<172>By the declaration which had been voted so enthusiastically on June 4, the Commons had left to the King that full liberty of action 1620.November.Germany after the battle of Prague.which he loved so dearly. They had also left him the responsibility of acting wisely; and, unfortunately, partly through his own fault, but still more through the faults of others, the chance that he would be able to act wisely had been considerably lessened by the events of the seven months which had elapsed since the battle of Prague.
Between Ferdinand and Frederick nothing but distrust was now possible. In the eyes of the Emperor his fugitive enemy was Ferdinand and Frederick.a mere disturber of the peace whose flagitious intrigues must be baffled at any cost. In the eyes of Frederick, Ferdinand was himself a pretender who had been lawfully dethroned, and who now owed his success to the armies and the gold of the King of Spain. Nor were the views with which the rivals regarded their obligations as members of the Empire less opposite to one another. Ferdinand held that, in virtue of his office, he was the guardian of the peace of the Empire, and that this peace had been broken by the invasion of his dominions, and by the illegal assumption of one of the seven Electorates. Frederick, on the other hand, held that he had no quarrel with the Emperor as such. He had merely defended against an Archduke of Austria the throne which he held by legitimate election.
<173>For years political controversy raged around these simple points in an interminable circle. Masses of paper wearisome to read, wearisome even to look at, were piled up by learned controversialists on either side. As each party started from premises which were rejected by the other, both naturally failed either in convincing their contemporaries or in instructing posterity.
Regardless of such technicalities, the vast majority of German Protestants had maintained an anxious neutrality during the Bohemian war. Views prevalent in Germany.They saw clearly that Frederick’s theories involved the permanent establishment of anarchy. If the Emperor was to be nothing more than the nominal head of a federation, bereft even of the authority needed for the repression of private war amongst its members, order could never be preserved. Every prince who coveted his neighbour’s lands would easily find an excuse for invading them, whilst the only authority known to the constitution would be powerless to interfere.
Yet, strong as the disposition was to rally round the Emperor, there were not wanting other considerations to lead thinking men in an opposite direction. That strict law of which Ferdinand had constituted himself the champion, was almost certain to be ruinous to the very existence of Protestantism in Germany. From declaring Frederick to be a traitor, it was but a short step to the forfeiture of his lands and dignities. If indeed Frederick, and such as Frederick, had been alone exposed to danger, the world would easily have borne the mishap. But the presence of a new Catholic Elector at the Diets and Assemblies of the Empire, could hardly fail to be attended with undesirable consequences, and it was certain that a new Catholic Lord of the Palatinate would make short work with the conscientious convictions of his subjects. The next step would be to demand the restitution of the ecclesiastical lands which had been seized since the peace of Augsburg, and to convert each regained abbey and bishopric into an outpost of Jesuitism. Even if, in respect for the letter of the law, the triumphant Emperor stopped here, every Protestant knew full well that the tide of religious aggression would <174>not thus be stayed. Each Protestant prince would learn that power had passed to Vienna, and that favour was to be obtained there but in one way. If he would only consent to abandon his religion, the restored ecclesiastical estates would offer bishoprics and canonries for his younger sons. Partial judges would be ready to listen with open ear to the complaints of every Catholic who had quarrelled with his neighbours. One by one, it was to be feared, the Protestant princes would drop off into the seductive arms of the Church of Rome, as the Protestant aristocracy were dropping off in France, and as Wolfgang William of Neuburg had dropped off in Germany, at the time when his claims upon the Duchy of Cleves stood in need of Catholic assistance. Each apostate in turn would carry with him the legal right of proscribing the religion which his subjects had learned to cherish, and each defection would close in more tightly the ever-narrowing circle within which Protestantism could live, and within which alone the free moral and intellectual life of the Germany of the future would be able to develope itself.
Such were the thoughts, dimly and confusedly penetrating the minds of the great majority of German Protestants. If only John George of Saxony Weakness of the Elector of Saxony.had been capable of translating their inarticulate feelings into prompt and decisive action, he might have won himself a name second to none in the annals of his country. If he could have stood forward at the head of the Princes and people of Northern Germany, to tell the Emperor that he might deal as he pleased with Frederick, but that the frontier of Protestantism must not recede, he would have found no want of support. Unhappily he did nothing of the kind. Knowing full well the double danger of civil anarchy and ecclesiastical tyranny with which the Empire was threatened, he wavered between the two. At one time he was eager for Frederick’s complete restitution. At another time he was eager to see him completely crushed, and after every disappointment, he was ready to take refuge in the solace of the hunting-field and the bottle.
That which John George might have accomplished with comparative ease, presented far greater difficulties to James. <175>Of course, if he pleased, he might spend any subsidies which Parliament Difficulties in the way of James.might be willing to grant him in increasing the confusion which already weighed so heavily upon distracted Germany. But if he wished to do more than this; if he intended to interfere in the quarrel in the only way in which a foreign power can hope to interfere to any purpose, namely, by giving strength and solidity to the national will, he would have a hard task before him — a task of which more than half the difficulty arose from the impracticable temper of his son-in-law.
