<200>In May 1621, after a ruinous delay of months, Digby at last prepared to leave England. The instructions which he carried with him May 23.Digby’s instructions.were drawn up in a manly and self-reliant strain, which stood in marked contrast with the hopeful self-confidence stamped on every line of those which had been prepared two years before for the guidance of Doncaster. If internal evidence be worth anything, it leads to the conclusion that the paper had been drawn up under the eye of the ambassador himself.
Digby was first to demand of the Emperor the complete restitution of all that Frederick had possessed before he thought of The restitution of Frederick’s lands and dignities demanded.meddling with Bohemia. “But,” James went on to say, “for that it is not likely that fortune, having so much favoured the Emperor’s party this last year in Bohemia, and that he, being actually in possession of a great part of the Palatinate, will be drawn to restore it simply for our respect and friendship, but likewise that he may be assured of the respect, amity, and due observance of our son-in-law for the future,— we would have you, forasmuch as concerneth us, to let him know our great propension and desire of entertaining all friendship and amity with the House of Austria, and more particularly by uniting ourselves strictly by a match which we hope will take effect between the Prince our son Terms offered.and the Infanta of Spain; and, forasmuch as concerneth our son-in-law, we will undertake on his behalf that, upon the Emperor’s revoking or disannulling of <201>the ban imperial against him, and the restoring of him in such sort as it is above desired, he shall do all things that can justly be required by the Emperor, and may stand with the honour of a prince of his quality and birth. And for that it will be necessary to fall from these generals unto particulars, we will engage ourselves that he shall decline and depart from all pretensions to the Crown of Bohemia and the annexed provinces both for himself and his son, and shall make unto the Emperor all fitting and due recognition and acknowledgment, so that he be not pressed to any such deprecation as shall be dishonourable or unworthy of his blood and rank.”
If Ferdinand accepted these terms it would be well. “But,” James proceeded to say, “in case you shall find the Emperor If they are rejected, Digby is to go to Spain.resolved not to condescend to these our demands in any real point either of our son’s honour or inheritance, you shall then let him know that, as we should have been glad that he would have laid hold of this occasion of obliging us, so, by the contrary, he embarketh himself in a business which must make an immortal and irreconcilable quarrel both betwixt us and our posterities, which we shall be heartily sorry for; but, in a case which toucheth us so nearly both in honour and blood, and wherein we have not omitted to essay all courses of friendship and amity, if they may not prevail, we must betake ourselves to all other lawful means which God shall give us for the righting of ourselves and our children. And then you shall use all possible speed for the transferring of yourself into Spain, where you shall insist upon the same propositions unto that King, urging the hopeful promises given by the King his father and his ministers to our ambassador and agent there, both by word and writing. And, in case you shall find them desirous to evade by transferring the authority and power in this business unto the Emperor, you shall then let that King know that the inheritances of our children have been invaded, and remain yet possessed by his army and under his pay, and no way but titularly belonging unto the Emperor; and therefore you shall in our name earnestly move him that he presently withdraw his army out of the Palatinate, and leave the Emperor to himself, which, if he <202>shall refuse to do, you shall then make it known that we shall be little satisfied with that pretended evasion of having our children dispossessed of their inheritance by his army under the commission of the Emperor, but must desire to be excused if we address ourselves directly for reparation to the hand that really and immediately hurt us. Our meaning briefly and plainly is, that in case herein satisfaction shall be denied us, you endeavour to fix the quarrel as well upon the King of Spain as upon the Emperor. But this we would have you do rather solidly than by any words of threatening or menace, and rather to give us a just and good ground, when we shall see occasion, to enter into a war than suddenly to embark us in it.”
Finally, the ambassador was directed, if he found the King of Spain unwilling to listen to reason, “without any further treating of the match or anything else, fairly to take his leave.”
Such terms as those which Digby was thus authorised to propose are equally distasteful to zealots, who think that a Protestant nation James’s intervention in Germany.ought at all times and under all circumstances to cast its sword into the scale on behalf of a Protestant population, and to theorists who hold that interference in the affairs of foreigners is at no time either lawful or desirable. Yet they will commend themselves to those who think that it is the duty of a great nation to incur some risk in order to avert great evils, and who believe that such intervention can only be attended with success when it comes to give weight to a strong national feeling which is smothered under the overwhelming brute force of a foreign conqueror, or of a domestic faction in league with the armies of a foreign sovereign. Such was the intervention of William of Orange in England in 1688, and of Napoleon III. in Italy in 1859. Such, as far as words went, was the intervention undertaken by James in Germany in 1621.[285]
Unfortunately it went no further than words. Backed by a compact and disciplined army It needed the support of an army.well enough paid to enable it to dispense with the necessity of plunder, Digby might have laid down the law in the Empire. As it was, he had to soothe as he could, by the mere <203>persuasiveness of his voice, two armies ready to fly at each other’s throats. On the one side was Maximilian, impatient to add the Upper Palatinate to his hereditary dominions; on the other side was Mansfeld, whose disorganised forces combined the least possible power of resistance with the greatest possible amount of provocation.
Even whilst Digby was on his way to Vienna, the danger of an immediate collision was increasing. Mansfeld, now at the head of 20,000 men, June.Mansfeld and Jägerndorf.had seized and fortified Rosshaupt, a strong post within the Bohemian frontier. The Margrave of Jägerndorf, a kindred spirit, was at the head of 7,000 men in Silesia, and was threatening, after levying contributions from the territories of the Catholics, to cross the mountains and to join forces with Mansfeld before the gates of Prague. In Hungary, Bethlen Gabor was making head against Bucquoi. On every side the wild terrors of the storm which had been quelled for a moment threatened to burst forth with redoubled violence.[286]
The seizure of Rosshaupt filled, in Maximilian’s eyes, the cup of Mansfeld’s offences to the brim. It might now be seen, he Anger of the Duke of Bavaria.wrote to the Emperor, what was the real value of the adventurer’s protestations that he was only standing on the defensive. Ferdinand replied by authorising him to put his troops in motion, whilst messengers were hastily despatched to Brussels and Madrid to ask for Spinola’s co-operation on the Rhine.[287]
Mansfeld, at least, was determined to show his disregard of all diplomatic attempts to July.Mansfeld’s treatment of the neighbouring lands.bring about a peace. He turned sharply upon the Bishop of Bamberg and Würzburg, who was guilty of the offence of having sent his troops into Bohemia in common with other members of the League, and threatened to devastate <204>his territories with fire and sword.[288] A sudden attack was also made upon the Landgrave of Leuchtenberg, who had admitted a Bavarian garrison into his dominions. The Landgrave himself was dragged away as a prisoner to Mansfeld’s camp.[289]
Such was the crisis at which affairs had arrived when Digby entered Vienna. If any man living was capable of pouring oil upon July 4.Digby’s arrival at Vienna.the troubled waters it was he. For he possessed, to a very great degree, the power of penetrating the thoughts and intentions of others, and, in a still higher degree, the power of instant decision in the midst of conflicting perils.
