<167>To fight in Germany still formed part of the plan of the English King, but his heart — and, what was of still greater importance, the April.Charles hopes for success against France.heart of the favourite — was now elsewhere. Charles was deeply wounded by the refusal of the King of France to agree to Bassompierre’s plan for his household arrangements, and by Richelieu’s evident intention to make France powerful by sea. He fell into the mistake into which others have fallen before and after him, of fancying that any weapon was good enough to be used against a hostile Government, and that if he could raise a sufficient number of adversaries against Richelieu it would be unnecessary for him to inquire what cause they represented or what moral weight they possessed.
That the French aristocracy were highly discontented with Richelieu was no secret to anyone, and Charles and Buckingham determined Montague’s mission.to send an agent to fan the flame of their discontent. Walter Montague, the youngest son of the Earl of Manchester, one of those sprightly young men who sunned themselves in the light of Buckingham’s favour, was selected for the mission. In Lorraine it was expected that he would find the Duchess of Chevreuse, whose bright eyes and witty tongue were inspired by a genius for political intrigue, and who had been exiled from France in consequence of the part which she had taken against the Cardinal. She had been a partisan of the English alliance from the beginning, and it is believed that in 1624 she counted the English <168>ambassador Holland amongst her numerous lovers. Buckingham now hoped that she would allure the Duke of Lorraine to attack France from the east, whilst the communications which she still kept up with her friends at home would be of service in preparing trouble for the French Government nearer Paris. Still greater hopes were founded on the Court of Turin. The restless Charles Emmanuel, who had spent his youth in attacking France and his middle age in attacking Spain, was now believed to be willing to turn his arms once more against his first enemy. With him was the Count of Soissons, a French Prince of the Blood, who disliked the government of the Cardinal, and was pressing for a Savoyard force to enable him to invade his native country.
Such were the allies with whose help Buckingham hoped to effect a diversion for his great enterprise. The great enterprise itself had something in it of a loftier strain. Cool reason may suggest that the continued independence of the French Protestants was in the long run likely to bring ruin on themselves; but the dangers attending upon complete submission to a Catholic Government were so patent that wiser men than Buckingham might easily have become enthusiastic in the defence of Rochelle. For such a defence the time appeared favourable. The Duke of Rohan, whose authority was great in the south of France, was to raise the Protestants of Languedoc, and to welcome Soissons on the one side, whilst he gave his support to the Rochellese on the other.[287]
All through the spring preparations were going on in England. In the beginning of May the new levies which were to May.Preparations in England.make up the wrecks of the Cadiz regiments to 8,000 men were beginning to gather round Portsmouth, but the reports which were sent to the Government were not encouraging. Of 200 furnished by the county of Hants, 120 were ‘such base rogues’ that it was useless to keep them. No money had been sent down to meet the wants of the men.[288] The troops gathered at Southampton and <169>Winchester were ready to mutiny for want of pay.[289] The deputy lieutenants, whose duty it was to collect the men and send them forward, were hard put to it to satisfy the King and their neighbours too. In Dorsetshire the Isle of Purbeck refused to send men at all, and the officials who had advanced the money required for the clothing and support of the levies on the march to Portsmouth, complained that the county had refused a rate for the purpose, and that they had heard nothing of any order from the Lord Treasurer for their repayment.[290] A few days later came a fresh order for 150 more men. The men were found, and were sent away amidst the tears and cries of their wives and children. On June 3, Sir John Borough, the old soldier who was going as second in command of the expedition, wrote that the surgeons’ chests were still unfurnished. A warrant had been given for the money, but it was not paid, nor likely to be. If men were to be expected to fight, care must be had to preserve them when they were hurt. Shirts, shoes, and stockings too were wanting, and the arms had not yet arrived. Yet he hoped that, when ‘armed and clothed, the men would be fit to be employed.’[291]
In spite of every drawback, the armament, with the help of the French prize-money, was approaching completion. The King June 11.The King at Portsmouth.went down to Portsmouth to see the fleet, dined on board the Admiral’s ship, and talked merrily about the prospects of the voyage.[292] The Duke followed soon afterwards, boasting as he went of what he would do to re-establish the reputation of the English Navy, which had been tarnished by the failure at Cadiz and by Willoughby’s disaster.[293]
The instructions issued to Buckingham were dated on June 19.[294] The view which Charles took of his relations to the <170>French Government was very much the same as that which he had June 19.Buckingham’s instructions.taken of his relations to the House of Commons. Both had urged him to war with Spain. Both, for their own objects, had basely deserted him. As Seymour, Phelips, and Eliot wished to make themselves masters of England, Richelieu wished to make himself master of the sea. Charles was therefore only acting in self-defence. “Our nearest allies,” he maintained, “even those who have counselled us to the same war, have taken advantage to encroach upon our rights, to ruin our friends, and to root out that religion whereof by just title we are the defender. Our resolution therefore is, under the shield of God’s favour, to prosecute our just defence.” Buckingham was therefore to consider as his first business how to suppress all attempts on the part of Spain or France to interfere with English commerce and to destroy or capture the ships of either nation. Secondly, he was to conduct to Rochelle certain regiments which were needed by the French Protestants in consequence of the refusal of Louis to carry out the stipulations of the treaty of the preceding year. He was to explain to the Rochellese that there was no intention of raising a rebellion in France on any pretence of English interests, but that he was come on hearing that they were shortly to be besieged in defiance of the treaty, for the maintenance of which the King of England’s honour had been engaged. He was then to ask them if they still required assistance, and were willing to enter into mutual engagements with England. If the answer was ‘negative or doubtful,’ all the land soldiers not needed for other purposes were to be sent back to England. If the answer was in the affirmative, the troops were to be handed over to Soubise, who was to accompany the expedition. Buckingham was then to go on with the fleet to recover the English vessels detained at Bordeaux, and, having made good his claim to the mastery of the sea on the coast of France, was to pass on to break up the trade between Spain and the West Indies and between Spain and Flanders. After scouring the coasts of Spain and Portugal, he was, if he thought fit, to despatch divisions of his fleet to the Mediterranean, to the Azores, and even to Newfoundland, in search of French or Spanish prizes.
<171>Such were the instructions, drawn up doubtless with Buckingham’s full concurrence, under which the fleet was to sail. In them the aid to Rochelle is mentioned almost in an apologetic manner, as if it were only secondary to the greater object of maintaining the dominion of the seas. It may be that doubts were already entertained at the English Court of the extent to which any meddling with the French national feeling was likely to find favour in France. At all events it was already rumoured in London that not a few amongst the Huguenot population of the South were unwilling to join a foreign invader against their own sovereign, and that doubts had been expressed even in Rochelle itself of the feasibility of resisting the forces opposed to the city with the aid of such help as Buckingham, variable and inconstant as he was, was likely to bring to its succour.[295]
On June 27 the fleet, numbering some hundred sail, and carrying 6,000 foot and 100 horse,[296] left Stokes Bay with a favourable wind. Sailing of the fleet.Except a few Dunkirkers, who made all haste to escape, Buckingham saw nothing of any enemy. The first part of the Admiral’s instructions, which enjoined upon him the duty of sweeping the Spaniards and French from the seas, could not be fulfilled because Spaniards and French alike kept carefully within their ports. A poetaster of the day seized the glorious opportunity of declaring that King Charles was superior to Edward III. or Elizabeth. Whilst they had only conquered their enemies, he found no enemy willing to meet him.[297]
<172>On the evening of July 10, Buckingham cast anchor off St. Martin’s, the principal town of the Isle of Rhé, lying on the shore July 10.Buckingham at Rhé.towards the mainland, and guarded by the new fort which had been recently erected, and which, with the smaller fort of La Prée on the island and with Fort Louis on the mainland, served to hold in check the commerce of Rochelle. July 11.The next day was spent in collecting the fleet as it came in, and in battering La Prée. On the morning of the 12th July 12.a council of war was held. Sir William Becher, accompanied by Soubise and an agent of Rohan, was to go to Rochelle to discover whether the citizens would accept the hand held out to them. The English troops were to be landed at once upon the island.
