would not be bound in case of actual danger to the State from the Catholics. But I do not believe that he ever used words to imply that the whole engagement was a sham one, got up for the purpose of deceiving the Pope.
[418] Siri, Mem. Rec. v. 603; Kensington to Conway, June 15, S. P. France.
[419] Salvetti’s News-Letter, June 18⁄28.
[420] Nethersole to Carleton, June 25, S. P. Dom. clxviii. 40.
[421] Effiat to Louis XIII., July 8⁄18, Harl. MSS. 4594, fol. 115.
[422] Carlisle and Kensington to Conway, Aug. 7, S. P. France.
[423] Conway to Carlisle and Kensington, Aug. 12, Hardwicke S. P. i. 523.
[424] Charles to Carlisle, Aug. 13, S. P. France.
[425] Effiat to Louis XIII., Aug. 18⁄28, Harl. MSS. 4595, fol. 134; Nethersole to Carleton, Aug. 19, S. P. Dom. clxxi. 60.
[426] Buckingham to Louis XIII., Aug. 16⁄26, Harl. MSS. 4595, fol. 160.
[427] Harl. MSS. 4595, fol. 42 b, 55.
[428] Carlisle to Conway, Aug. 15, S. P. France.
[429] Kensington to Conway, Aug. 18, S. P. France.
[430] Louis XIII. to Effiat, Aug. 28⁄Sept. 7, Harl. MSS. 4595, fol. 219.
[432] Carlisle and Kensington to Conway, Aug. 29⁄Sept. 8, S. P. France.
[433] “Où” i.e. in Parliament, “il se trouve à présent en ombrages, pour n’avoir pas tenu ses paroles contre les dits Catholiques.”
[434] Effiat to Ville-aux-Clercs, Sept. 11⁄21, Harl. MSS. 4595, fol. 317; Conway to Carlisle and Kensington, Sept. 14⁄24, S. P. France.
[435] The Prince to Carlisle, Sept. 9, ibid.
[436] Effiat to Ville-aux-Clercs, Sept. 11⁄21, Harl. MSS. 4595, fol. 317.
[437] Conway to Carlisle and Kensington, Harl. MSS. 1593, fol. 266. The letter is undated, but was probably written on Sept. 5.
[438] Effiat to Louis XIII., Sept. 26⁄Oct. 6, Harl. MSS. 1596, fol. 17 b. Effiat speaks of a supersedeas under the Great Seal, of which no trace is to be found on the Patent Rolls. Probably there is some mistake, arising from a foreigner’s ignorance of legal forms.
[439] On March 14 (p. 197) James had promised to summon Parliament at Michaelmas or shortly after. On March 23 (p. 201) he had declared that the business of considering the course of the war should be taken in hand in the next session, and the actual prorogation had fixed the opening of the next session at November 2.
[440] Proclamation, Oct. 1, Rymer, xvii. 625. The prorogation was really ordered ‘for many weighty considerations, but principally this, that the respect of the Princess of France, and the reverence which will be given to her person when she shall be here, for those graces and virtues that shine in her, as likewise for the love and duty borne to the Prince, being all joined in her, will not only stay the exorbitant or ungentle motions that might otherwise be made in the House of Parliament, but will facilitate in his Majesty’s proceedings those passages of favour, grace, and goodness which his Majesty hath promised for the ease of the Roman Catholics.’ Buckingham to Nithsdale, Oct. (?), Ellis, ser. 1, iii. 179.
[441] Weston to Conway, July 31, S. P. Dom. clxx. 82.
[442] Siri, Mem. Rec. v. 639, 680.
[443] Richelieu, Mém. ii. 405; Louis XIII. to Effiat, Sept. 7⁄17, Harl. MSS. 4595, fol. 307. See p. 181.
[444] Louis XIII. to Effiat, Sept. 24⁄Oct. 4, ibid. fol. 369.
[445] Effiat to Louis XIII., Sept. 26⁄Oct. 6, ibid. fol. 17 b.
[446] Louis XIII. to Effiat, Sept. 30⁄Oct. 10, ibid. fol. 33.
[447] Rusdorf to Frederick, Oct. 2⁄12, Mém. i. 377.
[448] Rusdorf to Frederick, Oct. 5, 6⁄15, 16, Mém. i. 379, 381; Conway to Carlisle and Holland, Hardwicke S. P. i. 532.
[449] Carlisle and Holland to Conway, [Oct. 9], Hardwicke S. P. i. 536; date from copy in S. P. France.
[450] Carlisle to Charles, Oct. 7, ibid. i. 535.
[451] “À cause qu’ils disent que le Duc s’est fort éloigné des promesses qui leur avoient été faites.” — Effiat to Ville-aux-Clercs, Sept. 26⁄Oct. 6, Harl. MSS. 4596, fol. 25.
[452] The Prince to Carlisle, Oct. 19, S. P. France.
[455] Carlisle and Holland to Conway, Oct. 28, S. P. France.
[456] Ville-aux-Clercs to Effiat, Oct. 25⁄Nov. 4, Harl. MSS. 4596, fol. 45.
[457] Carlisle and Holland to Conway, Oct. 28, Nov. 12; Hardwicke S. P. i. 523, S. P. France.
[458] Abstract of the warrants of the Council of War, June 1625; S. P. Dom. Charles I., Addenda.
[459] Signet Office Docquets, Oct. 29.
[460] Rusdorf to Frederick, Nov. 5; the King to Mansfeld, Nov. 7; Rusdorf’s Mem. i. 390, 392.
[461] The impossibility of Spain remaining neutral if the Palatinate were attacked, is clearly put in a letter from the Infanta Isabella to Philip IV., April 9⁄19, Brussels MSS.
[463] Rusdorf to Frederick, Nov. 20, Mem. i. 394.
[464] Carlisle and Holland to Conway, Nov. 12, S. P. France.
[465] Salvetti’s News-Letter, Nov. 26⁄Dec. 6.
[466] The Infanta Isabella to Philip IV., July 2, 3, 19⁄12, 13, 29, Brussels MSS.
[467] Villermont, E. de Mansfeldt, ii. 240.
[468] Instructions to Ville-aux-Clercs, Nov. 17⁄27, Harl. MSS. 4596, fol. 106.
[469] The Infanta Isabella, writing to Philip IV., Nov. 16⁄26, argued that the troops must be intended for Breda, for it was not the season of the year to begin war in Germany. The greater part of the troops would perish before they could reach that country. Brussels MSS.
[470] This was probably said about Nov. 19. The declaration is printed without a date by Villermont, E. de Mansfeldt, ii. 242. The order for reprisals on the Dutch had really been given. Conway to Carleton, Nov. 4, S. P. Holland.
[471] Secret engagement, Harl. MSS. 4596, fol. 144.
[472] Conway to Williams, Dec. 30, S. P. Dom. clxxvii. 39.
[473] The King to the Archbishop of Canterbury, Dec. 26; the King to the Lord Keeper, Dec. 26; the King to the Lord Treasurer and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Dec. 29, S. P. Dom. clxxvii. 25, 29, 37; Banishment of Priests, Dec. 24, Rymer, xvii. 644.