Four months earlier Digby’s presence would have been invaluable. He could now hardly flatter himself that success was otherwise than very dubious. Ferdinand had been confirmed, by recent events, in his belief that it was hopeless to expect peace from Frederick, even if Frederick had the power to control the army which had been created in his name, and he had turned a deaf ear to the entreaties of the ambassadors from Denmark and the late Union, though they had asked to negotiate on the basis of Frederick’s abdication. It was no wonder if he was incredulous; for Frederick’s secret papers, which had fallen into the hands of the victors after his defeat at Prague, had recently been published, and his intrigues with Mansfeld and Savoy for the partition of the territories of the House of Austria had thus been laid open to the world.[290]
Digby saw that he had no time to lose. His only chance was, that, as he could speak with the authority of the King of England, July 5.Digby’s propositions.his engagements on behalf of his master’s son-in-law might be accepted, though the promises of others had been rejected with disdain. On the very day after his arrival, therefore, he asked the Emperor for <205>a declaration of his intention to restore Frederick to his lands and dignities. The King of England would then obtain from the Elector Palatine a recognition of his obedience. Upon these terms he hoped that the further execution of the ban would be suspended, and the truce in the Lower Palatinate prolonged.
In three days he received his answer. The Emperor, he was told, could decide nothing without consulting the Princes of the Empire, July 8.The Emperor’s answer.who had been already summoned to Ratisbon. It was impossible to suspend hostilities any longer. Mansfeld had assailed Bohemia. Jägerndorf had published a commission signed by Frederick at the very moment when he professed to be treating. Yet, even now, if Frederick showed real signs of repentance, the execution of the ban should be stopped.[291]
The concluding words were a symptom of the hesitation which was gaining ground in the Emperor’s mind. During the Ferdinand’s hesitation.last few days bad news had been pouring in from every side. Bucquoi had been slain in Hungary, and his troops were in full retreat. The first days of the campaign in the Upper Palatinate had not turned out well for the Bavarians. The Elector of Saxony had refused to attend the assembly at Ratisbon, and his refusal was, with great probability, ascribed to his dislike of the plan of depriving Frederick of his Electorate.[292] Upon Maximilian the effect of the intelligence was merely irritating. He at once concluded a short truce with Mansfeld, which he hoped to turn to his own purposes, and hurried off a courier to Brussels with an urgent demand that Spinola might be ordered at once to take the field.[293] Ferdinand, whose territories were more immediately exposed to danger, and who was at all times more single-minded than Maximilian, began to hesitate. Was it <206>wise, he wrote to the Duke, to let the opportunity slip? The King of Spain was fully occupied with the Dutch war. If Digby were dismissed without a satisfactory answer, it would not be long before the Elector of Saxony, with the whole of the North of Germany at his back, would be found fighting on Frederick’s side.[294]
Ferdinand’s suggestion was not likely to meet with a favourable reception. Maximilian was indignant that Digby Maximilian protests against Digby’s offers.had been listened to for an instant. The Emperor, he said, had solemnly promised that the Electorate should be his. He had come to his assistance when he was in distress, and, if his wishes were now to be disregarded, he would take no further trouble to preserve the Austrian territories from their present danger. His language did not fail in finding influential supporters at Vienna. The Pope’s Nuncio, and Hyacintho, a Capuchin friar, who had lately arrived on a special mission from Rome, put forth all their eloquence in the hope of persuading Ferdinand to break off the negotiations, and to effect an immediate transference of the Electorate to Maximilian.
The Emperor was not usually inaccessible to spiritual influences, and he was bound by every tie of interest and gratitude to Maximilian, but Ferdinand determines to treat.his better nature shrank from the prospect of interminable and perhaps hopeless war which was opening before him. After some days’ hesitation, he told the Nuncio that he had made up his mind to treat with Digby. “If the Pope,” he said, “knew what the position of affairs really is, he would be of the same opinion with myself.”
On July 21, therefore, Digby was informed of the Emperor’s determination. The blame of the recent outbreak of hostilities was July 21.thrown upon Mansfeld and Jägerndorf. Let Frederick relieve the Catholic Powers from all fear of future aggression, and no difficulty would be thrown in the way of the proposed negotiation. Letters should be despatched to Maximilian and Spinola, requesting them to abstain from <207>hostilities, if only they had reason to believe that they were themselves safe from injury. It was for Frederick to revoke any commission which he might have issued for an attack upon the Emperor’s dominions, and to prove to the world that his lieutenants had acted without his authority. If he would do this, all risk of war would be at an end.[295]
With this answer Digby was well satisfied. He had gained, he said, in the despatch in which he recounted his proceedings, Digby satisfied.all that could reasonably be expected. He had hardly hoped that the Emperor would consent to treat the transference of the Electorate as an open question. Yet he was too clear-sighted not to be aware how many difficulties were still to be surmounted. Everything, he said, depended on the part taken by Spain. Yet if, like James, he was inclined to hope for the best from the Court of Madrid, he knew far better than James how unwise it would be to trust to unsupported argument for success. “I must earnestly recommend,” he wrote, “the continuing abroad yet for some small time Sir Robert Mansell’s fleet upon the coast of Spain, which, in case his Majesty should be ill used, will prove the best argument he can use for the restitution of the Palatinate.”[296]
Yet, in truth, if Digby had been able to speak with confidence of Frederick’s intentions, there would have been little need of such an argument. June.Policy of the new Spanish Government.The reception by the new Spanish Government of the first hint of the Emperor’s proposal to transfer the Electorate to Maximilian had been most unfavourable. Letters were at once despatched in the name of the young King to the Archduke Albert at Brussels, and to Oñate at Vienna. The House of Austria, wrote Philip, owed much to the Duke of Bavaria; but it would be unreasonable to continue the war solely for his <208>personal advantage. It was to be hoped, therefore, that the Assembly of Ratisbon would lead to a speedy pacification.[297]
By the time that these despatches reached their destination much had changed. Mansfeld’s army was daily increasing in numbers, Spinola ordered to aid the Duke of Bavaria.and Maximilian, by the Emperor’s orders, was preparing to expel him from the threatening position which he occupied. To an inquiry whether he would desert his allies at such a conjuncture, the Archduke Albert could hardly reply otherwise than he did. He should much prefer, he said, a general pacification; but if the proceedings of Mansfeld made war necessary, he could not leave the Duke of Bavaria to be crushed. The suspension of hostilities would July.come to an end on July 22, and Spinola should receive orders to recommence the war in the Lower Palatinate as soon as he heard that the Bavarians had actually taken the field.[298]
This order was the last public act of the Archduke. On July 3 he died, after a long and painful illness.[299] With him the nominal independence of the country came to an end. He left <209>no children to succeed him, and his widow, the aunt of the young King of Spain, July 3.Death of the Archduke Albert.was now again the Infanta Isabella, the Spanish governor of the Spanish Netherlands. Excepting that perhaps the Infanta was rather more reluctant to embark in hazardous enterprises than her husband had been, no change in the system of government was observable.
She had not been long in possession of authority when she learned that Mansfeld had attacked the Catholic States in his neighbourhood, and that The Spanish operations suspended.Maximilian’s worst fears were already realised. When Trumbull saw Spinola, who had been recalled to Brussels to conduct the preparations against the Dutch, he found him greatly excited. “What,” he said, “will the world think of us, if we make a truce in the Palatinate whilst the throats of our confederates are being cut?”[300] A few days afterwards, however, Cordova, who had been left in command of the troops in Germany, contrived to intimate to Frederick’s officers that, though the truce would not be formally renewed, he should not take the field without special orders from Brussels;[301] and it was not long before a letter arrived from Ferdinand conveying the intelligence that negotiations had been opened with Digby, and expressing a wish that, unless there were grave military reasons to the contrary, hostilities should continue in suspense till it was seen whether Frederick’s assent could be obtained to the terms July.proposed by the English ambassador.[302] Trumbull was accordingly assured by Spinola, that if Frederick were really in earnest he might have a truce for six months.[303]
It is therefore beyond all reasonable doubt that, at the <210>beginning of August, the Duke of Bavaria stood alone in his Frederick’s proceedings.desire to proceed to extremities. The Courts of Spain, of Brussels, of Vienna, and of Dresden might, from various causes, and with different degrees of earnestness, be counted amongst the supporters of Digby’s pacificatory negotiation. Unhappily Maximilian found one man who was doing everything in his power to give effect to his warlike policy. That one man was no other than Frederick himself.