There were reasons apart from the decision of the Rochellese which made Buckingham anxious to place himself in possession of Rhé. If only it could be brought into English hands it would be a thorn in the side of the rising French commerce. Its ports within the still waters of the strait which divided it from the mainland would be an admirable gathering-place for English privateers, whilst its situation in the close neighbourhood of the Protestant populations of Southern France would open the door to a skilful use of religious and political intrigue. Its salt marshes too, which were in high repute all over Europe, would offer a valuable source of revenue to the English exchequer.
In the afternoon the preparations for landing near the eastern point of the island were completed. Buckingham, on his The landing.first day of actual warfare, showed no lack of spirit or intelligence. He was to be found everywhere, listening to information and urging on the men. When the troops descended into the boats it was evident that opposition would be offered. Toiras, the Governor of St. Martin’s, the commander who had insidiously broken peace with Rochelle two years before, had collected a force of some 1,200[298] foot and 200 horse to dispute the landing of the English. Covered by <173>the fire of the ships the boats put off. The great defect of the English army was at once made manifest. There was no cohesion amongst the men, no tradition of customary discipline. There were some who hastened to take up their place in rank as good soldiers should. There were others, and that too not merely raw recruits, who, weary with the long voyage, lingered on shipboard and turned a deaf ear to the orders of their commanders, or who, even when they reached the shore, hung about the water’s edge dabbling their hands in the waves. Among this helpless mass Buckingham, cudgel in hand, went to and fro, ‘beating some and threatening others.’ When two regiments were on shore, he had to throw himself into a boat and go back to do the like on shipboard. Sir William Courtney’s regiment had refused to leave their safe position in the vessels, and without the personal presence of the Duke nothing could be done.[299]
Toiras saw his opportunity. The French horse charged down upon the disordered clusters, and drove them headlong into the sea. Many a brave man, carried away by the rush, perished in the waters. The two colonels, Sir John Burgh and Sir Alexander Brett, did their duty well. Buckingham, perceiving what had happened, hurried back to the post of danger. At last a line was formed, and before the French infantry had time to come up, the horsemen, leaving on the ground nearly half their number, many of them bearing some of the noblest names in France, drew off from the unequal combat. It was thought in the English ranks that, if the enemy’s foot had hastened up, the day must have gone otherwise than it did.
Of personal bravery Buckingham The march towards St. Martin’s.had shown that he possessed his full share, and in his march towards St. Martin’s he gave proof of that consideration for the needs and feelings of others which is no slight element of <174>success. He refused a large sum of money offered him for the ransom of the bodies of the slain Frenchmen, and allowed them to be taken freely away by their friends for burial. He tended his wounded enemies as if they had been his own personal friends. Not content with issuing the usual orders against pillage, he directed that none of his soldiers should even enter a village, and he himself set an example to men less delicately nurtured than himself, by sleeping under a cloak in the open fields. He neglected nothing which would conduce to the comfort of his men. With his own eyes he took care to see that the provisions were landed in due time, and on one occasion he risked his life to save a poor wretch who had been left on a sandbank surrounded by the rising tide.
If only military and political capacity had been granted to Buckingham, he might well have become the idol of his soldiers; but already the unstable foundations on which his enterprise was raised were beginning to make themselves manifest. Answer from Rochelle.Before he reached St. Martin’s he knew that the Rochellese, instead of springing into his arms at a word, were doubtful and hesitating. Soubise thought that they were like slaves too long held in captivity to venture to claim their freedom. Becher thought that the magistrates had been bribed by the King of France. But whatever the explanation might be, the fact was certain that they would not stir till they had consulted their brother Huguenots in the interior of the country. A miserable handful of eighteen volunteers, gradually swelling to 250 men, was all that Rochelle had to offer to her self-constituted deliverer.[300]
According to the letter of the Admiral’s instructions, he should have turned elsewhere as soon as he found that no real support was to be expected from Rochelle; but it was one thing for Buckingham to contemplate in England the abandonment of the main object of the expedition, it was another thing for him to turn his back upon the enemy in the Isle of Rhé. <175>He resolved, unsupported as he was, to remain on the island, and to push on the siege of the fort of St. Martin’s.
At first all seemed to promise well. Guns were landed and placed in position, and the English officers hoped to reduce the place July 17.St. Martin’s besieged.in a short time. A fortnight later they were of another mind. The fort was well garrisoned and vigorously defended. The soil around was rocky and ill-suited for the operations of a siege. What was worse still, there was no longer any cordial co-operation between Buckingham and his chief officers. Men who had served in the hard school of actual warfare were restless under the command of a novice, and the Duke, with his resolute desire to look into everything with his own eyes, may easily have given offence without any intention of being overbearing to those beneath him. Whilst his own forces were diminishing, the French armies were gathering around. Ships were fitting out along the coast, and a land army, under the Duke of Angoulême, was firmly established in the neighbourhood of Rochelle.
To do him justice, Buckingham saw clearly into the heart of the situation. He knew that his chance of obtaining auxiliaries in France depended entirely upon his success or failure at St. Martin’s. If force failed, a blockade must be kept up till the fortress surrendered from sheer starvation, and if this was to be done in the face of the threatened succour from the mainland, reinforcements of every kind must be sent from England, and that soon.[301]
By the middle of August the works surrounding the fort had been completed. On the sea side the passage was guarded by the fleet, and August.The siege turned into a blockade.a floating boom was thrown round the landing-place to make ingress impossible. In order that hunger might do its work the more speedily, the wives and female relations of the soldiers of the garrison were collected from the town on the 11th, and driven towards the fort. They were told that if they returned they would be <176>put to death without mercy. Toiras at first turned a deaf ear to the cries of these miserable creatures; but the English soldiers knew how to appeal to him in a way which he was unable to resist. Again and again they fired into the midst of the shrieking crowd. One at least, a mother with a child at her breast, was killed on the spot. The demands of the fathers, husbands, and brothers within could no longer be resisted, and the fort received the helpless fugitives, to burden yet more its failing resources.[302] After this barbarity, excused doubtless in the eyes of the English officers as a necessity of war, there is little satisfaction in reading how the commanders corresponded with one another in terms of high-flown courtesy, how Buckingham sent to Toiras a present of a dozen melons, and how Toiras returned the compliment by sending some bottles of citron-flower water to his assailant.
It was well known in the English camp that the resources of the besieged were limited; but the numbers of the besiegers, too, were wasting away, and it was uncertain whether they would be able to hold out long enough to enforce the hoped-for surrender. Reinforcements needed.Reinforcements were therefore absolutely needed, all the more because there was little prospect of aid from the allies from whom so much had been expected.
The Duke of Lorraine had listened to Montague, but had done no more. The Duke of Savoy was thinking of designs upon Geneva and Genoa, and wanted the aid of an English army before he would stir. Soissons asked that some strong place — Sedan, Stenay, or Orange — might be given up to him before he moved, and that he might marry a daughter of the titular King of Bohemia, with a rich provision from her uncle the King of England. Rohan was agitating the South of France, and promised to take the field in September or <177>October.[303] Whilst the aid upon which Buckingham had counted was not forthcoming, Rochelle promised to be a burden rather than a support. The neutral position which the citizens had taken up was fast becoming untenable. No French commander could endure to leave them unassailed whilst an English army was on the Isle of Rhé. Angoulême accordingly let them know that they must make up their minds. They must be subjects of the King of France or subjects of the King of England. The Rochellese upon this began to draw closer to Buckingham; but they approached him to ask for succour, not to offer him assistance.[304]
Louder and louder grew Buckingham’s entreaties for aid from home. Men and provisions were diminishing sadly, and the work was still undone. His own personal risks he could pass over lightly, and he scarcely mentioned the danger which he had run from a French deserter who had attempted to assassinate him; but the army under his command must not be neglected.[305]
A sanguine miscalculation of the state of feeling in France had left Buckingham isolated in the Isle of Rhé. Had he not equally miscalculated the state of feeling at home?