Unhappily for himself and for his country, Frederick was still living in that dream-land which had so long usurped Frederick persistently renews his claims.the place of reality in his mind. To him the defeat on the White Hill was not the final result of years of anarchy. It was a mere accident of fortune, a military check which with a little perseverance might easily be repaired. His confident belief was still that others would be ready to do that for him which he had made no serious effort to accomplish for himself. “The hopes of the King and Queen,” wrote Conway, a few days after the battle, “are that their father will do for them now, and not treat.”[229]
On November 7 the cavalcade of fugitives took refuge in Breslau. On the 11th Frederick issued a manifesto in the form of a letter to the Princes of the Union. Silesia and Moravia, he wrote, were still true to him. Bethlen Gabor was ready to assist him to recover all that had been lost. Let them see that they too were ready to join heart and hand in his cause. If they now refused, the Emperor would soon reoccupy the ecclesiastical domains by force of arms.[230] To James he was less explicit. With English aid, he said, his affairs would soon mend. Elizabeth, as was her wont, spoke out her mind, and asked that the help promised for the Palatinate might be extended to Bohemia.[231] “I am not yet so out of heart,” she wrote a fortnight afterwards <176>to her old friend Carleton, “though I confess we are in an evil estate, but that, as I hope, God will give us again the victory; for the wars are not ended with one battle, and I hope we shall have better luck in the next. The good news you write of the King my father’s declaring himself for the Palatinate, I pray God they may be seconded with the same for Bohemia.”[232]
Ruinous as her counsel was, it was well for her that her brave woman’s heart could beat so cheerily in the midst of trouble. December.He leaves Silesia.She was herself sent away to seek a refuge at Cüstrin to give birth to a child, the little Maurice, who was doubtless loved all the more tenderly for the gloom amidst which his stormy life began. Bad news was coming in almost every day. The Moravians, it seemed, were ready to make their peace with Ferdinand. Frederick, blind to much, could see that the ground was slipping from beneath his feet. There were those in Breslau who were already muttering that it would be better to come to terms with the Elector of Saxony.[233] Frederick’s fears got the better of him. He told the Estates of Silesia that he would leave them for the present; but he would soon be back with powerful allies to support his cause. If they wished to send commissioners to treat with the Saxons, he would make no objection. Such a negotiation, he privately added to those who were in his confidence, would serve to gain time till he was able to return with an army at his back.[234] On December 23, he left Breslau for ever, not forgetting to despatch an embassy to John George to demand a cessation of arms, and to ask for assistance to drive the Emperor out of Bohemia. To this impertinence the Elector replied by a solemn lecture on the recognition which his adversary’s right had received from Providence, and by a well-timed admonition to make his submission to the Emperor before it was too late.[235]
On January 12, the day before this answer was given at <177>Dresden, the ban of the empire was pronounced at Vienna 1621.January.The ban pronounced against him.against Frederick and his principal followers. They were declared to have forfeited their lands and dignities, whilst the execution of the sentence was significantly entrusted to the Duke of Bavaria, who was eager to put himself, if possible, in possession of both.
As soon as the news was published, a shriek of horror arose from the whole circle of Frederick’s partisans. It was only after a legal trial, they said, that the ban could lawfully be proclaimed. Ferdinand’s reply was that this might well be the case in time of peace; but it was notorious that Frederick had levied war against the Emperor, and it was no less notorious that he had not the slightest intention of submitting to any form of trial whatever. Whether Ferdinand were technically in the right or not, it is certain that legal formalities had been too often unblushingly disregarded by Frederick and his supporters to justify them in interpreting the law very strictly in their own favour.[236]
On the day on which the ban was pronounced Frederick was riding out of Cüstrin to urge the princes of Lower Saxony to take arms on his behalf.[237] Yet Rusdorf’s advice.he had not been left altogether without a warning. Rusdorf, one of his ablest councillors, had written earnestly to dissuade him from his imprudence. The foreign powers in which he trusted, he told him, would be sure to fail him in the end. The wound in Bohemia was mortal, and no recovery was possible there. Of the Palatinate he could speak from personal experience. <178>Soldiers and officers were alike intent upon their own private aims. There was not one amongst them who believed in the goodness of the cause for which he was fighting. The country was laid desolate by its own defenders. It was to be feared that the inhabitants would, in sheer self-defence, break out into open sedition. The Union, at all events, would certainly break down as soon as it was exposed to real danger.[238]
To the truth coming from one of his own ministers Frederick could refuse to listen. To Sir Edward Villiers, who Mission of Sir E. Villiers.met him at Wolfenbüttel with a message from the King of England, he was unable to close his ears; for he knew well that, unless James took up his cause, there would be few indeed amongst the princes of Germany who would venture to declare in his favour.
Frederick listened to Villiers, and announced in a letter to his father in-law the result of his conversation. “Whatever has been done,” Frederick’s promises.he wrote, “proceeded from a good intention. If it had pleased God to grant me success, the whole party of the religion would have been relieved; but since this has not been the will of God, it is for me to take the good and the evil at His hand; and although I hoped, with His aid, and with the assistance of your Majesty and the other princes and states of the religion, to regain what I had lost, holding still, as I do, Silesia and several towns in Bohemia yet, seeing by your letter that you incline rather to an accommodation I am ready to follow your good counsels and commands.”[239]
Even if Frederick had meant what he said, there was a studied vagueness about his language which augured ill for the success of James’s negotiations. But the truth was, that the engagement February.His letter to Mansfeld.thus wrung from him was no indication of his real intentions. Two days after his promise had been given to his father-in-law he wrote to Mansfeld to assure him that he would never surrender his kingdom <179>of Bohemia. He had justice on his side, and he would soon win back all that he had lost.[240]
Frederick was, within the limitations of his own narrow mind, thoroughly consistent with himself. Utterly to destroy the German branch of the House of Austria; to convert the Empire into a federation of independent princes, amongst which the stronger would find no restrictions upon their desire to prey upon their weaker neighbours; and to establish the supremacy of Protestantism, and especially of its Calvinistic form, by force of arms, were the objects at which his father had aimed, and to the attainment of which, with such reservations as sufficed to conceal from his own mind the iniquity of his proceedings, he had himself directed his course.
No doubt there are higher rights than those of kings and emperors. No doubt injustice receives no consecration from the successful efforts of pikemen and musketeers. But what Frederick forgot was that his enemies were not confined to those who looked for inspiration to Munich and Vienna. He had alienated his own allies; he had converted the lukewarm into hostile antagonists; he had dragged in the dust the great cause of German Protestantism. Prudent politicians stood aloof from his rash and impatient violence; sober and religious men shrank from accepting the advocacy of a champion whose victory would have destroyed much and founded nothing. Whilst Frederick was imagining that he had only to contend with the armies of Ferdinand and Maximilian, he had in reality a far harder battle to fight; for he had to convince his fellow-Protestants that he could protect their religious independence without converting Germany into a den of thieves.
Meanwhile the King of Denmark and the other princes of the Lower Saxon Circle were assembled at Segeberg to listen to Frederick’s proposals. The Assembly of Segeberg.The selfish and unprincipled Christian IV. thought of little else than the retention of the secularised Church property which he had got into his possession, and he was shrewd enough to perceive how the settlement of that question had been retarded <180>by Frederick’s proceedings in Bohemia. “Who advised you,” he called out savagely to the fugitive Prince, “to drive out kings and to seize kingdoms. If your counsellors did so, they were scoundrels.” He then told him plainly, as Villiers had told him before, that, if he wanted help, he must submit to the Emperor. When he had done that, he might expect aid to drive Spinola from the Palatinate.