That unhappy prince could see plainly enough that Maximilian wanted to possess himself of the Upper Palatinate; but he could see nothing else. That his own retention of the Bohemian crown was a gage of battle flung down at the feet of the Catholic Powers, and that it alienated from him the sympathies of three-fourths of the Protestant Powers, was a truth which he was incapable of comprehending. His language when he heard of the violent proceedings of Mansfeld and Jägerndorf, was the language of hopeless incapacity. He had given them no orders, but he could not blame them. It was all the fault of Ferdinand and Maximilian. His lieutenants had been in the service of the Bohemian Estates before they entered his. If they had pretensions of their own in Bohemia, he could not hold them back. He could not even say that they were in the wrong in offering a helping hand to the oppressed Protestants.[304]
It was quite true that the Bohemian Protestants were in evil case, and it was impossible to blame Frederick for his sympathy with his late subjects; but it is certain that a wise man would have attempted to help them in a very different way. If Bohemian Protestantism was to be saved, it would only be because German Protestantism was strong. Still, as three years before, the only hope of strengthening German Protestantism lay in a close union between Heidelberg and Dresden, and it was notorious that it was mainly by Frederick’s aggressive ambition that such a union had hitherto been rendered impossible. It was therefore only by abdicating the throne of Bohemia that he could hope to help the Bohemians.
In the mood in which Frederick was, it was inevitable that <211>he would do something foolish. Yet even those who thought August.Frederick in the Dutch camp.most meanly of his understanding, can hardly have been prepared for the gratuitous act of folly of which he was now guilty. If he had made his way to Mansfeld’s camp, had placed himself at the head of his troops, and had given orders to march upon Prague, there would at least have been some method in his madness. But what was to be said when he gravely proposed to join the camp which the Prince of Orange was forming at Emmerich for operations against the Spaniards? Such a proceeding could do him no possible good, whilst it was certain to be regarded at Brussels and Vienna as an act of defiance. Carleton and Nethersole were at their wits’ end. Even Elizabeth, ready as she invariably was to encourage her husband in any rational act of manliness, joined in protesting against the step. It was some time before the English envoys were able to discover what Frederick’s motive could be. At last it came out that he was ashamed of the part which he had played at Prague, and that he hoped, under Maurice’s tuition, to learn enough of war to qualify him for taking command of his own troops at some future time. On August 16, he set out from the Hague, with this childish fancy in his head.[305]
The real cause of Frederick’s headstrong conduct, however, lay far deeper. The news of Bucquoi’s defeat, which had alarmed Ferdinand, He is resolved to prosecute the war.restored the confidence of his rival. Once more the fugitive prince was dreaming of entering Prague as a conqueror. “Our affairs,” wrote Elizabeth to a confidential friend in England, “begin to mend. The King of Hungary is master of the field. Mansfeld and Jägerndorf do daily prosper.”[306] Carleton complained bitterly that Frederick was ‘less tractable than before.’ In fact, he was now possessed by the most extraordinary delusion. Ferdinand’s cause he believed to be hopeless. The only <212>question was, whether Bohemia should belong to himself or to Bethlen Gabor, and he came to the conclusion that it was his duty to prevent the surrender of Prague to an ally who was, after all, a mere creature of the Turks. In this absurdity he was encouraged by Mansfeld, in whose busy brain the idea had perhaps originated.[307]
Already Digby, at Vienna, had been made to feel the change. On August 4, Andreas Pawel, one of Frederick’s councillors, Pawel at Vienna.arrived to assist him in his negotiation. He found that the English ambassador had resolved upon striking the iron whilst it was hot, by presenting for Ferdinand’s approval a form of submission which Frederick should be required to make, and that he proposed that in proof of his sincerity Frederick should surrender the two towns which he held in Bohemia, on receiving a guarantee that the religion of their inhabitants would be respected. To both these proposals Pawel offered a determined opposition. For the present, at least, he said, his master would not hear of the surrender of the towns. Still less would he agree to make any kind of submission to the Emperor. By so doing he would acknowledge that he had committed a fault. The truth was, that the ban was a nullity, and he would never bring himself even to ask for its revocation. “I think,” wrote Digby to Calvert, “they would have the Emperor ask them forgiveness for having wronged them with so injurious a ban.”[308] Almost at the same time Frederick was writing a despatch to Digby, in which he adopted these extravagant pretensions. He would be ready, he said, to pay all due respect to the Emperor, but he would make no submission.[309]
Deeply mortified as Digby must have been by Frederick’s unreasonableness, he knew that it was from another quarter that Digby’s opinion of the crisis.the immediate danger was to be apprehended. “As for the main business,” he wrote to James, “I am in great hope that in convenient time it may be effected to your Majesty’s good satisfaction; and, <213>in the interim, a general cessation of arms both in the Lower and Upper Palatinates might have been procured, were it not in respect of the Count Mansfeld, whose present condition is such that it hindreth and overthroweth all I have in hand; neither know I what course to take for the redress of it, for when I proposed here a cessation of arms in the Palatinate, until by treaty all things may be finally and conveniently ended, it is answered me that the Emperor is not averse thereunto; so that it may be general as well in the Upper as the Lower Palatinate, and that the Emperor’s territories may not be assailed, for which I am very doubtful whether the Prince Elector himself can do it. For, although the Count Mansfeld shelter himself under the name and authority of the King of Bohemia, yet I doubt much, in case he should command him absolutely to disarm, or in the interim to stand upon a pure defensive, whether therein he would obey him; neither see I, indeed, well how he could, for he hath now with him above twenty thousand men, most of them adventurers, and in case he should yield unto a cessation of arms, most of them must either disband or starve. For the Upper Palatinate is absolutely ruined and wasted, so that his army can no way remain there, and if he shall attempt the living upon any other neighbour country, it will be esteemed a public act of hostility; and as for the dismissing of his army, it is a thing impracticable until the business shall be well settled, and there must be means found for his payment before he will out of the Upper Palatinate. Besides, he pretendeth great sums of money to be due unto him by the estates of Bohemia, and for that debt pretendeth to hold Tabor and Wittingau. So that, whereas it is said that those towns hold for the Prince Palatine, I conceive they are very willing to advantage themselves with that pretext. But, in case upon any composition he should command them to be restored to the Emperor, I have just cause to doubt he would not therein be obeyed. Insomuch that his name and authority is used in that which is prejudicial to him. But wherein it may be for his good and advantage, I fear he will find his authority very limited.”[310]
<214>Such were the unpromising elements of the problem which Digby had undertaken to solve. Yet, strange to say, it was Vere in the Lower Palatinate.not on the Bavarian frontier that the first blow was struck. Since the dissolution of the Union the command in the Lower Palatinate had been entrusted by Frederick to Vere, and Vere was beginning to experience the same difficulties as those by which Mansfeld was beset. His troops were ill paid and ill-provided. The land was exhausted. In the presence of the spectre of war, the peasants had not ventured to sow their fields, in order to prepare a harvest which they would not be allowed to gather into their barns. It was with famine staring him in the face that Vere read the letters which reached him from Digby, from Trumbull, and from Calvert, urging him to keep the peace at all hazards. Though he was an Englishman, he was not in the King of England’s service. James had plenty of advice to give, but he sent no money with which to alleviate the distress of the army. Frederick was equally unable to supply him, and whatever advice he had to give was very bad. His representative, the Duke of Zweibrücken, joined the council of Heidelberg in urging that something should be done. Vere was a good soldier, but he was not a statesman; and in his desperation he weakly consented to a middle course from which no good could possibly come.[311]
The lands of the Bishop of Spires had been untouched by the war, and Vere knew that it would be a great relief to his own men The truce broken.if he could quarter one or two regiments upon the inhabitants. His soldiers, he believed, were well under control. They would take nothing from the people but provisions. No pillage should be allowed. In all courtesy he would first ask the bishop for his consent. Upon this scheme he acted. Making a virtue of necessity, the bishop <215>gave the required permission, and sent a commissary to watch the proceedings. But the peasants who were to find quarters for the men did not take the matter so easily. They had a strong suspicion that the soldiers would not prove quite as lamblike as their commander reported. In one village resistance was offered, and shots were fired. The troops forced their way into the place, striking down in the fray those who attempted to bar their path.[312]
In a moment the whole Catholic party was roused to indignation. This, then, was what Frederick meant by peace. Stein seized by Cordova.Cordova at once declared that the truce was at an end, seized the strong castle of Stein, which commanded the passage of the Rhine, and threatened Vere’s weak battalions with his superior force.