Of one thing at least he might be sure. The King would stand by him stoutly. The quarrel with France was as much Charles’s as Buckingham’s. July.The King’s eagerness to support the expedition.No sooner therefore had the fleet left Portsmouth than Charles threw himself with unwonted vigour into the conduct of affairs. Up to this time he had been content to leave everything to Buckingham’s energetic impulse. If he appeared on rare occasions at the Council table, it was but to give the sanction of his authority to schemes which Buckingham would <178>have to carry into effect. In Buckingham’s absence the duty of rousing the sluggish from their apathy and directing the energies of the active devolved upon him alone.
As far as urgency went Charles left little to be desired by his favourite. Marlborough and Weston, whose business it was, as Treasurer and Chancellor of the Exchequer, to furnish supplies, were not long in feeling the application of the spur. “I will not think,” July 17.wrote Charles on July 17, “that now, in my absence, delaying answers will serve me.” Ten days later, finding that nothing had been done, he sent Carlisle to see what they were about. “I confess,” he complained, “these delays make me impatient even almost beyond patience, if I did not hope that the goodness of your answer should in some measure recompense the slowness of it. One item, and so an end. Let not my monies go wrong ways.”[306]
Such exhortations were of little avail. Charles could call upon others to do the work, but he had no practical suggestion of his own to give. Difficulties of the Exchequer.Yet the position of the Exchequer was one in which a single practical suggestion would be worth a whole torrent of exhortations. The great source which had made the fitting out of the expedition possible — the sale of French prize goods — had suddenly dried up. The supremacy of the English at sea was so complete that the enemy’s vessels refused to venture from their harbours. The only resource left was the loan money. Since Buckingham’s departure the loan money had been gathered in with a more unsparing hand. Many gentlemen in custody were sent into places of confinement in counties as far distant from their own homes as possible, so as to be a standing token of his Majesty’s displeasure, and fresh batches of refusers were summoned before the Council.[307] For the present this rough discipline was successful. A large part of the loan was paid, grudgingly and angrily no doubt, but still it was paid. On July 17, 240,000l. had thus come into the Exchequer.[308]
<179>It was like pouring water on the sand. The money was paid out as soon as it was paid in. 10,000l. a month by estimate, amounting to nearer 12,000l. in practice,[309] had to be paid for Sir Charles Morgan’s troops in the Danish service, and claims of all kinds arising from the fitting out of the expedition had to be paid by the help of the loan.
Immediately upon the sailing of the fleet the Council had come to the conclusion that 2,000 recruits should be levied, and some days later it was agreed to be necessary to spend 12,615l. upon provisions for the seamen already at Rhé.[310] The money was not to be found. Marlborough was too old to lay the difficulty very deeply to heart, and took refuge in telling all applicants for payment that their case would be taken into consideration to-morrow.[311] Weston growled over every penny he was called upon to spend, but was powerless to raise supplies from an alienated nation. Ordinary applicants for money due to them were driven to despair. One of them declared that when he waited on the Lord Treasurer he was treated ‘like a cur sent by a dog,’ and ordered out of the room; when he applied to the Chancellor of the Exchequer he was set upon like a bear tied to the stake.[312] The King could not be treated thus; but if he met with more civil treatment, he did not get more money than his subjects.
On August 1 Charles wrote again. Becher had come from Rhé to urge on the reinforcements. The Council had at last despatched August.Fresh urgency of the King.orders for the levy of the 2,000 men, and there was a talk of finding half the sum needed for the provisions for the sailors.[313] Charles took even this as a promise of better things, and charged his officers to go on in the course they were pursuing. “For if,” he wrote, “Buckingham should not now be supplied, not in show but substantially, having so bravely, and, I thank God, <180>successfully begun his expedition, it were an irrecoverable shame to me and all this nation; and those that either hinders, or, according to their several places, furthers not this action as much as they may, deserves to make their end at Tyburn, or some such place; but I hope better things of you.”[314]
Something at last was to come of all these consultations. The King was able to announce to Buckingham on August 13, that Reinforcements promised.in eight days Becher would sail with provisions and 400 recruits, as well as with 14,000l. of ready money. Two thousand men were to follow on September 10. Two thousand more were getting ready in Scotland.[315] Besides this, a fresh force of about the same number was in an advanced state of preparation.
The King’s calculations had outstripped reality. More than three weeks passed before the money was actually provided,[316] and Progress of the siege.contrary winds prevented Becher from sailing till September 16. He arrived at the Isle of Rhé on the 25th.[317] An Irish regiment had anticipated him, and had joined the army in the beginning of the month.[318]
When Becher landed, matters were looking more hopefully for the besiegers. The recruits had done something towards filling up the gaps in the English ranks. Food was known to be scarce within the citadel, and desertions were becoming numerous. Buckingham, at least, cannot be accused of misunderstanding the requirements of his position. Everything, he knew, depended upon keeping up the strength of the army and stopping the ingress of supplies by sea. He erected a floating battery to watch the sea face of the fort, and when this was broken down by the violence of the waves he barred the passage with a strong boom which, though it was in its turn <181>snapped by the beating waters, was subsequently replaced by a barrier of hawsers stretched from ship to ship.
These failures increased the gloom which was spreading in the army. Sir John Borough, Buckingham’s second in command, September.Difficulties of the siege.had been killed by a shot. The hot words which had caused a rupture between him and the Duke had been long ago forgiven, and the two had worked together in the face of difficulty. Buckingham did not conceal from himself the extent of the danger. The French army was gathering on the opposite coast, and if it should effect a landing before the fort surrendered, he would hardly be able to meet it. One attempt at negotiation was tried by Buckingham. Sending his kinsman Ashburnham to Paris, on September 4, he made overtures for peace. The suggestion was taken by the French Government as a confession of weakness. Ashburnham was told that as long as an English soldier stood upon French soil, no peace was to be had.[319] Even before this answer reached Buckingham he was crying out for further reinforcements to be sent at all costs.[320] “The army,” wrote Sir Edward Conway on September 20 to his father the Secretary, “grows every day weaker; our victuals waste, our purses are empty, ammunition consumes, winter grows, our enemies increase in number and power; we hear nothing from England.”[321]
A week later confidence had returned. With the exception of a few boats which had slipped in from time to time, all attempts at victualling St. Martin’s had hitherto been baffled. Deserters were thrust back into the fort, to increase the number of mouths. On the 25th a request that a gentleman might be sent out ‘to treat of a matter of importance,’ was refused unless he came to treat for a surrender. All men in the English camp were ‘full of hope and confidence.’ Sept. 27.Proposed surrender of the fort.On the 27th the offer to surrender was actually made. The officers who brought it were to come back in the afternoon to specify the conditions. When the appointed hour arrived, a <182>message was brought asking for a further delay till the next morning.[322] In three days more the provisions of the defenders would be exhausted.[323]
Much, however, might be done before the next morning dawned. A flotilla of thirty-five boats had been hindered by contrary winds from attempting to bring relief to the garrison. On the 27th, while Toiras was negotiating, the wind changed and blew strongly from the north-west. The night was dark and gloomy, and the waves were running high. About three hours after midnight, the Frenchmen, guided by beacon fires within the fort, Sept. 28.The fort supplied.dashed into the heart of the English fleet. Buckingham, roused by the firing, hurried on board. The combat was carried on almost at hazard in the thick gloom. At one point the hawsers which defended the passage were severed, and twenty-nine boats laden with supplies succeeded in depositing their precious burden under the walls of the fortress. After morning dawned a fire-ship was sent in after them by the besiegers; but the wind had dropped and the garrison had no difficulty in thrusting off the dangerous assailant. In the afternoon a second fire-ship was let loose, with much the same result. Buckingham had all his work to recommence.[324]
On the 29th a council of war was summoned to consider what was now to be done. Sept. 29.A council of war resolves to abandon the siege.The citadel had been furnished with supplies which would last for more than a month. The delay could not be a long one. Yet the prospects of the besiegers were not promising. Sickness was making sad havoc in the ranks, and there were <183>only 5,000 men fit for duty. The winter was coming on, and it would be harder than ever to watch the access to the fort; provisions were growing scarce, and as only unground corn had been sent out,[325] whenever the wind lulled the windmills were rendered useless and the men were all but starved. The French forces on the mainland were gathering thickly, and an attempt to relieve the garrison might be expected at any moment.