A day or two after this scene, Christian had cooled down. Frederick, ostensibly at least, consented to give up his claims to Bohemia, and was informed in return that a Danish embassy would be sent to ask for peace at Vienna. If that failed, the princes of Lower Saxony would not desert him.[241]
Before the assembly broke up, Sir Robert Anstruther arrived from England. He had come to ask Christian for a fresh loan of 25,000l., Anstruther’s mission.of which 5,000l. were to be at once repaid as interest due upon the loan of the preceding summer, whilst the remainder was to be made over to Elizabeth as a present from her father. Anstruther found that the King of Denmark had little faith in the success of the proposed embassy to Vienna, and that he was looking forward to a campaign on the Rhine in conjunction with England and the Netherlands. “By God,” he said, laying his hand familiarly on the ambassador’s shoulder as he spoke, “this business is gone too far to think it can be redressed with words only. I thank God we hope, with the help of his Majesty of Great Britain and the rest of our friends, to give unto the Count Palatine good conditions. If ever we do any good for the liberty of Germany and religion it is now time.”[242]
After some weeks’ delay Anstruther obtained his money,[243] and the 20,000l. was duly paid over to Elizabeth.
From Segeberg Frederick set out for the Hague,[244] where the Prince of Orange was waiting to receive him with open arms. <181>It was not what his father-in-law would have wished. James had March.Villiers advises Frederick to go to the Palatinate.charged Villiers to recommend him to betake himself at once to the Palatinate, and had sent orders to Carleton to prevent him from coming to England.[245] This advice, though doubtless in part inspired by fear lest Frederick should place himself at the head of the Parliamentary opposition, was probably, but for Frederick’s own weakness of character, the best that could be given. In Holland the exile would be breathing an atmosphere of war; in England he would be far removed from the scene of action. At Heidelberg his presence would have served to keep his subjects in heart in their hour of trial, and would have given emphasis to his assertions that he had ceased to seek for anything beyond the preservation of his own domains.[246]
Frederick’s reply to Villiers’ proposition was not encouraging to those who wished well to his cause. He must first, he said, Frederick’s reply.go to the Hague, that he might place his wife and children in a place of safety. He would then be ready to return to the Palatinate, “so that his Majesty may be speedily assisted with a good army either of his Majesty of Great Britain or of the States, that he may be able to bring with him some comfort and ease to his subjects who languish in expectation thereof. For, if he should go otherwise, and in his own person only, that would get his Majesty very little reputation, and would encourage the Marquis Spinola to assail the Palatinate so much the more earnestly, and to send his Majesty back thither whence he came with shame enough to himself and to all them to whom his Majesty hath the honour to be so nearly allied. And withal, if his Majesty should go in that manner, the Princes of the Union would retire themselves every one to his own house, leaving the defence of the Palatinate, and the charge of the army, upon his Majesty’s hands, which would undoubtedly cause the total ruin and subversion <182>of all his Majesty’s estates and of his person, and would make him at once lose all his friends and allies. Which considerations being of consequence, his Majesty doth promise himself that his Majesty of Great Britain, examining them maturely, will not only approve them, but also esteem this his retreat into the Low Countries to be good and necessary; and favour him so much with his forces that he may return into the Palatinate, not only with reputation, but with some good effect, by God’s help, as he doth most humbly beseech his Majesty, promising himself that such a resolution would serve for an example, not only to the Union, but also to the King of Denmark, the States, and others, to take a good and a vigorous resolution together, which is very necessary for all those that have made a separation from the Papacy.”[247]
Frederick, it would seem, was Frederick still. No man could be more eager to summon armies from the ends of the earth to fight in his cause. No man could be more unable to define satisfactorily what the cause was for which he wanted them to fight. From a proposal that he should place himself at the head of the troops of the Union, he shrank as he would have shrunk from the plague. It would endanger his reputation. It would encourage his enemies to assail him more bitterly. If Ferdinand had reasoned thus when Thurn was thundering at the gates of Vienna, Frederick would still have been in comfortable enjoyment of the delights of Bohemian royalty.
Whatever may be thought of the advice given by James to Frederick, nothing but sheer timidity can account for his behaviour to Elizabeth. Eiizabeth forbidden to visit England.During her journey from Cüstrin she allowed it to be understood that she wished to take refuge with her father.[248] James was struck with alarm. He had enough to do to keep the war party in check, and he could not bear to think that his daughter’s <183>winning smiles would be placed in the balance against him.[249] Carleton was therefore told that the journey must be stopped at all hazards.[250] It is probable that some intimation of her father’s repugnance to her visit was conveyed to Elizabeth by her friends; for her language suddenly changed, and she now declared positively that nothing on earth would induce her to cross the sea to England.[251]
On April 4, escorted by a convoy of Dutch soldiers, the King of Bohemia, as he still persisted in calling himself, rode into the Hague. Frederick at the Hague.He was received with all honour. The Prince of Orange placed his own house at Breda at his disposal; and in the town itself, the mansion of Count Frederick Henry was assigned to him as a residence.[252]
Wise intervention in German affairs was evidently not so easy as the majority of Englishmen supposed. But, in the main, Policy of James.James’s policy was undoubtedly the right one. To compel Frederick to renounce the crown of Bohemia, and at the same time to form an alliance strong enough to defend the Palatinate, was the only combination which offered a prospect of success. As usual, it was in the execution rather than in the conception that James’s arrangements broke down utterly. He ought to have forced his son-in-law to notify to the world by a renunciation of the Bohemian crown that he was ready to conform to the conditions under which alone he could hope to maintain his hereditary domains. He ought to have made such preparations for war as would have convinced friends and enemies that now at last he was in earnest. Instead of this he allowed the weeks to slip away, leaving everything to chance, and to the evil designs of men <184>who wished for their own selfish purposes to see the prolongation of the war.