At last James was roused from his apathy. Upon his son-in-law he bestowed a severe but not unmerited rebuke. If he wished James expostulates with Frederick.for any further aid from England he must leave the Dutch camp; he must recall all commissions by which his officers were empowered to take any measures not needed for the defence of his own dominions, and a copy of this revocation must be sent at once to Digby. Above all, he must consent to make due submission to the Emperor, and must leave it to the English ambassador to see that it was not couched in degrading terms.[313] At the same time Calvert was directed to expostulate with Gondomar on Cordova’s precipitation.
It was somewhat of the latest. Digby felt deeply the want of that support upon which he might fairly have counted. To Calvert September.Digby’s complaints.he poured out his sorrows. Everywhere Frederick’s commanders had been the aggressors. “I will make no complaint,” he wrote, in the bitterness of his heart, “but I must needs confess it hath been a strange unluckiness.” For every one of Frederick’s servants who desired peace, there were five who wished to drag England <216>into a war with Spain.[314] If the King intended to carry out his plans, “he must first reduce the business to such a conformity that that which his faithful ministers shall have established in one part be not overthrown by the malice or artifice of the attempts of others in other parts, as hitherto hath happened.”[315]
Whatever man could do was done by Digby. To the Emperor’s reasoning that he could not be expected to grant an armistice unless it were to include the whole theatre of the war, he had nothing to reply. But neither Mansfeld nor Jägerndorf were under his orders, and it was more than doubtful whether they would obey Frederick himself. Yet, unless he took some responsibility upon himself, all chance of peace was at an end. Accordingly he concerted with the Emperor a plan for a pacification, and trusted to accident to enable him to realise it.
Ferdinand, according to this scheme, engaged to write once more to the Infanta Isabella and the Duke of Bavaria, urging them Sept. 3.Digby’s new plan.to suspend hostilities unless they could show good reason to the contrary. Mansfeld would be bound to respect the armistice which, it was hoped, would then be signed, on pain of being treated by James and Frederick as a common enemy. Frederick was to be induced to revoke his commission to Jägerndorf, and to surrender the towns in Bohemia. Negotiations for a peace were then to be opened, and, as soon as the execution of the ban had been suspended, Mansfeld’s troops were to be disbanded on a promise from the Emperor that he would give three months’ notice before renewing the war.[316]
Digby’s hopes of the success of his endeavours were not high. He knew that he had not a single line under Frederick’s hand He leaves Vienna.to authorise him to make the concessions which he regarded as indispensable, and he could hardly suppose that the last arrangement, depending as it did upon the consent of the Duke of Bavaria, would really take effect. <217>He was now leaving Vienna, anxious to visit Maximilian on his way home. “Of my proceedings here,” he wrote to the Prince of Wales before he started on his journey, “I will only say this, that things have been so carried as if the chief care and study had been to overthrow the treaty I had in hand, and to renew the war; which I doubt not we shall find by experience will turn infinitely to the prejudice of the King’s son-in-law.”[317]
A few days after these words were written, Digby’s worst fears were realised. Unsupported by Frederick, no engagement Invasion of the Upper Palatinate.into which he could enter could offer any solid guarantee to the Imperialists. In recommending the scheme of the English ambassador to Maximilian, Ferdinand acknowledged that he was mainly influenced by the despondent view which he took of his military position.[318] Such an argument was not likely to weigh much with Maximilian. He had made up his mind to cut the knot with the sword, and without waiting for any further instructions from Vienna, he threw himself with all his forces upon the Upper Palatinate.
Then was seen on what a broken reed Frederick had placed his confidence. The great adventurer, the would-be conqueror of Austria and Bohemia, was not even in a condition to defend the country which had been trusted to his care. Unpaid and unprovided with supplies, Mansfeld’s troops had reimbursed themselves at the expense of those whom they had been charged to defend. Rapine and violence had done their work. The heart of the population was alienated from the prince who had entrusted his subjects to the care of a pack of wolves. The magistrates refused to provide for the defence of the country. It was better, men were heard to say, that the Duke of Bavaria should take the land than that Mansfeld should remain in it a moment longer.[319]
As usual, Mansfeld sought to escape from his difficulties by <218>trickery. In the spring he had invited his nephew Rene de Chalon to come to him from Flanders, in order that he might be the medium of an arrangement by which he then hoped to sell his services to the Emperor. When Chalon arrived Mansfeld had reinforced his army, and was looking forward to the reconquest of Bohemia. He did not, however, let go the thread of the intrigue, and while continuing to hold out hopes to the Imperialists, took credit with Frederick for the firmness with which he had resisted their seductions. He now intimated to Maximilian that he was ready to sell his master’s interests. Mansfeld engages to disband his army.A treaty was drawn up by which he engaged, in consideration of a large sum of money, either to disband his army or to carry it into the service of the Emperor.[320]
As chance would have it, Mansfeld, riding into Neumarkt for the purpose of signing this infamous treaty, met Digby’s train His meeting with Digby.on its way to Nuremberg. Putting a bold face on the matter, he asked the ambassador to accompany him and to assist him with his advice. Digby answered coldly that he had no authority to treat with the Duke of Bavaria. Upon this Mansfeld began to defend his conduct. His wants, he said, were great; his forces were too weak to hold head against the enemy; the people of the country were traitors; all that he meant in treating with Maximilian was to gain time in order to transfer his army to the Lower Palatinate. To Digby such language was intolerable. He had seen, he told him, the articles of the treaty by which he had bound himself not to serve against the House of Austria. He knew what was the exact sum of money for which he had sold his master. “When I replied unto him thus,” was Digby’s account of the scene, “I never saw so disturbed or distracted a man, and he would have recalled many things he had said, and began to swear nothing was concluded, but that things were to be ended now with the Commissioners, and that he would do nothing but with the consent of the Council of Amberg, who he had likewise appointed to be there, and desired that Monsieur <219>Andreas Pawel might return with him to be present at their meeting. Much passed betwixt us, for we were together almost two hours. I concluded by telling him freely my opinion, that the defence of the Palatinate being committed to him, and being now only invaded for his cause in regard of his assailing Bohemia, if he should now, with so great and flourishing an army, abandon to the enemy a country for the defence whereof his honour was answerable, especially for a mercenary reward of money, I conceived that the Count Mansfeld would, from one of the most renowned cavaliers of Christendom, become the most vile and infamous; and on these terms we parted, he swearing he would do nothing but what would stand with his honour; but, my lords, I must confess that so perturbed a man I never saw.”[321]
So the two men separated: the one to his duty, the other to his treason.