On these grounds the council of war unanimously voted for giving up the attempt. Buckingham reluctantly gave his consent, and part of the siege material was carried on board ship. Before long new considerations were presented. Soubise and the Rochellese pleaded hard for delay. Their town was by this time girt about with the entrenchments of the Royal army, and they knew that they must make their choice between submission to their own King and a thorough alliance with England. They offered to find quarters in the city for a thousand sick men, to supply the troops with provisions, and to send boats to assist in guarding the approach to St. Martin’s. Nor did the offer of the Rochellese stand alone. Dulbier, Mansfeld’s old commissary-general, who was now Buckingham’s chief military adviser, brought news from England that the long-wished-for reinforcements would soon be on the way. The Earl of Holland was coming with supplies in men and money which would make the army safe for the winter.[326]
The council of war was Oct. 3.It retracts its opinion.again summoned on October 3. With only one dissentient voice it retracted its former decision and voted for a continuance of the siege.[327]
The resolution thus taken has been severely criticised. It is possible that the officers may have yielded, against their better judgment, to Buckingham’s urgency; but even if this were the <184>case it would have been hard to affirm that the military situation was already desperate. October had been marked out for Rohan’s rising, and if that rising were to take place, the French commanders, with a fortified city before them, would be in no position to send further aid to St. Martin’s. Even if Rohan’s rising came to nothing, Holland’s reinforcement, if it really arrived, would place any landing of French troops out of the question. The 6,000 foot and 300 horse which the enemy was preparing to throw upon the Isle of Rhé, would indeed be a formidable diversion to Buckingham’s 5,000 soldiers; but they would be powerless in the face of the 13,000 which the army was expected to number upon Holland’s arrival;[328] and, indeed, there is every reason to believe that if the reinforcements had been furnished promptly no attempt would have been made by the French to land troops on the island at all.[329] The only question would, then, be whether, with greater care and a larger number of ships, it would be possible to frustrate any fresh attempt to revictual the fort.
The difficulties before Buckingham, in short, were, in October as they had been in August, rather political than military. Rohan, indeed, Rohan’s insurrection.kept his word, and before the end of October was at the head of 5,500 men.[330] In his own country, and in the midst of a Protestant population, he could not but meet with some support, but there was no general enthusiasm in his cause. Buckingham’s theory that Richelieu was bent upon the suppression of Protestantism as a religion, in order to please the Pope, was entirely at variance with fact. The assurances of the French Government that only the political independence of the Protestant towns was at stake, found ready credence.
<185>Disappointed of the support which he had looked for from the French Protestants, Buckingham was equally disappointed in his hopes of a French aristocratic rebellion. Montague had been Oct. 13.Montague again at Turin.sent back to Turin, and on October 13 he reported that the Duke of Chevreuse had made up his quarrel with Richelieu, that the Duke of Savoy and the Count of Soissons talked much of an attack upon France, but that they would do nothing till St. Martin’s was taken. “Your Majesty’s present undertakings,” was Montague’s conclusion, “grow upon their own roots, and can be nourished by nothing but their own natural heat and vigour.”[331]
His Majesty’s undertakings had, indeed, need of all the heat and vigour obtainable. Before the middle of September it was known that Failure of the negotiation with Spain.the negotiation carried on by Gerbier and Rubens had broken down utterly.[332] It would be well if Olivares did not send an actual reinforcement to the French army before Rochelle. While all Charles’s attention was thus directed to the Isle of Rhé, the fortunes of the King of Denmark were Misfortunes of the King of Denmark.crumbling away in North Germany. England had helped him just enough to spur him on to the enterprise, not enough to save him from ruin. Even if Morgan’s troops had been duly paid, they formed but a slight instalment of the aid which Charles had promised at the beginning of the war. In point of fact pay came to the poor men with the greatest irregularity. On July 23 July.Morgan’s regiments.Morgan reported, from his post near Bremen, that his men would probably refuse to fight if the enemy attacked them.[333] Just as Buckingham was sailing, his confidant, Edward Clarke, was sent to the King of Denmark to assure him that order was taken for the money, and to console him for the past by informing him that the expedition to Rhé had been sent out ‘to weaken and divert our joint enemies, that our burden might be easier to our dear uncle.’ The uncle must have been possessed of no <186>inconsiderable control over his temper if he did not burst out into angry reproaches when he received the message.[334]
Clarke reached the seat of war with a month’s pay just in time to prevent Morgan’s regiment from breaking up; but he might as well have left the 1,400 recruits he brought at home. No sooner had they set foot on shore than they deserted in troops of a hundred or two at a time, to hire themselves out to other masters who knew the value of a soldier. The one service which was plainly intolerable to an Englishman, was the service of the King of England. Some of them were recaptured and brought back to their colours, but it was easy to foretell that they would be at best of little use in the field.[335]
At last the crisis was come. A peace with Bethlen Gabor had released Wallenstein from Hungary. Crushing the Danish garrisons in Silesia as he passed, September.The King of Denmark overpowered.he met Tilly at Lauenburg towards the end of August. The plan of the joint campaign was soon arranged. Christian, with his finances in disorder and his forces diminished, dared not offer resistance. Only 8,000 men gathered round his standards. Throwing them into garrisons as best he might, he took ship at Glückstadt and fled hurriedly to his islands. On August 28 Wallenstein was marching past Hamburg at the head of 25,000 men. A few days later one of his lieutenants smote heavily upon the Margrave of Baden at Heiligenhafen. Excepting three or four fortified towns there was nothing to resist the Imperialists but the ocean.[336]
The remnants of Morgan’s men were called across the Elbe. The money brought by Clarke had proved useless. There was some Misery of Morgan’s men.confusion in the accounts, and the merchant who was to pay the bills of exchange refused to do so. Morgan borrowed 3,000 dollars on his own credit; but this would not last long. “What service,” he wrote in despair, “can the King expect or draw from these unwilling men? Thus I have been vexed all this summer, and could do nothing but what pleased them. Their officers had little <187>command over them, and by these reasons the King had no great services from us. … I could have wished our men had died at the point of the sword, rather than live to see those miseries we are in, and like to be still worse.”[337]
It was not owing to Charles’s wisdom that he had war with only half Europe on his hands. The art of giving up his rights from Blockade of Hamburg.motives of policy was entirely unknown to him. All through the summer, when it was of the utmost importance to conciliate the Germans of the North, an English fleet, under Sir Sackville Trevor, had been lying off the Elbe and stopping the whole commerce of Hamburg by prohibiting trade with France or Spain. At last Trevor was recalled, to take measures against a State more powerful than Hamburg. When Carleton was sent to the Hague, he was ordered to watch the progress of some ships which were building in Holland for the French, and to remonstrate with the Dutch on the use which was being made of their harbours. Carleton’s remonstrances proving fruitless, Trevor was ordered to sail into the Texel and bring out every French vessel that he could find. On the night of September 27, whilst the French boats were dashing in to relieve St. Martin’s, Trevor sailed along the front of the Dutch vessels at anchor. Ranging up unexpectedly alongside of a French ship A French ship seized in the Texel.he poured a broadside into her. She was but half-manned, and her captain hastily struck his colours. The next morning, before the Dutch authorities had time to remonstrate, Trevor set sail with his prize to the English coast, leaving Captain Alleyne behind him, with orders to look out for other French ships which were known to be fitting out in Holland.[338]
If the Dutch had been as easy to provoke as Charles or Louis, so flagrant a violation of a neutral harbour might easily have brought on an open rupture. The Dutch, however, wished merely to draw as much assistance as possible from each of the rival nations. To please the French they sent a <188>commission to the Texel to seize upon Alleyne’s ships; but at the same time the Prince of Orange sent a secret message to Carleton, urging him to direct Alleyne to be gone before the Commissioners arrived, and suggesting that, ‘for fashion’s sake,’ Alleyne and the Dutch officials should fire in the air over one another’s heads as he sailed out of the harbour.[339] The imperturbable refusal of the Dutch to take offence is the more noteworthy, as Charles, weary with their delay in giving him satisfaction for the Amboyna massacre, had just seized upon three Dutch East Indiamen, and had lodged them safely under the guns of Portsmouth.