Amongst these, contrary to the general belief in England, the Spanish Ministry was not to be reckoned. Early in January, Philip, or Desire of Spain for peace.those who acted in his name, had expressed to the Archduke Albert the anxiety with which the continuance of hostilities was regarded at Madrid. Perhaps, wrote Philip, he might obtain repayment of his expenses by means of the confiscations in Bohemia. Perhaps a contribution might be levied in the Palatinate itself. At any rate, it would be impossible for him long to continue to bear this intolerable burden. As for the Elector Palatine, if he was to be restored, he must renounce the crown of Bohemia, and must forsake the Protestant Union. Care must be January.taken to restrain the Duke of Bavaria from pressing his claims to the Electorate. Perhaps the difficulty might be arranged by allowing the two families an alternative voice in the College.[253] When such were the opinions of the King of Spain, expressed not in formal diplomatic language, but in private and confidential intercourse, it can hardly admit of a doubt that if Frederick had really given up the shadow of the Bohemian crown, and had offered guarantees for his peaceable behaviour in future, he might have had anything else that he could reasonably ask for. Philip’s poverty, if not his will, would have given consent.
The burden of James’s inertness fell heavily upon Morton, who presented himself in the beginning of February before the February.Morton at Heilbronn.Assembly of the Union at Heilbronn, having brought with him 30,000l., and a few vague promises. He was told that the struggle could not be continued on these conditions. It was true that the ban against Frederick was illegal, and they had sent an ambassador to Vienna to remonstrate against it. But they had no money left. The towns were falling off from the cause. The troops were melting away, and no more than 11,000 men were still under arms. They <185>hoped, therefore, that the States would send them a force of 6,000 men, and James would allow them 30,000l. a month till he was prepared to do something more.[254]
By James the demand thus made was received with complete indifference. His preparations for war had been limited to an order to increase the stock of arms in the Tower, and to an inquiry made through Carleton as to the possibility of procuring in Holland the equipments of an army of 10,000 or 12,000 men.[255]
Very different were the feelings of the Dutch statesmen, by whom the whole chart of continental politics was not unnaturally January.Dutch Commissioners in England.regarded through the medium of their own quarrel with Spain. In January, the States-General had sent over to England a body of commissioners charged to express their views. The truce with Spain, they said, would be at an end in April, and for them at least war was inevitable. Germany and the Protestant religion were in the utmost danger, and they wished to know what were the intentions of the King of England.
From such categorical demands James was always anxious to escape. In his distress he caught at the excuse afforded him by the Reply of James.state of affairs in the East. Though the treaty of 1619 had been accepted by the Dutch authorities in those seas, differences of opinion had arisen upon the interpretation of some of its clauses. There was one dispute as to the right of the Dutch to erect a fort at Batavia. There was another dispute about the value of the captured goods to be restored. The English Company had sent commissioners to Amsterdam, but no satisfaction could be had. James, accordingly, instead of giving a plain answer to the plain question put to him, rated the Dutchmen soundly for having nothing to say upon these points, or upon the equally difficult question of the herring fishery.
In despair, the Commissioners applied to Buckingham. <186>He listened to their complaints, but, according to their report, They apply to Buckingham.he did not seem to know much about the affairs of Germany. The King, he said, was ready to risk his own life, and the life of his son, in the defence of the Palatinate; but there was no hurry about the matter. “In fact,” he concluded by saying, “the Palatinate is by this time pretty well lost. When a good opportunity arrives, the King will try to recover it.” Such was the tone in which Buckingham allowed himself to speak of a question upon which depended the peace of Europe for a generation.
Once more the Commissioners turned to the King. They assured him that the States were ready to do their utmost in the defence of the Palatinate, and they begged James to support them by a diversion in Flanders, an operation which they represented as certain to be followed by the recall of Spinola from Germany.[256] The same advice was repeated at the Hague, with even more distinct emphasis, by the Prince of Orange, in a conversation with Carleton.[257]
To Maurice, James did not vouchsafe an answer. To the Commissioners he replied with studied rudeness. He informed them that he had nothing to say to them about the truce, as they understood their own affairs better than he did. As soon as they had obtained full powers to treat about the herring fishery, and other matters of the kind, he would be ready to give them information as to his intentions respecting the Palatinate.[258]
James’s refusal to state his intentions was wholly unjustifiable, but he was probably right in regarding with suspicion the The expiration of the truce in the Netherlands.counsels of men who had so deep an interest in the prolongation of the war in Germany, as they were themselves likely to be engaged before long in hostilities with Spain. In April the truce of Antwerp would have run its course, and it was no secret that the Spaniards intended, if possible, to wring from the Dutch the <187>abandonment of the East India trade, the opening of the Scheldt, and a guarantee of liberty of worship to the Roman Catholics as the price of its renewal. In the meanwhile, Maurice, fearing lest the inland provinces, which had less immediate interest than Holland and Zealand in the commerce of the Republic, might prove lukewarm when the time of temptation came, was casting about for the best means of defeating the machinations of his ancient enemy. Unexpectedly, the very opportunity which he sought was brought within his reach. There was a certain Madame Tserclaes, an elderly lady, living at Brussels, Intrigues of the Prince of Orange.who had been frequently employed in conveying secret political messages across the frontier. This time she was directed to seek out Maurice himself, and to win him over, if possible, to second the designs of the King of Spain. In the proposal Maurice saw nothing but an attempt upon his fidelity to the Republic, and determining to meet guile with guile, he assured his visitor that he longed for nothing more than a complete reconciliation with Philip. The unexpected news was at once carried to Brussels, and was transmitted without delay to Madrid. The bait was eagerly taken. Madame Tserclaes spent her whole time during the winter months in passing backwards and forwards between Brussels and the Hague. Maurice redoubled his professions of devotion to the King of Spain, and engaged to do all in his power to induce the States to return to their allegiance. Under other circumstances it is possible that his language might have been regarded with suspicion even by Spaniards, slow as they usually were to detect imposture when covered by profuse declarations of devotion to the puppet sovereign who nominally ruled them. Since the Arminian troubles they had been accustomed to take for granted the extreme weakness of the Republic, and they seem to have imagined that Maurice was only using common prudence in attempting to escape from the ruin of a falling house.[259]
<188>The consequences of the implicit faith now placed at Madrid in the Prince of Orange were not long in showing themselves. On March 8, March.Pecquius at the Hague.it was announced that Pecquius, the Chancellor of Brabant, would shortly arrive at the Hague with a proposition from the Archdukes. Immediately it was seen that Maurice was right in foreseeing a division in the counsels of the Republic. The deputies of Holland and Zealand urged that not even bare civility should be shown to the ambassador. The other five provinces were in favour of exhausting all honourable means before the prospect of a renewal of the truce was finally abandoned. Maurice, whose word on such a question was law, gave his voice in favour of the reception of the ambassador with all due respect. At the same time he took care to raise expectation, by spreading the most favourable rumours of the probable issue of the negotiation. Madame Tserclaes, he gave out, had assured him that not only would peace be secured to the Netherlands, but that all reasonable satisfaction would be given with regard to the Palatinate.[260]
On the 12th Pecquius arrived. The next day he was admitted to the Assembly of the States-General. To the utter consternation of all but the one man who held the thread of the intrigue, the ambassador made a formal demand that the Provinces should return to their allegiance. To such words there could be but one reply. Pecquius was ordered to leave the territory of the Republic without delay.[261]
Maurice had gained his end. The insult was resented equally by Calvinist and Arminian, by the seamen of Holland and Renewal of the war.the farmers of Utrecht. The Archduke had supposed that if his first proposition were rejected, there would be time to negotiate upon a fresh basis.[262] He now found that he had roused a spirit which made all negotiation impossible. The renewal of hostilities followed almost immediately.