Under such circumstances the fate of the Upper Palatinate could not remain long undecided. On the 15th of September Conquest of the Upper Palatinate.the strong military post of Cham had surrendered to the Bavarians. Before the end of the month Maximilian’s troops were welcomed by the whole country as deliverers from the tyranny of Mansfeld. Frederick’s general retained nothing more than the ground on which his troops were encamped.[322]
It was not in the field alone that Maximilian was victorious. The first news of his determination to appeal to the sword had been The Electorate secretly conferred upon Maximilian.followed by a total change of policy at Vienna Ferdinand’s hesitation was at an end. Whatever the prospects of the two armies might be, he had no intention of deserting his old and tried friend for such a will-of-the-wisp as the mere chance that Frederick, who had never done a wise thing in his life, would now at last be wise enough to adopt the terms to which Digby had consented in his name. On September 12 he sent for the friar Hyacintho, and placed in his hands, in the strictest secrecy, an <220>act by which he conferred the Electorate upon Maximilian. The Archduke Charles, the Emperor’s brother, was despatched to Dresden, to gain over John George. Hyacintho himself was to go to Madrid, to wring, if possible, an assent from the King of Spain.[323]
Whatever Englishmen might think about the matter, it was from Spain that the most strenuous opposition was to be expected. August.Objections of Spain.If the Spanish Government continued to take part in the war at all, it was only because Frederick’s folly made it impossible for them to withdraw with honour. In June the Council of State at Madrid was looking forward with hope to a general pacification. Then had come the news of Mansfeld’s excesses in Würzburg and Leuchtenberg, and it was necessary to take the change of circumstances into consideration. Zuñiga was consulted, and his advice was embodied in a despatch written by Philip to his ambassador at Vienna. “By all means,” such was the substance of the letter, “take care to oppose the pretensions of the Duke of Bavaria to the Electorate. Induce the Emperor, if possible, to satisfy him by the cession of the district of Burgau, or of some other Austrian territory. Every day increases the necessity for obtaining a settlement to which the Palatine will agree. Probably the best solution is that which has been indicated by a councillor of the Elector of Saxony. If Frederick would abdicate the Electorate, his son might at once be accepted as his successor, and educated at the Emperor’s Court.”[324] A few days later Sept. 1.Philip wrote again, approving the support which Oñate had given to Digby. It was necessary, he said, that the troops in the Lower Palatinate should come to the assistance of the Bavarians, but he hoped that the negotiations for a general pacification would not be postponed.[325]
The plan thus put forward by the Spanish Government is the more noteworthy because it continued to be the object of its <221>desires till the course of events made the position which it now Recommendation of Frederick’s abdication.took up altogether untenable. It sprang from a profound conviction that with Frederick no peace was possible. It had the advantage of offering a middle ground upon which both parties might agree. It had the disadvantage with which all the schemes proceeding from the Catholic side were attended. It dealt only with the wrongs of the princes, and forgot the wrongs of the people. That education at the Emperor’s Court involved a change of religion it was impossible to doubt; and as matters stood in Germany, the voluntary conversion of a prince carried with it the forcible conversion of his subjects. Perhaps if some neutral Protestant Court had been substituted for Vienna as the place of education, the plan might ultimately have been found to promise the most satisfactory solution; but it was evidently premature to expect that it would as yet be acceptable to anyone.
If better terms were to be obtained, it was indispensable that Frederick should be brought to his senses. Accordingly James, Mission of Villiers to the Hague.finding that his son-in-law paid no attention whatever to his letters, despatched Sir Edward Villiers to Holland, with orders to insist upon his return from the Dutch camp. Frederick saw the necessity of obeying, and whilst Sir Edward was journeying towards him by one road to the camp, he hurried back to the Hague, like a truant schoolboy, by another. It was more difficult to extract from him a promise that he would make the required submission to the Emperor. He placed in Villiers’ hands a lengthy argument by which he proved, to his own satisfaction, that such a step would be ruinous to his country and dishonourable to himself.[326] At last, however, he yielded, and protested that he would do as he was bidden.[327]
Nor did James stand alone in urging upon Frederick the necessity of submitting. In a letter written to him about this time by the Princes of Lower Saxony, the blame of all that had occurred is distinctly ascribed to his own restlessness; and his <222>obstinacy is characterised as the chief impediment to the peace of Germany.[328] Even Frederick’s own subjects in the Palatinate were of the same opinion. Men openly said that if he had but written a few lines to the Emperor, all would have been well.[329]
Experience was not very favourable to the hope that Frederick would take these admonitions to heart. Yet, considering Digby at Heidelberg.the interests that were at stake, Digby was no doubt right in refusing to throw up the game. He had been summoned in haste to Heidelberg to assist in providing for the defence of the Lower Palatinate.[330] He found the troops in a pitiable condition. The Spaniards were masters of the open country on both sides of the Rhine. Vere’s little force of three or four thousand men was fully employed in garrisoning Heidelberg, Mannheim, and Frankenthal. The troops at Frankenthal, which was soon actually besieged by Cordova, were under the command of Sir John Burroughs, a brave and skilful veteran. He was supported by the ardour of the townspeople, who mainly consisted of Protestant emigrants from the Spanish Netherlands. Yet it was evident that, unless succour came, he could not hold out long. Nor was this the worst. There were symptoms that the same causes which had produced the defection of the inhabitants of the Upper Palatinate, were operating in the Lower. “The gentry of the country were using means to be preserved in their estates and goods.” The people were groaning under their hardships, and were seeking an accommodation with the enemy. Vere’s men were almost in open mutiny for want of pay, and food to satisfy them was not to be had.
Such was the position of affairs when Digby arrived. He was not the man to shrink from responsibility. Though without orders, He supplies the Council with money.he would supply what was needed to carry on the defence of the country. He borrowed money on his own credit from the Nuremberg bankers. He sent his plate to the melting-pot. In this way he got together <223>a sum of 10,000l., which he at once placed in the hands of the Heidelberg Council. “If this sum,” he wrote to his own Government, “could be made up to 20,000l., the garrisons might still hold out. If not, everything would run a hazard.” 20,000l., supplied now, would do more than 100,000l. afterwards.[331]
Digby, satisfied that he had done his duty, passed on to Brussels. Strange news awaited him there. After all, Mansfeld had Mansfeld in the Lower Palatinate.come to the conclusion that Frederick’s service was better than the Emperor’s, and had made up his mind to continue steadfast to what he was pleased to call his principles. Deceit and trickery cost him nothing. On September 30, he disarmed the suspicion of his enemies by signing the engagement to disband his army.[332] Before the next sun rose, he slipped away with his whole force, and marched with all speed for Heidelberg.[333]
Digby had no confidence in Mansfeld. He knew that the Bavarians would soon be at the heels of the force which had October.Digby at Brussels.eluded them, and that even if the adventurer remained master of the field, it was not likely that he would consult any interests but his own. It was useless to appeal to the Infanta. Personally in favour of a general suspension of arms,[334] she had been charged by the Emperor to take no steps without the consent of Maximilian, and that consent had not been accorded to her. Nor was Digby in a very dissimilar position. He had no authority to speak in Frederick’s name. He contented himself, therefore, with using strong language on his own account. “I know not,” he wrote to Calvert, “what I may be held in England, but I am sure here I shall hardly ever be <224>held Spanish hereafter; for I assure you I have dealt very plainly with them.”[335] It was in Spain, as he well knew, that, so far as it was possible to do anything whilst Frederick and Mansfeld His return to England.were masters of the position, his work was to be done. He accordingly hastened back to England, to impart to James the knowledge which he had acquired, hoping to start again for Madrid as soon as possible. Before he left the Continent, he heard that Mansfeld had arrived in the Lower Palatinate, and that Cordova had been forced to raise the siege of Frankenthal.