All these tidings of failure before the enemy and provocation to allies came dropping in upon the ears of Englishmen during the month of October, whilst October.State of feeling in England.the Government was straining every nerve to get ready the reinforcements for Buckingham. What wonder if the feeling against Buckingham grew more bitter every day? So strong was it that it left its impression even on the letters of those who were nearest and dearest to the absent man. His wife, whose clinging tenderness was not to be turned aside by his many infidelities, had been saddened by the absence of him who was to her the head and front of all mankind. He had promised to see her Letters of the Duchess of Buckingham.before he went, and he had broken his promise. “For my part,” she wrote when she first knew that he had slipped away from her, “I have been a very miserable woman hitherto, that never could have you keep at home. But now I will ever look to be so, until some blessed occasion comes to draw you quite from the Court. For there is none more miserable than I am now; and till you leave this life of a courtier, which you have been ever since I knew you, I shall ever think myself unhappy.”[340] After the bad news of the introduction of supplies, a sense of her husband’s personal danger mingled with the thought of her own loneliness. Some hint he seems to have given of an intention of throwing himself into <189>Rochelle. Against this, in writing to Dr. Moore, a physician in the camp, she protests with her whole soul. “I should think myself,” she says, “the most miserablest woman in the world if my lord should go into the main land; for though God has blessed him hitherto beyond all imagination in this action, yet I hope he will not still run on in that hope to venture himself beyond all discretion; and I hope this journey hath not made him a Puritan, to believe in predestination. I pray keep him from being too venturous, for it does not belong to a general to walk trenches; therefore have a care of him. I will assure you by this action he is not any whit the more popular man than when he went; therefore you may see whether these people be worthy for him to venture his life for.”[341]
Buckingham’s mother, as a good Catholic, wrote in another tone, scolding her son for his blindness and presumption. “Dear mother,” Buckingham’s correspondents.he had written from Rhé, “I am so full of business as hardly have I time to say my prayers, but hardly passes an hour that I perceive not His protecting hand over me, which makes me have recourse to your prayers to assist me in so great a duty. For my coming home, till I have means from England wherewithal to settle this army here, I cannot with any honour leave them. If it be possible for you to lend me some money, do it.”[342] The Countess had plenty of good advice to give, but no money. “I am very sorry,” she wrote, “you have entered into so great a business, and so little care to supply your wants, as you see by the haste that is made to you. I hope your eyes will be opened to see what a great gulf of businesses you have put yourself into, and so little regarded at home, where all is merry and well pleased, though the ships be not victualled as yet, nor mariners to go with them. As for moneys, the kingdom will not supply your expenses, and every man groans under the burden of the times. At your departure from me, you told me <190>you went to make peace, but it was not from your heart. This is not the way; for you to embroil the whole Christian world in war, and then to declare it for religion, and make God a party to these woful affairs, so far from God as light from darkness, and the highway to make all Christian princes to bend their forces against us, that otherwise, in policy, would have taken our parts.”[343]
Most of Buckingham’s correspondents, however, wrote in a different strain. The Earl of Exeter told him that his success at Rhé was ‘miraculous.’ Dorset assured him that he had only to let him know his will, for if he failed to obey it he deserved to be ‘whipped with double stripes.’[344] Yet even amongst those who were entirely dependent on his favour there were some whose anxieties would not allow them to conceal from him September.Pye’s warning.the misery at home. On September 21, amidst the difficulties of getting Holland’s reinforcement ready, Sir Robert Pye, whose position as Auditor of the Exchequer gave him every opportunity of knowing the truth, uttered a note of warning. “Pardon me, I beseech you, if I humbly desire that you would advisedly consider of the end, and how far his Majesty’s revenue of all kinds is now exhausted. We are upon the third year’s anticipation beforehand; land, much sold of the principal; credit lost; and at the utmost shift with the commonwealth. I would I did not know so much as I do, for I do protest I would not for 500l. but I had been in the country. Deputy lieutenants are not active, and justices of the peace of better sort are willing to be put out of commission, every man doubting and providing for the worst, so that all our fears increase at home. I know I please not, but I cannot see one I am so much bound unto and not inform him my reason. I know no way to advise, but by some speedy accommodation of these loans, for nothing pleaseth so long as this is on foot, and of late no money, or little, hath been paid thereupon. For my own <191>particular, I will lay myself to pawn for your Lordship, but so soon as the fort is taken I could wish your Lordship were here.”[345]
“So soon as the fort is taken” was easily said; but the taking of the fort depended on Holland’s speedy setting out, and Delays in Holland’s expedition.the difficulties in the way of Holland’s expedition were almost insuperable. Weston might be, as Sir Humphrey May asserted, ‘not a spark, but a flame of fire, in anything that concerned’ the Duke, but the words with which this assertion was prefaced were none the less true. “It is easy for us to set down on paper ships, and money, and arms, and victual, and men, but to congest these materials together, especially in such a penury of money, requires more time than the necessity of your affairs will permit.”[346]
The whole frame of government was unhinged. Lord Wilmot, a veteran who had seen hard service in Ireland, was to command the reinforcements which were to be shipped on board Holland’s fleet. On October 6 he was waiting at Plymouth for supplies from London.[347] The warrant for the money needed for Oct. 9.feeding the troops was only issued three days later.[348] On the same day Sir James Bagg, Buckingham’s creature who had succeeded Eliot in the Vice-Admiralty of Devon, wrote that no money had been sent him to purchase provisions, or Oct. 10.to hire ships for his patron’s relief. Of the new levies which were ordered to rendezvous at Plymouth, large numbers had, as was now usual, escaped Oct. 11.the hateful service by desertion.[349] On the 11th, Wilmot again wrote that the supplies from London had not arrived, that he had no arms with which to train the men, and that the population of the county was exasperated <192>at being forced to maintain the soldiers upon credit.[350] His answer was Oct. 12.an order from Conway to put his men as soon as possible on board ships lying at Plymouth. Holland would sail from Portsmouth, and the whole expedition would meet before St. Martin’s.[351]
Charles was growing anxious. “Since I have understood your necessities,” he wrote to Buckingham, “for fault of timely supplies, Oct. 13.The King’s anxiety.I still stand in fear that these may come too late.[352] But I hope God is more merciful to me than to inflict so great a punishment on me.” Even yet Wilmot could not start. On the 15th the ships Oct. 15.from London had only reached the Downs.[353] On the same day Holland reported from Portsmouth that nothing was ready, but that, though the captains assured him that it would take ten or fifteen days to remedy the defects of their ships, he hoped to sail in two.[354]
On the 18th the long-expected supplies from the Thames reached Plymouth. Holland, leaving Portsmouth on the 19th, was Oct. 21.Holland unable to leave.driven back to Cowes by a storm.[355] Leaving his windbound ships behind him, he posted to Plymouth to meet Wilmot, who was then ready to sail.[356] Almost at the moment of his arrival the wind, which had been favourable at Plymouth, chopped round and blew steadily from the south-west.[357]
Everything on board the provision ships was in confusion. No bills of lading were on board, no official to take any account of the stores. But it mattered little now. The pitiless wind made the voyage impossible. The Portsmouth squadron, attempting once more to get out, was driven back into the Solent.[358] <193>The soldiers on board at Plymouth were eating the provisions designed for the army at Rhé.[359] On the 28th Oct. 28.news from Buckingham reached London. The Duke had made up his mind to assault the fort. If Holland came in time with the supplies, he would stay on the island. If not, he would throw himself into Rochelle, and run all hazards with its defenders.