<189>Thoroughly as the Spanish ministers had been duped, it was not for men whose whole diplomacy was one vast network of intrigue, to Digby’s mission to Brussels.complain of the wrong which they had received. Nor, to do them justice, did they show any signs of vexation. When, on March 7, just as Pecquius was starting for the Hague, Digby arrived at Brussels on a preliminary mission before setting off to negotiate peace at Vienna, he met with a cordial reception. He came to ask for a suspension of arms in the Palatinate. The King of Spain, he was told, would not be unwilling to restore the Palatinate, if he could be assured that James would “contribute all good offices of perfect amity and alliance, and particularly not more to esteem the friendship of the Hollanders than his.”[263] To this Digby, who wanted to bring the Dutch to commercial concessions through fear of Spain, and the Spaniards to political concessions through fear of Holland, raised no objection. He was then informed that the Archduke would give his good word on behalf of Frederick’s re-establishment in the Palatinate, and would order Spinola to make arrangements for a suspension of arms. Digby accordingly returned to London under the impression that the Court of Brussels was “very desirous and ready to give satisfaction.”[264] Nor was he mistaken. For the Archduke had just written to assure Philip that he had been well satisfied with the prospect of a pacification opened by Digby, as Spinola’s troops would now be wanted nearer home.[265]
On March 21, the very day on which this letter was written, the sovereign to whom it was addressed, breathed his last at Madrid.[266] Soon it was rumoured that whilst he was on his deathbed, Death of Philip III.words of no light import had fallen from his lips. The Infanta had been summoned to her father’s presence. “Maria,” he said, “I am sorry that I must die before I have married you; but your brother will take care <190>of that.” He then turned to his son. “Prince,” he added, “do not forsake her till you have made her an empress.”[267] The calculations and intrigues of so many years had been wiped away by the approach of death. The promise which he had given, six months before, to Khevenhüller, that his daughter should become the wife of the Archduke Ferdinand, the future Emperor Ferdinand III., had alone branded itself upon his memory.[268]
The new King, Philip IV., was a mere lad. Unlike his father, he took delight in bodily exercises. His chief pleasure was Philip IV.in the hunting-field. For politics he cared little or nothing, leaving all matters of state to those who understood them, whilst he was intent upon the higher work of keeping himself amused. The favourite companion of his pleasures was the Count of Olivares, and it was soon known that the whole stream of honours and promotions would flow through that channel. Affairs of state were committed to Balthazar de Zuñiga, the uncle of the new favourite, a man of ability and integrity, who had formerly served as ambassador at the Imperial Court, and who was inclined from principle to do all that could be done safely to advance the power of the House of Austria and the Church of Rome.
Under these circumstances James naturally conceived some anxiety, and directed Aston to inquire what were the intentions of April.Aston receives friendly assurances.the young king. The ambassador was met with overwhelming assurances of good-will, and was told that whatever the late sovereign might have said, Philip IV. was most anxious to go on vigorously with the marriage treaty.[269]
Undoubtedly no one but James would have been likely to accept these profuse expressions of good-will as conveying the real feeling of the Spanish ministers. To a more cautious politician, they would not have been without their use. Taken in connection with the circumstances in which the Spanish monarchy was placed, they would at least have served as <191>indications of the value which was placed at Madrid upon the friendship of the King of England. In truth it was in Protestant Germany The dissolution of the Union.far more than in Spain that the dangers were to be found upon which James’s mediation was likely to be wrecked. Frederick’s obstinate retention of the royal title on the one hand, and the menaces of Spinola on the other, were beginning to produce their natural effect upon the Union. The ardent Landgrave of Hesse Cassel had been compelled to keep the peace by his own subjects, who would not hear of his making war against the Emperor. The cities were the next to give way. They had entered the Union in order to defend themselves and their religion against aggression, and they had no idea of following Frederick in a crusade against the Emperor, in which, to them at least, success or defeat would be equally ruinous. Without the money and supplies which the towns alone were able to furnish, the Princes saw no prospect of being able to carry on the war; and on April 2, a treaty was signed at Mentz, by which they engaged to withdraw their troops from the Palatinate, and to dissolve the tie by which their Union had been formed. On the other hand, Spinola agreed to suspend hostilities till May 4, and this concession was expressly declared to have been granted at the request of the King of England.[270]
Such was the ignominious end of the alliance which, under better guidance, might have served as the advanced guard of Protestantism in Germany. Many were the gibes, written and spoken, which were circulated at the expense of that now contemptible body. Yet, if all that is known by us had been known to contemporaries, they would have been less ready to find fault with the leaders of the Union when they abandoned what had become a hopelessly impracticable task, than when they turned aside from their ostensible object — the defence of German Protestantism — to extract from the pockets of peace-loving and orderly citizens the means of carrying on an aggressive and revolutionary policy.