A short breathing-time was gained. It was just possible that it might yet be used to force reasonable terms on Frederick and Maximilian alike. Perhaps, if Digby had been King of England, this might have been done, for no man knew better than he how little words could effect in such a case. The firmness of will and the promptness of action which had saved the Council of Heidelberg from ruin, might perhaps, if they had been allowed free play, have saved Europe from war.
Everything depended on the impression of resolution which James would be able to make upon the Court of Madrid. Philip’s ministers, after all, did not desire peace because they had no wish to encroach in Germany, but because they were afraid of the consequences. Unfortunately, during Digby’s absence, James had, as usual, been acting in the way most calculated to remove any fear that he would ever take up an independent position in opposition to Spain.
On November 27 in the preceding year, Mansell cast anchor with his fleet of twenty ships in the roads of Algiers. He sent 1620.November.Mansell at Algiers.a formal demand to the Dey for the restitution of all English vessels and English subjects in his possession, and for the execution or surrender of the pirates by whom they had been captured. He might have saved himself the trouble. The Algerines pretended extreme eagerness to comply with his wishes, and released some four-and-twenty captives. Mansell was well aware that such a handful of men formed but a small instalment of the crews of the hundred and <225>fifty English vessels which had been taken in the past six years, but though he was ready to remonstrate, he was not prepared to fight. Supplies promised from England had not reached him; sickness was raging in his fleet, and he sailed away, leaving the town untouched. 1621.May.He fails in an attack upon the town.For five months, he did little or nothing. It was not till May 21 that he re-appeared at Algiers. Three days afterwards, the wind at nightfall blew towards the shore, and he launched his fire-ships against the pirate shipping. For a moment success seemed to be within reach. In no less than seven places the flames were seen shooting up amongst the rigging; but the English vessels which were to have supported the fire-ships had been ill-supplied with ammunition, and in a few minutes they had got rid of all their powder. The Algerines were not slow to profit by the opportunity. Hurrying back to the mole, they drove off their assailants, and with the timely assistance of a shower of rain, succeeded in extinguishing the flames.
Not a breath of air was stirring, and, before the wind rose, the harbour was rendered inaccessible by a boom thrown across its mouth. The failure was complete, and there was nothing left for Mansell to do but to sail away to Alicant.[336]
On his return to harbour he found orders to send back Recall of part of the fleet.four of his ships to England. To this number he added four others, which had become unserviceable. Twelve only remained in the Mediterranean.[337]
It does not appear on what grounds the four vessels were recalled; but it was not long before a resolution of a more The blockade of the Flemish ports.important character was taken. The outbreak of hostilities between Spain and Holland had been accompanied by a renewal of the dispute about the blockade of the Flemish ports. The Dutch claimed the right of excluding all commerce from the enemy’s harbours. James, <226>on the other hand, declared that they were not justified in stopping anything under a neutral flag but contraband of war. To this assertion the Prince of Orange refused to listen for an instant. “These countries,” he said one day to Carleton, “will sooner cast themselves into the hands of the King of Spain, than permit the trade of any nation to enter the ports of Flanders.”
Even if James’s claim had been far better than it was, it would have been unwise to have insisted upon it in the existing July.The rest of the fleet recalled.state of his relations with the Continent. With James such considerations were of little weight. Before July was over, the remainder of Mansell’s fleet was recalled to maintain the supremacy of the English flag in the Narrow Seas.[338]
In the course which he was now taking, James received Buckingham hostile to the Dutch.every encouragement from Buckingham. Again, as in the previous summer, the Lord Admiral saw in an injury done to an English ship a personal insult to himself.
Caron looked upon this state of things with sorrow, for he knew the value of the English alliance to his country, and though he could not recommend the opening of the Flemish ports, he was aware that the long delay in sending the promised commissioners to treat on the East India business was bringing to Buckingham a support which would otherwise have failed him. “I have seen the time,” he wrote, “when the friends of Spain were held here as open enemies; but the King’s subjects are now so irritated by these East Indian disputes, that they take part against us.” Yet there was no lack of hostility to Spain. James, he went on to say, thought himself as certain of the restoration of the Palatinate as if he held it in his own hand. Gondomar was growing in credit every day, and Buckingham was entirely devoted to him. A few days ago, the favourite had accompanied the Spaniard to his house in a litter. As they passed through the streets, no man took off his hat, and not a few muttered a wish that they might both be hanged.[339]
<227>It was not without reason that Caron spoke of the growth of Gondomar’s credit. It was at his request that the decision September.Destination of Mansell’s fleet.had been taken to recall the fleet.[340] In September, however, he intimated that his master would prefer a different arrangement, and that he wished twelve ships to remain in the Mediterranean, whilst twelve others were employed against the Dutch. What may have been the motives of the King of Spain we do not know; but we do know that James made no objection to changing his plans at the bidding of a foreign ambassador, that he bore down all opposition in the Council, and that, but for the sudden arrival of Mansell in the Downs, in obedience to previous orders, Gondomar’s plan would have been carried out to the letter.[341]
The opposition in the Council had been headed by the Lord Treasurer. Mandeville may have been a bad financier, but Mandeville’s enforced resignation.he was a good Protestant, and he had a deeply rooted aversion to the Spanish alliance. It was now intimated to him that he must resign his office. If he gave way without difficulty, his fall would be softened. The post of Lord President of the Council, long disused, should be revived in his favour, though, as Gondomar remarked, no one knew what its duties were. At the same time, the 20,000l. which he had given to the King for his appointment would be acknowledged as a debt, for which Buckingham was ready to become security. Mandeville was unable to struggle against the pressure put on him, and accepted the terms without difficulty. “My lord,” said Bacon, when next they met, “they have made me an example, and you a president.” The jest was made more tolerable by the spelling of the day, than it could possibly be considered now.[342]
<228>Almost as a matter of course, the Cranfield Lord Treasurer, and Weston Chancellor of the Exchequer.white staff was placed in Cranfield’s hands. A few weeks later the Chancellorship of the Exchequer, vacant by the resignation of Greville, who had recently been raised to the peerage as Lord Brooke,[343] was committed to Sir Richard Weston.[344]
As far as the administration of the finances was concerned, it was a happy change. If anyone living could restore order and economy it was Cranfield. But the manner of his appointment was of evil augury. The nation was thinking far more of its religious sympathies with the German Protestants than of its commercial rivalry with the Dutch, and it was well known that, though Cranfield cared a great deal about the prosperity of trade, he cared very little about the ruin of the Protestant Churches on the Continent.