On the 29th the wind lulled, and Holland’s fleet left the Catwater. In the night the storm raged once more, and the ships were Oct. 29.in great danger from the waves, lashed into fury in the then open waters of the Sound. The winds blew loudly for twenty hours. Even if the wind changed, wrote Wilmot, it would be long before the damaged ships could be repaired. The soldiers, besides, were ill armed, and there was no store at Plymouth from which to supply them.[360]
If evidence were still needed of the thorough disorganisation of the Government, it would be found in the circumstance that Nov. 2.Disorganisation of the Government.five or six hundred recruits arrived at Plymouth without any directions accompanying them. Nobody had orders to receive them, and Holland was obliged to support them out of his own pocket till he could persuade the unwilling deputy-lieutenants to force their maintenance upon the county.[361]
No wonder that one more of the Duke’s confidants should be found bewailing to his patron the state of affairs at home. “In my last,” Nov. 5.Goring’s letter.wrote the courtly Goring, “I was bold to represent unto your Lordship the hazard you would run if you expected more timely supplies; for the City, from whence all present money must now be raised, or nowhere, is so infested by the malignant part of this kingdom, as no man that is moneyed will lend upon any security, if they think it to go the way of the Court, which now is made diverse from the State. Such is the present distemper. … <194>In a word, therefore, my dearest Lord, let me tell you what many honest-hearted men, divested of passion or bye-ends, say — that if it be true, as is here conceived, that the fort be again revictualled in such plenty as will force you to a winter siege at the best, before you can hope for any good success, that then your Lordship would rather betake you to a new counsel, and think what way to curb the French insolency some other way than by a wilful struggling against them where the season and place give them such infinite advantage of you. Besides, my dear Lord, here at home — where your judgment is first to reflect — are such desperate obstructions as nothing but your presence can remove, and that will do it, if you will yet be pleased in time to look about you, or let me perish for a false, vile wretch to you.”[362]
Whatever others might think of him, Buckingham was still certain of the King’s support. The letter written by Charles Nov. 6.The King’s constancy.in the midst of all this uncertainty is very pathetic in its mingled spirit of resignation and confidence. “I pray God,” he wrote, “that this letter be useless or never come to your hands, this being only to meet you at your landing in England, in case you should come from Rhé without perfecting your work, happily begun, but, I must confess with grief, ill seconded. This is therefore to give you power — in case ye shall imagine that ye have not enough already — to put in execution any of those designs ye mentioned to Jack Hippesley, or any other that you shall like of. So that I leave it freely to your will, whether, after your landing in England, ye will set forth again to some design before you come hither; or else that ye shall first come to ask my advice before ye undertake a new work; assuring you that, with whatsomever success ye shall come to me, ye shall ever be welcome, one of my greatest griefs being that I have not been with you in this time of suffering, for I know we would have much eased each other’s griefs. I cannot stay longer on this subject, for fear of losing myself in it. To conclude, you cannot come so soon as ye are welcome; and unfeignedly in my mind ye have gained as much reputation <195>with wise and honest men, in this action, as if ye had performed all your desires.”[363]
Charles’s forebodings of evil, though he knew it not, were already realised. By the middle of October the condition of the besiegers was pitiable. The weather was cold and wet, and the men were exposed to grievous misery in the trenches. The officers were ‘looking themselves blind’ by sweeping the horizon with their telescopes for the first signs of Holland’s fleet,[364] as in old days the soldiers of Nicias gazed across the Sicilian sea for the triremes of Demosthenes. But for the south-west wind in the Channel, Holland would have been with them in less than a week, and their necessities would have been relieved; but Holland came not, and Buckingham was called on once more to face the question of relinquishing his enterprise.
Everything hung on the chances of Holland’s arrival. If he came quickly, all might yet be well. If he delayed, the army might easily be exposed to an irreparable disaster. Was it strange that the officers of Buckingham’s council concurred in taking a gloomy view of the situation, while Buckingham himself, upon whom failure would weigh infinitely more heavily than upon all the rest together, hoped against hope, broke out into passionate reproaches against those who seemed to have forgotten him at home, and, whilst prudently making preparations for departure in case of necessity, still clung firmly to the spot on which he was?
The time was fast passing by when hesitation would be any longer possible. The smaller fort of La Prée had been left unassailed in July, and it now afforded a shelter to the French troops Oct. 20.The French land in the island.passing over from the mainland. By October 20 nearly 2,000 soldiers had been received within its walls and within the entrenchments which had been thrown up in front of it,[365] and their number might be expected to increase every day.
<196>It was lamentable for Buckingham to be so near success and yet to miss it. Toiras had only provisions to last him till November 5,[366] and though the exact date was not known in the English camp, the conjectures formed by the besiegers were not far wrong. Between the greatness of the prize and the terrible consequences of exposure to a French attack upon his diminished army, Buckingham was unable to form a resolution. During the week which followed upon the last landing of the French there were continued combats, in which the English held their own. Yet it was certain that when fresh troops arrived at La Prée, Buckingham’s position would be untenable, and at last he reluctantly gave way to those who urged him to retreat. Yet in the desperate condition in which he was, he was ready to catch at any straw, and having heard that Toiras had but 500 men left capable of bearing arms,[367] he talked openly of ordering Oct. 27.Attempted storm.an assault upon the fortress, though an assault had long ago been regarded as a hopeless operation.[368] On the morning of the 27th the attempt was made. Toiras, probably through Buckingham’s want of reticence, <197>was amply forewarned, and the troops from La Prée came out to threaten the assailants in the rear. Even if secrecy had been maintained, the operation would probably have failed. The works of the citadel were intact, and the scaling ladders were too short. After a useless butchery, Buckingham was compelled to draw off his men.
Military prudence counselled instant retreat; but Buckingham had not learned to steel his heart against suffering. The Rochellese urged him to protect them a little longer, whilst they gathered in provisions from the island to replace those which they had made over to the English army in the beginning of the month.[369] Neither could he bear to leave his own wounded to Oct. 28.the mercies of the enemy. The whole of the next day was spent in shipping the injured men.[370] On the morning of the 29th Oct. 29.The retreat from St. Martin’s.it was too late. Marshal Schomberg, who had already landed with fresh troops at La Prée, advanced to the attack at the head of little less than 6,000 men.
Preparations for retreat had been duly made. A wooden bridge had been constructed across the marshes and the narrow arm of the sea which separated the Isle of Rhé from the smaller Isle of Loix,[371] and this bridge was to have been guarded by a fortified work, which would have enabled the troops to embark in safety. Unhappily, by some blunder, the causeway which led to the bridge from the side of the Isle of Rhé was left entirely undefended, whilst only the farther end of the bridge on the lesser island, to which the troops were marching, was guarded by an entrenchment. The French accordingly had but to watch their opportunity. As soon as three regiments were over they charged the handful of horse which had been left to guard the passage.[372] Yielding to the weight of numbers the English <198>horse gave way, and dashing in headlong flight towards the bridge, threw the infantry into hopeless confusion. Almost at the same time a body of French, who had pushed round the three English regiments which had not crossed the bridge, fired upon them in the rear. The slaughter on the bridge.From that moment a sheer massacre ensued. Two colonels were slain upon the spot. Not a horseman succeeded in crossing the bridge. “By this time,” wrote the officer who had the command of the work beyond the bridge, “the Rochellese, having found another way on the left hand through the salt-pits, made extraordinary haste to the bridge, and wedged themselves into the flank of Sir Alexander Brett’s regiment then passing over, by means whereof, the passage being choked up, the enemy had the killing, taking, and drowning of our men at the bridge at his pleasure, without any hazard, musqueteers being not able to annoy them without endangering our own men.” The bridge, too, had no protection at the sides, and large numbers fell over and were drowned. At first the soldiers who guarded the entrenchment beyond the bridge were borne away by the flying rout. But, after a time, a knot of men was rallied by the officers, and the French were driven back. At nightfall the English were Oct. 30.still in possession of the entrenchment. Early in the morning the bridge was set on fire, and the remains of Buckingham’s army were enabled to re-embark at their leisure.[373]
Various accounts have been given of the numbers lost in this disastrous retreat. The French claimed to have destroyed 2,000 men. Estimate of the loss.The English authorities would hardly admit that more than 1,000 perished.[374] If, however, the ravages caused by warfare and disease during the preceding weeks be taken into account, the entire English loss must be set down at little less than 4,000 men. On October 20, 6,884 soldiers drew pay at St. Martin’s. On November 8 the embarkation was effected without further difficulty, and after a short voyage <199>2,989 poor wretches, worn with hunger and enfeebled by disease, were landed at Portsmouth and Plymouth.[375]
One of the colonels has left on record his opinion of the proximate causes of the disaster. “It is not to be doubted,” Causes of the disaster.he says, “that the Duke had both courage, munificence, and industry enough, together with many other excellent parts, which in time would make him a renowned general. But his prime officers undervaluing his directions because of his inexperience, and taking a boldness in regard of his lenity to delinquents, did not only fail to co-operate with him, but by giving out that he cared not to expose them all for his own vainglory, had infused into a great part of the army a mutinous disposition, insomuch as whatsoever was directed touching our longer abode or any attempt to be made upon the enemy was either cried down, or so slowly and negligently executed as it took none effect. For instance, when it was resolved in council that the little fort should be besieged, they obstinately declined it.[376] On the other side, whatsoever tended to the retreat was acted with all possible expedition; as for example, the shipping of all the brass cannon, whereunto they had by surprise gotten his consent before the assault, by himself often repented of. In this distraction of affairs, the Duke was forced to resort to new and private counsels, by which he was then so guided that Dulbier, one author thereof, writing to his friend in Holland, used these words:— ‘L’ignorance et la dissention qu’est entre les Anglois, m’a faict vendre les coquilles[377] à bon marché.’”[378]
An inexperienced general, discontented commanders, and a half-mutinous soldiery were enough to ruin any undertaking, and it can hardly be denied that Buckingham’s hesitation during the last few days went far to convert a necessary retreat <200>into a terrible disaster. Yet neither must it be forgotten that, except when he ordered the assault, his fault lay simply in his miscalculation of chances over which he had no control. But for the persistence of the south-west wind in the Channel, Holland would have been at Rhé about October 24 or 25, and the firmness of Buckingham in resisting the timid counsels of his subordinates would have been one of the commonplaces of history.