The dissolution of the Union would not have been without <192>its good effects if Frederick had been induced by it to reconsider May.Frederick persists in opposition.his own position. No doubt as long as he contented himself with fixing his eyes merely upon the enemy’s proceedings, there was every reason to induce him to persist in his opposition; for we may well believe that it was something more than personal vanity which made him loth to surrender the crown of Bohemia. The cause of his fellow-Protestants, whose interests he had striven to serve after his blind, ignorant fashion, was still at stake. If he did not re-appear to save them, his trustiest supporters would soon be hurried to the scaffold, and the clergy who had besieged the gates of heaven with prayers for his success would be thrust forth into poverty and exile. Nor was the position of Protestantism in the Empire free from danger. It was now well known that the Emperor intended to convoke an assembly of German princes to meet at Ratisbon, and it was generally believed that he would ask them to sanction the transference of Frederick’s electorate to the Duke of Bavaria. Yet if Frederick really wished to prevent this unhappy consummation, he ought to have been aware that, without assistance from his countrymen, he was powerless to effect his purposes. From one end of Germany to another, wherever public opinion had found a voice to express it, a steady determination had been manifested to remain faithful to the Emperor. On this point, the burghers of Strasburg and Ulm were of one mind with the Elector of Saxony, and with the knightly vassals of the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel. In the institutions of the Empire they all saw the only remaining barrier against anarchy, the only possible guarantee that disputes between the States would be decided by some sort of law, and not by the sword.[271] If Frederick could satisfy this feeling, he might yet hope to stand at the head of a powerful party of his countrymen. If he could not, there was nothing left for him but to become the tool of <193>foreign nations, who saw with delight whatever misery afforded them a prospect of weakening the strength of Germany.
How ready a strong force would have been to rally round him, is nowhere more apparent than in the reception accorded by Proposal for the transference of the Electorate.members of the Imperial party to Ferdinand’s proposition for the transference of the Electorate. Amongst the Catholic prelates, there was none who had stronger personal reasons for desiring the overthrow of the great Calvinist prince, whose territories bordered so closely on his own, than the Elector of Mentz. Yet the first hint that the scheme had been seriously entertained at Vienna was sufficient to fill him with alarm. He wrote at once to Ferdinand to implore him to desist from so rash an enterprise. It would, he said, be certain to throw into the arms of Frederick many of those who had hitherto held aloof. The Elector of Treves expressed himself in almost similar terms. Oñate, speaking on behalf of the King of Spain, was as decided in his opposition; and John George of Saxony began to talk of the infringement of the Golden Bull, which would be the result if the Emperor’s intentions were carried out. Even Ferdinand’s own council recommended at least the postponement of the measure.[272] It needed two years of bitter experience to convince these men that Frederick was indeed incorrigible, and that neither peace nor order was possible so long as he was allowed to set foot within the limits of the Empire.
Meanwhile, a few weeks after his arrival at the Hague, Frederick issued a manifesto, in which he made known his Frederick’s manifesto.intentions to his countrymen, and demanded that a general amnesty should precede the meeting of the Assembly at Ratisbon. The difference between the amnesty which he thus demanded, and the submission for which the Emperor asked, may seem but slight. Yet in reality it contained within its limits the whole matter in dispute. For submission implied that civil war between the states was a wrong done to the Emperor, whilst an amnesty implied simply that peace had been made between contending parties. In other <194>words, Ferdinand and Frederick were divided on the important question, whether the Empire were a reality or a fiction.[273]
Of any readiness to sacrifice himself for the public good, not a trace is to be found in Frederick’s manifesto. Nor is this Nethersole’s mission to England.to be wondered at, for he had recently sent Nethersole to England, to beg for speedy aid for the defence of the Palatinate; and he had directed him to suggest that when he renounced his own claims to Bohemia, he should be allowed to reserve those of his son, who had been elected as his successor during his occupation of the throne, and to ask that he might not be required to promise to abstain from fresh attacks upon the House of Austria.[274]
Infatuated as was Frederick’s notion of fighting his battle without winning the moral sympathies of his countrymen, there was Proceedings of James.equal infatuation in James’s belief that the conflict could be allayed by words alone. He had already obtained from the Archduke a prolongation of the truce in the Palatinate, and, in addition to the money which he had borrowed from the King of Denmark, he now sent to his son-in-law a present of 20,000l.[275] But here his active interference stopped. Long afterwards, Christian IV. bitterly complained that James had blamed his warlike preparations as a hindrance to the success of the English negotiations, and that he had been driven to disband his forces by the coldness with which his overtures had been received in London.[276] In the meantime not the slightest effort was made to secure the co-operation of the Elector of Saxony, though his policy was almost identical with that which James was now pursuing.
<195>Yet, sluggish as he was, so clearly were James’s ideas in accordance with the public opinion of Germany, that it is not improbable that if he had had to deal with nothing more dangerous than the intemperate language of his son-in-law, he would have been able to effect something by his mediation. Unfortunately this was not the case. In his obstinate belief that nothing could be done excepting by the sword, Frederick had been drawing more closely the bonds which united him to the man who was certain to bring his cause into greater disrepute than any folly of which he was himself capable.
Ernest Count of Mansfeld was a soldier of fortune. Utterly deficient in those moral qualities which contribute so much Character of Mansfeld.to the character of a great general, he was never willing to subordinate his own interests to the public good. There is nothing which goes so far as the power of self-abnegation to make a commander of the first class. He must bear to be misrepresented and traduced, and be ready to work in harmony with, or even in subordination to, men whose behaviour is most distasteful to him. He must form no schemes, however glorious, which he does not believe himself capable of carrying into execution. He must be ready to relinquish the most assured success, if he sees that it will stand in the way of the ultimate interests of the cause for which he is fighting. Of all this Mansfeld knew nothing. He was capable of forming the most brilliant conceptions, but he was equally capable of forgetting all about them before a week was over. In the field, he was fertile in resources and daring in action; but personal animosities easily turned him aside, and the mere lack of an intelligent interest in the cause to which he had given his adhesion, made him blindly pass over opportunities which would at once have been appreciated by a general whose heart was in his work.
During the first months of his career in Bohemia, indeed, he had shown the qualities of an active and serviceable officer. His behaviour in the Bohemian war.His capture of the strong fortress of Pilsen was the only real success of the Bohemian armies, and so long as his troops were paid, he had maintained tolerable discipline. The time, however, soon came when all <196>attempts on the part of the Bohemian Directors to find money and provisions for their armies ceased entirely, and Mansfeld’s men were driven to supply themselves by plunder.