In the meanwhile Buckingham was hounding on the King to an open declaration of war against the Dutch. Nor was he less inclined Buckingham eager for war with the Dutch.to speak evil of Frederick. Sharp tongues had been busy at the Hague, and it was rumoured that, at the little court of the exiles, Buckingham had been spoken of as a Papist and a traitor. In revenge he placed in Gondomar’s hands the letters which Frederick and Elizabeth had written to the King, and assured the pleased ambassador that not a penny should be sent from England for the defence of the Palatinate.[345]
Such was the direction in which James, carried away as usual by the feeling which happened to be uppermost for the moment, Digby in England.had been tending during Digby’s absence. Yet, when the news reached him of the danger of the Lower Palatinate, he roused himself to unwonted activity. He not only promised to repay the money which had been advanced by Digby to the Heidelberg Council, but he engaged to add another 10,000l.[346] On October 31 Digby himself returned to tell his story. James was moved at least to <229>momentary indignation. The next day the Privy Council was summoned to listen to the narrative, and James wrote to the Emperor and the King of Spain to demand redress. The cry for Nov. 3.Parliament summoned.immediate action was loud.[347] On November 3 a proclamation appeared, summoning Parliament, which had lately been adjourned once more by the King’s orders, to meet on the 20th of the same month.[348]
This time there was to be no hesitation. Steps were taken which should have been taken at least ten months before. Terms offered by James.Money was borrowed, and the promised 10,000l. swelled into 30,000l., which were immediately[349] despatched to Frederick at the Hague. More was to follow as soon as supplies had been voted by the Commons. Frederick was again urged to put himself at the head of his troops in the Palatinate. At the same time James wrote to the Emperor, renewing his original demand for the restitution of the lands and dignities of which his son-in-law had been deprived, and engaging that he would relinquish the crown of Bohemia, and, after making such full submission as might be consistent with his honour, would renounce any confederacy by which the peace of the Empire might be endangered. A copy of this letter was sent to Frederick, in order that he might signify, in writing, his consent to negotiate on the proposed terms. If he did so, he was told, James would put forth his whole strength in his behalf.[350]
For a few days Digby was the most popular man in England. There may have been some Popular enthusiasm.who wondered why all this had not been done long ago, but such thoughts were drowned in the general enthusiasm. At last, <230>men said, the weary time of weakness and vacillation was at an end. “God grant,” wrote the Earl of Bedford, “that the King’s resolutions may be so propounded to the Parliament, as they may with a general applause be seconded, and not disputed, and that no past distastes breed such variance at home as may hinder the speedy execution requisite for the good success of what is to be done by us abroad.”[351]
Even now, however, James unhappily did not know how serious the crisis was. If everything else failed, the King of Spain, Lafuente’s mission to Rome.he fancied, was certain to see him righted. His words had been for the moment the words of Digby, manly, self-reliant, and far-sighted. His thoughts were his own. Still, as ever, he hated trouble and responsibility. He was the more disposed to confidence in Spain because good news, or what he held to be good news, had lately reached him of the progress of that foolish marriage treaty of which he was so deeply enamoured. Early in the year Lafuente had arrived at Rome, and had soon been joined by George Gage, Conway’s Roman Catholic cousin, who had been sent to watch the negotiation on the part of the English Government. There had been a delay at first in consequence of the death of Paul V., and a further delay in consequence of the death of Philip III. These obstacles were now surmounted. A congregation of cardinals was appointed by the new Pope, Gregory XV., to consider the propriety of granting the dispensation asked for. Nor was it long before Gage was able to report that, if only James could make up his mind to make concessions to the English Catholics, no difficulties would be thrown in the way of the marriage by the Pope.[352]
It was in the frame of mind resulting from his knowledge of the progress which had been made in this affair, that James James’s message to Gondomar.prepared to meet his Parliament. At a moment when he ought to have done his utmost to impress Gondomar with a sense of the firmness of his attitude, he sent him a message, bidding him not to care for <231>anything that might be said in Parliament, as he would take good care that nothing was done which would be displeasing to his Catholic Majesty.[353] With the dice thus loaded against him, Digby had a hard game to play.
[285] Digby’s Instructions, May 23, S. P. Germany.
[286] See especially, for Mansfeld’s proceedings, the letters printed by Uetterodt, Ernst Graf zu Mansfeld, 328–353.
[287] Menzel, Neuere Gesch. der Deutschen, vii. 531. Zuñiga’s Consulta on Oñate’s despatches, Aug. (?), Simancas MSS. 2506. The Duke of Bavaria to Ferdinand II. June 18⁄28. Ferdinand II. to the Archduke, June 25⁄July 5, Brussels MSS.
[288] Mansfeld to the Chapters of Bamberg and Würzburg, July 4⁄14, S. P. Germany.
[289] The Duke of Bavaria to Ferdinand II., July 10⁄20, S. P. Germany.
[290] The publication of the Anhaltische Canzlei, as it was called, is mentioned in Digby’s letter of June 19. Compare, on this subject, Wotton to Calvert, July 8, S. P. Venice.
[291] Digby to the Commissioners for German affairs, July 26. Digby’s Propositions, with the Emperor’s reply, Clarendon State Papers, i. App. 2.
[292] The Elector of Saxony to Ferdinand II., June 27⁄July 7. Ferdinand II. to the Archduke Albert, July 14⁄24, Brussels MSS.
[293] Minutes of the Duke of Bavaria’s letter to the Archduke Albert, July 8⁄18, Brussels MSS.
[294] Ferdinand II. to the Duke of Bavaria, July 8⁄18 ibid.
[295] The Emperor’s second answer, July 21⁄31, Londorp, Acta Publica, ii. 486. Digby to the Commissioners for German affairs, July 26, Clarendon State Papers, i. App. 6. Gritti to the Doge, July 28⁄Aug. 7, Venice MSS. Desp. Germania. Extract from a letter from Vienna, July 30, S. P. Germany.
[296] Digby to the Commissioners for German affairs, July 26, Clarendon State Papers, ii. App. 6.
[297] It would be well, writes Philip to the Archduke Albert on June 17⁄27, to come to a settlement at Ratisbon, “para cuyo cumplimiento pareze que la dificultad que ocurre es el haver pasado el Emperador tan adelante con el Duque de Baviera en la promesa de la dignidad electoral Palatina, pues es sin duda que el Duque dificultará contentarse con menos, y el Rey de Inglaterra y los demas adjuntos del Palatino es de creer estribarán en que permanezca en su persona la dignidad, y que no se quietarán sin esto; y si bien es muy devido que se tenga con el Duque de Baviera buenissima correspondencia … si para esto effecto se huviesse de renovar una guerra perpetua en Alemaña, no será possible que lo que el Rey mi Señor y padre, que está en el cielo, hizo por restaurar la religion, y el Imperio, y los Reynos de Bohemia y Hungria, y provincias patrimoniales se pueda continuar por sola una circumstancia de acrescentamiento del dicho Duque; pues, aunque es mucho lo que ha hecho, y justo el reconocerselo, tambien es de considerar que hera caussa de todos, y que si la religion y el estado se perderán en nuestra cassa, no quedará en pie lo uno ni lo otro en la Baviera; y no es razon que el Duque quiera poner lo todo en compromisso por su fin particular.” Compare the King’s letter to Oñate of the same date, Brussels MSS.
[298] The Infanta Isabella to Philip IV., July 16⁄26, Brussels MSS.
[299] Trumbull to Calvert, July 3, S. P. Flanders.
[300] Trumbull to Calvert, July 21, S. P. Flanders.
[301] Cordova to the Landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt, S. P. Germany.
[302] Ferdinand II. to Spinola, July 26⁄Aug. 5, Londorp, ii. 487.