As a man Buckingham gains much from an impartial examination of his conduct in this expedition. At least he was no carpet knight, Buckingham at Rhé.no mere courtier dancing attendance upon the powerful at banquets and festivities. No veteran could have surpassed him in the readiness with which he exposed his person to danger, and in his determination to see all with his own eyes, to encourage the down-hearted, and to care for the suffering of his men. After all, the charge which history has to bring against Buckingham is not so much that he failed in the expedition to Rhé, as that there was an expedition to Rhé at all. The politician, not the man, was at fault. Even if the French war had been justifiable in itself, the idea of undertaking it with no support but that of an alienated nation was hazardous in the extreme. The south-west wind which kept Holland in port was but a secondary cause of the disaster. But for the thorough disorganisation of the English Government, which was the clear result of the quarrel with the House of Commons, Holland would have been able to start at least a fortnight earlier, whilst the wind was still favourable to his voyage. The position at Rhé after the succour had been thrown into the fort was something like that of the allied armies before Sebastopol after the failure of the first bombardment; but the allied armies had powerful Governments behind them, and the British army at least had the support of a nation feverishly anxious for the honour of its arms, and ready to pour forth its treasures without stint to support the enterprise which it had undertaken. Buckingham had nothing behind him but an attached but incapable sovereign, and a handful of officials rendered inert by the dependence in which he had kept them, and by their knowledge of the ill-will with which every act of theirs was scanned by the vast majority of the nation.
[287] Buckingham’s plans from time to time may be gathered far best from Contarini’s despatches.
[288] Blundell to Buckingham, May 1, S. P. Dom. lxxii. 6.
[289] Mason to Nicholas, May 7, ibid. lxii. 70.
[290] Deputy Lieutenants of Dorsetshire to the Council, May 30, June 8, ibid. lxv. 19, lxvi. 41.
[291] Burgh to Buckingham, June 3, ibid. lxvi. 19.
[292] Mason to Nicholas, June 11, ibid. lxvi. 67.
[293] Contarini to the Doge, June 19⁄29, Ven. Transcripts, R.O.
[294] Instructions to Buckingham, June 19, S. P. Dom. lxvii. 57.
[295] Contarini to the Doge, May 10⁄20, Ven. Transcripts, R.O.
[296] Herbert (Philobiblon Society’s edition), 46. The common soldiers embarked numbered 5,934. S. P. Dom. lxxxii. 431.
[297] May (S. P. Dom. lxviii. 74) made Neptune address the King thus:—
“I saw third Edward stain my floodBy Sluys with slaughtered Frenchmen’s blood;And from Eliza’s fleetI saw the vanquished Spaniards fly.But ’twas a greater mastery,No foe at all to meet;When they, without their ruin or dispute,Confess thy reign as sweet as absolute.”
[298] The numbers vary in different accounts from one to more than two thousand.
[299] The account of the early history of the expedition is taken from Graham’s journal (S. P. Dom. lxxi. 65) compared with another journal (ibid. lxxi. 60), and the printed books of Herbert (The Expedition to the Isle of Rhé), Philobiblon Society’s edition; Isnard (Arcis Sammartinianæ Obsidio); Le Mercure François, tom. 13, &c.
[300] Soubise to Buckingham, July 12⁄22 (not July 22⁄Aug. 1, as calendared). Becher’s Journal. Symonds to Nicholas, Aug. 15, S. P. Dom. lxii. 74, lxxii. 22; i. lxxiv. 9. Mém. de Rohan, 211.
[301] De Vic to Conway, July 27; Buckingham to Conway, July 28, Hardwicke S. P. ii. 23, 27.
[302] Isnard, 101. Herbert (84) makes light of the whole matter, talks as though the Duke had performed an office of piety in sending the women to their husbands, and suggests that if any were shot it was by the French. But a letter from the camp says coolly: ‘Afterwards they were often shot at by our men.’ Symonds to Nicholas, Aug. 15, S. P. Dom. lxxiv. 9.
[303] Montague’s relation, July 5; Instructions to Montague, July 13, S. P. Savoy. Rohan to Soubise, July 29⁄Aug. 8, S. P. France.
[304] De Vic to Conway, Aug. 14, Hardwicke S. P. ii. 35.
[305] Buckingham to Nicholas, Aug. 14 [?], Hardwicke S. P. ii. 34. Buckingham to Becher, Aug. 14; Symonds to Nicholas, Aug. 15. An account of what happened at Rhé, Aug. 15, S. P. Dom. lxxiii. 91, lxxv. 53; i. lxxiv. 9, 10.
[306] The King to Marlborough and Weston, July 17⁄27; printed by Mr. Bruce in his Calendar of State Papers, Preface, viii.
[307] Holles to Wentworth, Aug. 9, Strafford Letters, i. 40.
[308] Manchester to Conway, July 17, S. P. Dom. lxxi. 25.
[309] Manchester to the King, July 20, S. P. Dom. lxxi. 44.
[310] Manchester to the King, June 29; Estimate for victuals, July 5, ibid. lxviii. 28, lxx. 37.
[311] Coke to Conway, June 20, ibid. lxvii. 76.
[312] Belou to Conway, July (?), July 30 (?), ibid. lxx. 1, lxxii. 41.
[313] Coke to Conway, July 31, S. P. Dom. lxxii. 48.
[314] The King to Marlborough and Weston; Calendar of Domestic State Papers, Preface, ix.
[315] The King to Buckingham, Aug. 13, Hardwicke S. P. 17, 13.
[316] Long to Nicholas, Aug. 18, S. P. Dom. lxxiv. 40, 74, 81. Conway to Coke, Aug. 22; the King to Marlborough and Weston, Aug. 23.
[317] Becher to Conway, Sept. 27, ibid. xxv. iii. 16. Hardwicke S. P. ii. 46.
[318] Sir E. Conway to Conway, Sept. 4, Hardwicke S. P. lxxvi. 26.
[319] Isnard, 135. Herbert, i. 19. Richelieu to Louis XIII., Sept. 20; Richelieu to Toiras, Sept. 22, Lettres de Richelieu, ii. 609, 620.