If, indeed, nothing more could be said against Mansfeld than that his men were guilty of abominable excesses, it would be Soldiers of the Thirty Years War.unjust to blame him for evils which he was unable to prevent. In those terrible years, no army marched into the field without perpetrating horrors which in our day even the most depraved outcasts could not look upon without a shudder. Liable to dismissal at any moment, the soldier thought it no shame to transfer his services from one side to the other with reckless impartiality. No tie of nationality kept him faithful to the cause which he happened to be serving for the moment, and against which he might be fighting to-morrow. Even military pride, which has sometimes been known almost to replace that lofty and patriotic feeling, was wanting to him. He knew that he had sold himself, body and soul, to his hirer for the time being, and according to the law of our nature all other vices followed in the train of that last degradation of which man is capable. In those camps robbery, cruelty, and lust reigned supreme. Smiling fields and pleasant villages were made hideous by their presence. Blazing farmsteads marked the track of their march, and the air was tainted by the mouldering corpses, not of armed men, but of helpless peasants — of tender babes and of delicate women, fortunate if they had escaped by the sharp remedy of the sword a fate more horrible still.
With an army composed of such materials, a general’s only chance of maintaining even a shadow of discipline lies in the power of Mansfeld’s subsequent conduct.furnishing his troops with regular pay and regular supplies.This, however, was what Mansfeld was unable to do. After his defeat by Bucquoi, in the summer of 1619, he had been at bitter feud with the Bohemian magnates, whom he accused of deserting him in the hour of danger. The revolutionary leaders had little money to spare for their own troops, and none at all for Mansfeld’s. He had consequently held aloof at Pilsen during the campaign of 1620, had entered into separate negotiations with the <197>Imperialists, and had probably by his inaction contributed more than anyone else to the disaster of the White Hill. Since the great defeat he had offered his sword to the highest bidder. Whilst he was imposing upon Frederick by solemn speeches about his loyalty to his king, and his fidelity to the Protestant religion, he was offering to transfer his services to his old master, the Duke of Savoy,[277] and was assuring the Elector of Saxony that if he still held some towns in Bohemia in Frederick’s name, it was merely that he might have in his hands a pledge for the payment of the arrears due to himself and his men.[278] At the same time he was attracting fresh troops to his standard by promising to allow them free liberty of plunder to their hearts’ content.[279]
The difference between Mansfeld and other generals of the time was, not that his troops were more degraded than theirs, but that Comparison between him and other generals.he erected into a system that which with them was an evil which they were powerless altogether to control. It would be difficult to say whether the wretched Bohemian peasants suffered most from Bucquoi’s Hungarians or from Mansfeld’s troopers. There was, however, no doubt that Bucquoi, serving a regular Government, and acting with a distinct military object, would disband his troops as soon as that object was attained, but with Mansfeld there was no such hope. To him it mattered little whether he were victorious or defeated. All he needed was to roam about from one district to another, plundering and destroying as he went. Every German territory would have to learn that it was liable to attack, not in proportion to the good or evil which it had done to one side or the other, but in proportion to the fatness of its pastures, the comfort of its peasants, and the wealth of its citizens.
Such was the man who was formally appointed by Frederick to the command of his armies in Bohemia. He is appointed general by Frederick.That land had been already pillaged too thoroughly to make it a safe basis of operations for an army led on <198>these principles. One post after another surrendered to the Imperialists. Pilsen itself was sold by its own garrison during the temporary absence of Mansfeld.[280] By the end of April, Tabor and Wittingau alone remained in his hands; and he was himself driven to take refuge in the Upper Palatinate.
The question of Frederick’s immediate abdication of the Bohemian crown was therefore no mere point of diplomatic propriety. Mansfeld at Waidhausen.With such a commander still holding two fortified positions in the country, every day that he retained his claim brought with it a fresh provocation to war. It was impossible for Ferdinand, in spite of his past successes, to feel any confidence for the future. The standard raised in Frederick’s name was, in reality, a standard of brigandage. The dissolution of the army of the Union had come in time to supply Mansfeld with throngs of fresh recruits, and, before the end of May, a force of sixteen thousand men, without a country or resources of their own, hung like a dark cloud amongst the forest-clad defiles which command the passes from the Upper Palatinate into Bohemia.
To Frederick, Mansfeld represented himself as only anxious to stand on the defensive, but there were few who believed in His intentions.the sincerity of his professions. Even in Protestant lands it was looked upon as certain that he was meditating a vast aggressive movement. The only doubt expressed was whether the blow would fall upon Bavaria or Bohemia.[281] Nor did he himself make any secret that he did not consider himself bound to remain within the hereditary dominions of his master. In forwarding to the Bavarian commander an extract from a letter in which Frederick had directed him to conclude, if possible, a suspension of arms in the Upper Palatinate, he requested that the towns which still held out in Bohemia might be included in the armistice, and threatened that in case of refusal he should proceed to relieve them by force of arms.[282] <199>Such a demand was of course regarded as totally inadmissible, and both sides prepared for war.[283] In the meanwhile the unhappy inhabitants of the Upper Palatinate had to suffer from the unwelcome presence of their protectors.[284]
[229] Conway to Buckingham, Nov. 18, Harl. MSS. 1580, fol. 281.
[230] Frederick to the Princes of the Union, Nov. 11, Theatrum Europæum, i. 454.
[231] Frederick to the King. Elizabeth to the King, Nov. 13, Ellis, Ser. i. 3, 111, 112.
[232] Elizabeth to Carleton, Nov. 27, S. P. Holland.
[233] Nethersole to Naunton, Dec. 4, S. P. Germany.
[234] Frederick to the Estates of Silesia, Dec. 12, Dec. 23, Londorp, ii. 237. Nethersole to Naunton, March 19, 1621, S. P. Germany.
[235] Theatrum Europæum, i. 462.