[303] Trumbull to Calvert, Aug. 13, S. P. Flanders. Spinola said that the Emperor’s letter had not arrived. Judging from the similarity of his language with that held by Ferdinand, I doubt this; but, if he spoke the truth, it shows that the same conclusion was independently adopted at Brussels and Vienna.
[304] Carleton to Calvert, July 19. Frederick to the King, July 28. Frederick to Digby, Aug. 13, S. P. Holland.
[305] Nethersole to Calvert, Aug. 13, S. P. Germany. Carleton to Calvert, Aug. 13, S. P. Holland. Nethersole to Calvert, Aug. 22, S. P. Germany.
[306] Elizabeth to Roe, Aug. 21, S. P. Germany. By ‘the King of Hungary’ she means Bethlen Gabor, refusing to acknowledge Ferdinand as duly elected.
[307] Mansfeld to Frederick, Aug. 2. Nethersole to Calvert, Aug. 13, S. P. Germany.
[308] Digby to Calvert, Aug. 12, Clarendon State Papers, i. App. 17.
[309] Frederick to Digby, Aug. 13, S. P. Holland.
[310] Digby to the King, Aug. 12, S. P. Germany. “Cependant,” wrote <214>Mansfeld, a few days later, “nous tascherons de fayre nos recreues, et voir si vous pourrons avoir de Hongrie le secours demandé; que, si cela est, nous sommes bastans pour tirer raison de nos ennemys de la pointe de l’espée, et fayre nos affayres à la ruine de leurs.” Mansfeld to Frederick, S. P. Germany.
[311] Vere to Carleton, Aug. 9, S. P. Holland.
[312] Vere to Carleton, Aug. 7, S. P. Holland. Vere to Calvert, Sept. 14 (?), S. P. Germany.
[313] The King to Frederick, Aug. 28, 30, ibid. There are two letters of the latter date.
[314] Calvert to Buckingham, Aug. 27, Harl. MSS. 1580, fol. 160.
[315] Digby to Calvert, Sept. 5, S. P. Germany.
[316] Ferdinand II. to the Infanta Isabella, Sept. 1⁄11, S. P. Germany. Answer given to Digby, Sept. 3⁄13. Digby to the Commissioners for German Affairs, Sept. 5, Clarendon State Papers, i. App. 4, 10, 14.
[317] Digby to the Prince of Wales, Sept. 5, Clarendon State Papers, i. App. 8. Wrongly dated Aug. 5.
[318] Hurter, Gesch. Ferdinands II. ix. 40. His narrative is based upon documents in the Vienna Archives, which I have not seen.
[319] Mansfeld to Frederick, Oct. 1, S. P. Germany.
[320] Hurter, Gesch. Ferdinands II. ix. 58. Villermont, Mansfeld, i. 304, Uetterodt, Ernst Graf zu Mansfeld, 369.
[321] Digby to the Commissioners for German Affairs, Oct. 2, S. P. Germany.
[322] Nethersole to Calvert, Oct. 9, ibid.
[323] Hurter, Gesch. Ferdinands II. ix. 158.
[324] Consulta by Zuñiga, Aug. (?), Simancas MSS. 2506, fol. 4. Philip IV. to Oñate, Aug. 20⁄30, Brussels MSS.
[325] Philip IV. to Oñate, Sept. 1⁄11, Brussels MSS.
[326] Brieve déduction des Causes, &c., Sept. 29, S. P. Germany.
[327] Frederick to the King, Oct. 3, S. P. Germany. Carleton to Trumbull, Oct. 4; Villiers to Carleton, Oct. 10, S. P. Holland.
[328] The Princes and States of Lower Saxony to Frederick, Oct. 20, S. P. Germany.
[329] Camerarius to Solms, Sept. 8, 18⁄18, 28, Söltl, Religionskrieg, iii. 133, 135.
[330] The Council of Heidelberg to Digby, Sept. 21, Sherborne MSS.
[331] Digby to the Commissioners for German Affairs, Oct. 2, S. P. Germany. An unguarded expression of Lingard has induced many Continental writers to suppose that this money was given to Mansfeld, and Hurter even grounds upon this supposition a thoroughly baseless charge against Digby of connivance in Mansfeld’s treachery.
[332] The agreement in the Vienna Archives is cited by Hurter, Gesch. Ferdinands II. ix. 59.
[333] The Council of Heidelberg to Digby, Oct. 8, Harl. MSS. 1581, fol. 172.
[334] The Duke of Bavaria to the Infanta Isabella, Sept. 10⁄20. The Infanta Isabella to Philip IV., Sept. 14⁄24. Oct. 4⁄14, Brussels MSS.
[335] Digby to Calvert, Oct. 22, S. P. Flanders.
[336] Mansell’s account of his proceedings, Dec. 1620, S. P. Barbary States. Mansell to Buckingham, Jan. 13, 1621, Harl. MSS. 1581, fol. 70. Mansell to the Commissioners for the Expedition, Jan. 16. Mansell to Calvert, Jan. 17, S. P. Barbary States. Mansell to Calvert, March 15. S. P. Spain. Mansell to Buckingham, June 9, Cabala, 297.
[337] Algiers Voyage, S. P. Dom. cxxii. 106.
[338] Chamberlain to Carleton, July 28, S. P. Dom. cxxii. 46. Calvert to Carleton, Aug. 11, S. P. Holland.
[339] Caron to the States-General, July 2⁄12, Add. MSS. 17,677 K. fol. 140.
[340] Philip IV. to Ciriza, May 27⁄June 6. Gondomar to Philip IV., July 11⁄21, Simancas MSS. 2518, fol. 49; 2602, fol. 39.
[341] Gondomar to Philip IV., Sept. 12, 20⁄22, 30, Simancas MSS. 2602, fol. 66, 67. Order in Council, Sept. 15, S. P. Dom. cxxii. 126.
[342] Locke to Carleton, Sept. 29, S. P. Dom. cxxii. 152. Gondomar to Philip IV., Sept. 28⁄Oct. 8, Simancas MSS. 2602, fol. 77; Bacon's Apophthegms; Works, vii. 181.
[343] Jan. 29, Pat. 18 Jac. I., Part 2.
[344] Nov. 13, Pat. 19 Jac. I., Part 1.
[345] Gondomar to Philip IV., Sept. 28⁄Oct. 8, Simancas MSS. 2602, fol. 72.
[346] Digby to the Council of the Palatinate, Oct. 24, S. P. Germany.
[347] Gondomar to the Infanta Isabella, Nov. 1⁄11 Simancas MSS. 2602, fol. 80. Locke to Carleton, Nov. 3, S. P. Dom. cxxiii. 84; Salvetti’s News-Letter, Nov. 8⁄18
[348] Proclamation, Nov. 3, S. P. Dom. clxxxvii. 98*.
[349] The King to Carleton, Nov. 12, S. P. Holland.
[350] Calvert to Carleton, Nov. 5, 10, S. P. Holland. The King to Ferdinand II., Nov. 2⁄12, Cabala, 239. The King to Philip IV., Nov. 2⁄12, Madrid Palace Library. The King to Frederick, Nov. 2⁄12, Add. MSS. 12,485, fol. 99b.
[351] Bedford to Carleton, Nov. 5, S. P. Holland.
[352] Gage to Digby, Sept. 1, S. P. Spain; Francisco de Jesus, 32–35.
[353] Gondomar to the Infanta Isabella, Nov. 21⁄Dec. 1, Simancas MSS. 2558, fol. 14.