[320] Buckingham to the King, Sept. 19, Hardwicke S. P. ii. 45.
[321] Sir E. Conway to Conway, Sept. 20, S. P. Dom. lxxviii. 71.
[322] Becher to Conway, Oct. 3, Hardwicke S. P. ii. 48. Isnard (157) spreads the negotiation over the 27th and 28th.
[323] Letter from the French camp, Oct. 8⁄18, S. P. France.
[324] Becher to Conway, Oct. 3, Hardwicke S. P. ii. 48. Symonds to Ashburnham, Oct. 4, S. P. Dom. lxxx. 43. Letter from the French camp, Oct. 8⁄18, S. P. France. Herbert, 145. Isnard, 157. I give the number of boats entering from the French letter, which is in accordance with Isnard. The writer had the information from Audoin, who led them in. The English fancied only 14 or 15 had got through. The dates I give from Symonds. Becher gives the 28th wrongly as the day of the offer of surrender.
[325] Like the green coffee afterwards sent to the Crimea.
[326] Becher to Conway, Oct. 3; De Vic to Conway, Oct. 12, Hardwicke S. P. ii. 48, 51. Herbert, 154.
[327] This, which is distinctly stated in Becher’s letter, puts an end to the theory, hitherto, I believe, generally accepted, that Buckingham remained on the island in opposition to the officers. Their vote may have been reluctantly given, but given it undoubtedly was.
[328] Statement &c., Oct. 19, S. P. Dom. lxxxii. 35.
[329] I say this on the authority of Richelieu himself. “Il faut faire cet effet devant que le secours d’Angleterre arrive, d’autant qu’estant renforcés de trois ou quatre mil hommes, il pourroit arriver que nous ne serions pas en estat de deffaire nos ennemis.” Mémoire, Sept. 6⁄16, Lettres, ii. 603. The whole memoir should be read by those who think that Buckingham’s failure was a foregone conclusion.
[330] Mém. de Rohan, 235.
[331] Montague to the King, Oct. 13, S. P. Savoy.
[332] Sainsbury, Rubens, 85–105.
[333] Morgan to Conway, July 23, S. P. Denmark.
[334] Instructions to Clarke, July 27, S. P. Denmark.
[335] Clarke to Conway, Aug. 20, ibid.
[336] Anstruther to Conway, Sept. 1; Clarke to Conway, Sept. 7, ibid.
[337] Morgan to Carleton, Sept. 7, S. P. Denmark.
[338] Carleton to Coke, Sept. 29, S. P. Holland. Alleyne’s Journal, Oct. 2; Duppa to Nicholas, Oct. 3, S. P. Dom. lxxx. 13, 26. Mém. de Richelieu, iii. 386.
[339] Carleton to Coke, Oct. 5, S. P. Holland.
[340] The Duchess of Buckingham to Buckingham, June 26 (?), S. P. Dom. lxviii. 3. This and the other letters have been quoted in part in the Preface to Mr. Bruce’s Calendar, 1627–8.
[341] The Duchess of Buckingham to Moore, Oct. 20 (?), S. P. Dom. lxxxii. 42.
[342] Buckingham to the Countess of Buckingham. Printed from the Earl of Denbigh’s collection in the Fourth Report of the Hist. MSS. Commission, 256.
[343] The Countess of Buckingham to Buckingham, Aug. 26 (?), S. P. Dom. lxxv. 22.
[344] Exeter to Buckingham, Nov. 3; Dorset to Buckingham, Aug. 21, S. P. Dom. lxxxiv. 16. Preface to Bruce’s Calendar, p. i.
[345] Pye to Buckingham, Sept. 21, S. P. Dom. lxxix. 2.
[346] May to Buckingham, Oct. 7, ibid. lxxx. 60.
[347] Wilmot to Conway, Oct. 6, ibid. lxxx. 55.
[348] Docquet, Oct. 9, S. P. Docquet Book.
[349] Commissioners at Plymouth to the Council, Oct. 10, S. P. Dom. lxxxi. 4.
[350] Wilmot to Conway, Oct. 11, S. P. Dom. lxxxi. 13.
[351] Conway to Wilmot, Oct. 12, ibid. lxxxi. 25.
[352] The King to Buckingham, Oct. 13, Hardwicke S. P. ii. 19.
[353] Conway to Wilmot, Oct. 15, S. P. Dom. lxxxi. 50.
[354] Holland to Conway, Oct. 15, ibid. lxxxi. 5.
[355] Holland to Conway, Oct. 19, ibid. lxxxii. 30, 31.
[356] Wilmot to Conway, Oct. 21, ibid. lxxxii. 46.
[357] Holland to Conway, Oct. 22, ibid. lxxxii. 58.
[358] Wilmot to Conway, Oct. 23; Mervyn to Nicholas, Oct. 23, ibid. lxxxii. 66, 68.
[359] Ashburnham to Nicholas, Oct. 25, S. P. Dom. lxxii. 87.
[360] Conway to Holland, Oct. 28; Holland to Conway, Oct. 30; Wilmot to Conway, Oct. 31, ibid. lxxxiii. 17, 32, 38.
[361] Holland to Conway, Nov. 2, ibid. lxxxiv. 12.
[362] Goring to Buckingham, Nov. 5, S. P. Dom. lxxxiv. 20.
[363] The King to Buckingham, Nov. 6, Hardwicke S. P. ii. 20.
[364] Bold to Nicholas, Oct. 16; Louis to Nicholas, Oct. 16, S. P. Dom. lxxxi. 59, 61.
[365] Isnard, 177–193. It is not for me, remembering the controversy <196>about attacking the north side of Sebastopol after the battle of the Alma, to say whether Buckingham was right or wrong in neglecting La Prée. Of course he was blamed after the event for what he did, and Herbert, who represents the talk of the camp, says (p. 50) that ‘some of our ancient and well-experienced soldiers thought fit to begin with it,’ whilst ‘the pretenders to the Duke’s favour advised him to begin with St. Martin’s.’ I do not see, however, that anybody supposed that the Duke was strong enough to attack both at once; and the only question therefore is, whether he would have been able at the same time to master La Prée and to hinder Toiras from provisioning St. Martin’s, so as to make a blockade of that fort practically impossible after La Prée was captured. As matters stood in July, there was no danger of the landing of the French troops at La Prée, because there were none to spare on the mainland. Such a danger did not arise till October. It therefore seems to me to be a perfectly sustainable argument, for those who care to embark on such speculations, that Buckingham took the wisest course. All that I am concerned with, however, is to show that he was not the mere infatuated being that history chooses to represent him.
[366] Isnard, 184.
[367] News-Letter, Nov. 5, S. P. Dom. lxxxiv. 24.
[368] See the account of Courtney’s conversation with Eliot, in Forster, i. 403.
[369] Isnard, 210.
[370] Crosby to Conway (?), Nov. 14 (?), S. P. Dom. lxxxiv. 78.
[371] Now joined to the larger island.
[372] Crosby notes on this leaving sixty horse to meet 200, “An error never to be sufficiently condemned in the Colonel-General and the Sergeant-Major-General, to whom the Duke committed the retreat.” If this is true, and not a mere camp rumour, Buckingham was not responsible for the details of the manœuvres of that day.
[373] Crosby to (Conway?), Nov. 14 (?), S. P. Dom. lxxxiv. 78. Compare Herbert, 224. The bird’s-eye view given by Isnard brings the whole scene before us.
[374] Herbert, 257.
[375] Accounts of the number of soldiers, Oct. 20; Statement of the numbers, Nov., S. P. Dom. lxxxii. 43, lxxxv. 94.
[376] This cannot refer to the original question of besieging La Prée, but to some later resolution, probably when the French were beginning to land.
[377] ‘Bien vendre les coquilles’ is ‘tirer un profit exagéré d’une opération ou d’un service.’ Littré, s.v. coquille. Dulbier, on the contrary, sold his shells cheap, i.e. got little for his pains.
[378] Crosby to Conway (?), Nov. 14 (?), S. P. Dom. lxxxiv. 78.