[236] The clause in the Capitulation which Ferdinand was said to have broken is the following one:— “Wir sollen und wollen auch fürkommen und keines Wegs gestatten dasz nun hinfüro jemand hohes oder niedriges Stands Churfürst, Fürst, oder anderer, Ursach auch unverhört, in die Acht und Oberacht gethan, bracht, oder erklärt werde; sondern in solchem ordentlichen Procesz, und des H. R. R. in gemeldetem 55ter Jahr reformirten Cammergerichtsordnung, und darauff erfolgter Reichs Abschied in dem gehalten und vollzogen werde, jedoch dem Beschädigten seine Gegenwehr vermög des Landfriedens unabrüchig.”— Limnæus, Capitulationes, 591. See, for Ferdinand’s view of the case, his reply to the Danish Ambassadors, Londorp, ii. 392.
[237] Nethersole to Naunton, Jan. 19, S. P. Germany.
[238] Rusdorf, Consilia et Negotia, 8. The same desponding feeling is to be traced in the letters of Camerarius. Söltl, Religionskrieg, iii. 105–115.
[239] Frederick to the King, Jan. 31, Harl. MSS. 1583, fol. 219.
[240] Frederick to Mansfeld, Feb. 2, Londorp, ii. 377.
[241] Müller, Forschungen, iii. 468.
[242] Anstruther to Calvert, March 10, S. P. Denmark. The expressions given are taken from different parts of a long harangue.
[243] Slange, Gesch. Christians IV. iii. 170.
[244] Carleton to Nethersole, March 5. Carleton to Calvert, March 8, S. P. Holland.
[245] The King to Carleton, Jan. 25. Calvert to Carleton, March 1, S. P. Holland.
[246] It is curious that the Dutch, for opposite reasons, did not wish him to visit England. “We do not think,” wrote Carleton, “the King will discountenance his affairs in Germany by crossing the seas.”
[247] The paper is at the end of the February bundle of the Holland State Papers. It is without a date, but is in Nethersole’s hand. As Nethersole was in the train of Elizabeth, I suppose the answer must have been given about the middle of March.
[248] Carleton to Calvert, March 8, S. P. Holland.
[249] Tillières’ despatch, March 10⁄20, Raumer, ii. 308.
[250] The King to Carleton, March 13, S. P. Holland.
[251] Nethersole to Carleton, March 24, ibid. Amongst these State Papers, there is a note, in the handwriting of one of Sir J. Williamson’s clerks, stating that James had invited her and her husband to England. This may have been taken from some letter now lost, but in the face of the despatches just quoted, I cannot accept it as a true account of the case, unless, indeed, on the unlikely supposition that an invitation was given earlier and then retracted.
[252] Theatrum Europæum, i. 508.
[253] Philip III. to the Archduke, Jan. 9⁄19; Philip III. to Oñate, Jan. 9⁄19, Feb. 26⁄March 8, Brussels MSS.
[254] Morton’s Proposition. Memorial delivered to Morton, S. P. Germany.
[255] Caron to the States-General, Jan. 11, Add. MSS. 17,677 K. fol. 91. Calvert to Carleton, Feb. 17, S. P. Holland.
[256] Report of the Dutch Commissioners, Add. MSS. 22,863, fol. 1–88.
[257] Carleton to Calvert, Feb. 26, S. P. Holland.
[258] Answer of the Privy Council, Feb. 21⁄March 3, Add. MSS. 22,863, fol. 103.
[259] The evidence of all this is contained in a series of letters, too numerous to quote separately, in the Spanish correspondence of the Archduke with Philip III. in the Brussels Archives. They are spread over the whole of the winter months.
[260] Carleton to Calvert, March 8, 10, 13, S. P. Holland.
[261] Aitzema, Saken van Staet en Oorlog, i. 36.
[262] The Archduke Albert to Philip III. Feb. 20⁄March 2, Brussels MSS.
[263] Digby to Buckingham, March 14, Clarendon State Papers, i. App. i.
[264] Digby to Carleton, March 23. Answer of the Archdukes, March 24⁄April 3, S. P. Flanders.
[265] The Archduke Albert to Philip III. March 21⁄31, Brussels MSS.
[266] Aston to Calvert, March 21⁄31, S. P. Spain.
[267] Cabala, 223.
[268] See Vol. III. p. 377.
[269] Aston to the King, April 14, Harl. MSS. 1580, fol. 8; Francisco de Jesus, 32.
[270] Häberlin, xxv. 32; Londorp, ii. 382.
[271] Watchwords are not worth much as an indication of purpose; but they point to the state of feeling in the public to which the appeal is made. It is, therefore, worth noticing that whereas “Die Deutsche Libertät” is the often-recurring formula in the State papers of one party; “Die Liebe Justitia” is its correlative on the other side.
[272] Hurter, Gesch. Ferdinands II. ix. 155.
[273] Frederick to the Electors, May 1⁄11, Londorp, ii. 444.
[274] “His Majesty of Bohemia may happily find it strange that, in setting down the heads of my proposition, I have wholly omitted a very principal part of one of them, and maimed another; to wit, the demanding whether his Majesty should renounce the crown of Bohemia in the name of his children as well as his own, and his desiring not to be obliged never hereafter to attempt anything against the House of Austria.”— Nethersole to Carleton, May 2, S. P. Holland.
[275] The King to Frederick, April 16 (?), Add. MSS. 12,485, fol. 69.
[276] Answer of Christian IV. to Dohna, Londorp, ii. 608. Christian IV. to Frederick, May 2, S. P. Germany.
[277] Mansfeld’s proposal, S. P. Savoy.
[278] Mansfeld to the Elector of Saxony, Müller, Forschungen, ii. 60.
[279] Müller, Forschungen, ii. 43.
[280] Khevenhüller, ix. 1304.
[281] Carpenter to Calvert, June 10, 17, 23, July 1, S. P. Germany.
[282] Extract from a letter from Frederick to Mansfeld. Mansfeld to Tilly, May 16⁄26, Uetterodt, Ernst Graf zu Mansfeld, 746.
[283] This refusal is perpetually referred to in Frederick’s letters as a grievous wrong.
[284] “Der üble Zustand in der Oberpfalz ist nicht zu schildern. Das Mansfeldische Kriegsvolk haust übel.” Camerarius to Solms, May 17⁄27, Söltl, Religionskrieg, iii. 129. Printed “Unterpfalz,” by an evident error, as Onno Klopp has already pointed out.